Insight

Arbitration Awards: U.S. Fifth Circuit Confirms Judicial Deference

Published on: June 3, 2025

Arbitration is a favored method of dispute resolution in the energy and construction sectors, where complex, high-value contracts often generate multimillion-dollar disputes. Understanding the courts' standard of review of arbitration awards directly impacts risk assessment, contract drafting, and dispute resolution strategies. A recent U.S. Fifth Circuit decision reinforces the limited grounds for judicial intervention, a principle that remains central to the effectiveness of arbitration as an efficient alternative to litigation.

In United States Trinity Services, LLC v. Southeast Directional Drilling, LLC, a drilling subcontractor obtained a $1.7 million arbitration award against the general contractor for standby costs incurred on a pipeline installation project. The subcontractor incurred costs when ordered to stop work for causes outside its control, including delayed permits, mud infiltration, and COVID-19. The subcontract contained a provision that called for reimbursement of standby costs. On appeal, the general contractor sought to vacate the award in the U.S. Northern District of Texas, arguing that the arbitration panel failed to properly interpret various contract provisions related to standby costs and exceeded its authority and acted in manifest disregard of Texas law in interpreting the contract.

The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC §10 (“FAA”) applies and provides the exclusive grounds to vacate an award: corruption, fraud, evident partiality, misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, refusing to hear evidence, or where arbitrators exceeded their powers. The U. S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the FAA was enacted to create a national policy favoring arbitration; the arbitrator’s authority derives from the parties’ contract; and once parties agree to arbitrate, they “bargain for” the arbitrator’s, not the court’s, interpretation of their contract.

The Court instructed that a party challenging an award bears a high burden to show that the arbitrator ignored the contract. It is not sufficient to show the arbitrator erred in interpreting the contract. The question the court asks is “whether the arbitrators construed the contract at all” not “whether they construed it correctly.” A court should not reassess the merits of the arbitrator’s decision. Here, the award recited the pertinent contract terms and the arbitrators’ analysis. This showed the arbitrators considered the contract provisions, thus ending the Court’s inquiry.

The Court rejected the argument that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law in interpreting the contract. “Manifest disregard” – a judicially-created concept – is not a freestanding ground for vacatur. It does not serve as a separate basis to establish that arbitrators exceeded their powers. Otherwise, the FAA’s stated grounds for vacatur would be expanded to essentially a “full-bore” judicial review process.*

However, the Circuits are split on the validity of manifest disregard of the law or contract as a basis to vacate an award. See for example, Dewan v. Walia, where the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated an award after finding the arbitrator’s contract interpretation ‘untenable.”

Mary Anne Wolf, PE, FCIArb, is an arbitrator, mediator, and attorney in construction, energy, commercial and complex cases.

References:

United States Trinity Services, LLC v. Southeast Directional Drilling, LLC, 2025 WL 1218096 (5th Cir. 2025).

Dewan v. Walia, 544 Fed Appx 240 (4th Cir. 2013).

* Hall Street Assoc., LLC v. Mattel, 128 S.Ct. 1396 (2008).

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Louisiana Supreme Court issued a significant ruling in a class action case involving tax credits for solar panels

Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued a significant ruling in a class action case handled by Keogh Cox partners Chris Jones and Nancy Gilbert. The case involved tax credits for solar panels. The Court’s ruling overturned a lower court decision that held an Act of the Legislature unconstitutional. After the plaintiffs’ Application for Rehearing was denied, the Court’s decision is now final.

In Ulrich, et al. v. Kimberly Robinson, Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Revenue, 2018-0534 (La. 3/26/19), 2019 WL 1395316, the class action plaintiffs were persons who purchased and installed residential solar panel systems in their homes. When they claimed the solar electric system tax credits on their 2015 state tax returns pursuant to La. R.S. 47:6030, the tax credits were denied by the Louisiana Department of Revenue, based on Act 131 of the 2015 legislative session. Act 131 capped the maximum amount of solar panel tax credits to be granted by the Department of Revenue, and the plaintiffs’ claims were made after the cap was exhausted.

When their claims for the tax credits were denied, plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to declare Act 131 unconstitutional. During the pendency of the suit in the district court, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act 413 which provided additional funding for solar tax credits. Under Act 131, all taxpayers whose solar panel tax credit claims were previously denied would receive the entirety of their tax credits over installments. The district court declared Act 131 unconstitutional and concluded that Act 413 did not moot the controversy.

Because the district court declared Act 131 unconstitutional, the Department directly appealed the decision to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Oral arguments occurred in October of 2018. In the Court’s recent opinion, it concluded that Act 413 mooted the controversy. According to the Court, the plaintiffs no longer maintained a “justiciable controversy” because Act 413 provided for the payment of the entirety of the previously denied tax credits. Accordingly, the Court overruled the district court’s judgment that declared Act 131 unconstitutional. Plaintiffs filed an Application for Rehearing and that request was recently denied, making this decision final.

Chris Jones is a partner with Keogh Cox in Baton Rouge, LA. He focuses his practice on class actions and mass torts, and handles these matters in courts throughout the country. He is a life-long resident of Baton Rouge, where he lives with his wife and four children.

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To Arbitrate or Not to Arbitrate: LA Supreme Court Rejects Federal Court Position

Hurricanes Laura and Delta caused substantial damage in Louisiana, resulting in extensive litigation that continues to develop. In a July 8, 2024 blog post, we reported that the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bufkin Enterprises, LLC v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., affirmed that equitable estoppel applied to allow domestic insurers to compel arbitration under the New York Convention even where the insured dismissed the foreign insurers with prejudice. Click here to read more.

New case law from the LA Supreme Court warrants supplementation of our prior blog post. The Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish (“Calcasieu”) filed suit in federal court to recover alleged underpaid and untimely insurance claim payments. Various domestic insurers moved to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration clauses found in two foreign insurers’ policies. The foreign policies required all claims be submitted to arbitration in New York under New York law. The insurers relied upon Bufkin Enterprises, LLC v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., and Calcasieu moved to certify questions to the LA Supreme Court.

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of LA certified questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court to address this issue. In Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court held:

  1. Arbitration is prohibited by statute. The case involved the interpretation of La. R.S. 22:868, as amended in 2020. Generally, La. R.S. 22:868(A) prohibits the use of arbitration clauses in insurance policies. The Court held this prohibition is rooted in public policy because compulsory arbitration clauses deprive courts of jurisdiction over actions against insurers. The Court noted it historically has held arbitration clauses within insurance policies are unenforceable, and it did not deviate from its historical position.
  1. As a matter of first impression, an insurance policy with a political subdivision is a “public contract” within meaning of the statute banning any provision in public contracts which requires a suit or arbitration proceeding to be brought in a forum or jurisdiction outside of the state. It was undisputed that Calcasieu is a political subdivision of this state. Also, it was undisputed the Defendants contracted with Calcasieu to provide insurance coverage for approximately 300 properties that Calcasieu owned for the benefit of the public. No private actors involved. Thus, the Court found, “The Defendants’ insurance policies clearly covered public properties owned by Calcasieu, purchased with public funds––taxpayer dollars. As such, we easily find insurance contracts with political subdivisions, like the policies at issue, are public contracts within the meaning of La. R.S. 9:2778.” Thus, the statute precludes arbitration or venue outside of LA, or the application of foreign law, in claims involving the State and its political subdivisions.
  1. A domestic insurer may not use equitable estoppel to enforce arbitration via a foreign insurer's policy. Citing its disagreement with the Federal Court’s ruling in Bufkin Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Indian Harbor Ins., the Court held “[E]quitable estoppel is not available under these circumstances because it conflicts with the positive law of La. R.S. 22:868, which prohibits the use of arbitration clauses in Louisiana-issued insurance policies. As such, domestic insurers may not employ this common law doctrine to compel arbitration through the clause of another insurer's policies, as it clearly contravenes La. R.S. 22:868(A)(2). A contrary finding would (1) violate Louisiana's positive law prohibiting arbitration in Louisiana-issued insurance policies; and (2) invite domestic insurers’ misuse a doctrine of ‘last resort’ to ceaselessly rely on insurance policies of foreign insurers to compel arbitration.”

References:

Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co., 2024 WL 4579035 (La.), 9, 2024-00449 (La. 10/25/24).

Bufkin Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co. 96 F.4th 726 (5th Cir. 2024).

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Going Once, Going Twice ... A New Alternative to Design-Bid-Build Contracts

The 2014 Legislative Session brought new possibilities for large construction projects under the Public Contract Law. Generally, a public entity is required to separately hire a design professional to design the project, and let the project out for public bid for the construction work. "Design-build" contracts, in which the public owner contracts with one entity for the design and construction of the facility, are prohibited under Public Contract Law. However, the Legislature has now given public entities another option under the Public Bid Law: Construction Management at Risk Delivery Method (CMAR).

As a precursor to the new law, the Legislature granted special approval for use of the construction management at risk delivery method for several projects, to include the new airport terminal for the New Orleans Aviation Board at the Armstrong International Airport. This CMAR delivery method required two separate contracts for design and construction, but allowed selection of the construction contractor based on factors other than lowest construction cost. In other words, the design professional was selected in accordance with Public Contract Law, and the owner secured a lead construction firm during the design phase through an evaluation of the contender construction firms' qualifications, experience and history.

Under a construction management at risk delivery method, the selected lead contracting firm commits to deliver the final project for a maximum price. The owner has the option to award the construction contract to the firm after the design phase. Because the design professionals and the contractor are on the same team during the design phase, many industry leaders believe the construction management at risk method will help public entities control costs by allowing the contractor and designer to work together on scheduling, budgeting and constructability during the design phase. The goal also is to minimize the risk of construction and design disputes through the collaborative effort.

In 2014, via Act 782, the Legislature enacted La. R.S. 2225.2.4 which allows a public entity to use the CMAR method for projects estimated to cost 25 million dollars or more. The statute defines a CMAR contractor as one who is properly licensed, bonded and insured and can provide construction experience to the owner or its design professional and/or contracts with the owner to construct the project for a guaranteed maximum price, thus eliminating the need for a separate bid phase.

Under the statute, the public entity must advertise a request for qualifications to award a contract to a CMAR contractor for preconstruction and construction services in the official journal and website of the public entity. After the responses to the RFQ are received, a selection review committee makes a recommendation to the owner. This committee consists of one design professional not involved in the contract, one licensed contractor not involved in the contract, a representative of the owner and two members from the general public.

Once the CMAR contractor is awarded the contract, the contractor and the design professional are required to furnish the owner with a probable cost of the project at the 60% and 90% design completion phases. The CMAR contractor must provide the public entity a guaranteed maximum price for construction of the project. If the owner agrees with the guaranteed maximum price and the construction phasing and sequencing, the owner can award the construction contract to the CMAR contractor. If the public entity and the CMAR contractor cannot agree, the construction phase of the project will be re-advertised and let out for public bid.

Mary Anne Wolf, PE, FCIArb

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