The right ingredients for complex litigation in Louisiana.

Many in the construction industry favor arbitration and often include an arbitration clause in their contracts. Although best practice dictates that both parties sign the contract to eliminate doubt as to legal enforceability, in practice, one or both parties sometimes fail to sign. Instead, the parties show their mutual “meeting of the minds” that an agreement has been reached by performing and accepting the work. However, if a dispute arises, will an arbitration provision in an unsigned contract be enforced?

In Patriot Construction & Industrial, LLC v. Buquet& LeBlanc, Inc., when a dispute arose over the subcontractor’s work, the general contractor sought to invoke the arbitration clause in its standard subcontract. The subcontractor argued that the unsigned, red-lined subcontract its estimator had returned to the general contractor was not enforceable, and thus neither was the arbitration clause. The court found agreement on price and scope but found that no agreement was reached on the other terms because the estimator did not have authority to bind the subcontractor. Further, a provision in the contract required that changes be initialed by both parties, yet the subcontractor’s authorized agent had not initialed any of the changes.

The Court held that the arbitration clause was not binding. The Court emphasized that Louisiana law favors arbitration; however, it held “arbitration is a matter of contract, and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute to which he has not so agreed.” The question of who is bound by an arbitration agreement is determined from the intent of the parties as expressed in the terms of the contract. If the contract is deemed void because it was not properly confected, any arbitration clause contained therein may likewise be void. This may be true even where neither party objected to the arbitration clause per se.

Although the Patriot Court stated that generally, to be subject to arbitration, a party must be a signatory to the contract containing the arbitration clause, a signature is not a statutory requirement to enforce an arbitration clause. Louisiana’s arbitration statute, La. R.S.9:4201, requires only that the arbitration agreement be in writing. It does not require a signed contract. The jurisprudence is clear that the law does not require a signed agreement to arbitrate.  See Hurley v. Fox, holding that the defendant-architect’s motion to confirm the arbitration award could not be denied merely on the ground that the plaintiff-homeowner never signed the contract. See also Rainey v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., in which the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a party who drafts a contract and presents it to another for signature cannot claim the contract is unenforceable because that party never signed the contract. Even where the parties contemplate that both parties will sign the contract to signify acceptance, a contract may nevertheless be valid without both signatures where the non-signing party has availed itself of the agreement or taken action evidencing its acceptance of it.*

However, the result hinges on the parties’ intent – as determined by the written agreement. For example, where the written contract expressly conditions validity on both signatures, a missing signature is likely fatal to the enforcement of any arbitration clause contained in the contract.  See Huckaba v. Ref-Chem, LP, in which the U.S. Fifth Circuit invalidated an arbitration provision in an employment contract where the employee signed it but the employer – who sought to enforce the arbitration clause – did not.

Also noteworthy, an arbitration clause in a contract signed by both parties may nonetheless be invalid where the court finds that fraud, duress, or other vice was involved in the formation of the contract such that one party did not truly consent to the contract terms. In the recent case Mapp, LLC v. Floor and Decor Outlets of America, Inc., the U.S. Fifth Circuit held that a contract was unenforceable because it was found to be adhesionary – it gave the owner, which had superior bargaining power, sole discretion to invoke arbitration.

In Carver Theater, LLC v. Melancon, another noteworthy case, an arbitration clause in a written contract signed by both parties was enforced by the Court and resulted in an arbitration award. However, it was later determined invalid – and the award was also invalidated –where the party that initially sought to enforce arbitration later changed its position and argued that the contract was invalid.  The Court invalidated the arbitration award under the Louisiana arbitration statute, finding that the award was procured using “undue means.” In seeking to compel arbitration, the party argued that the contract was valid and required arbitration. Once in arbitration, that same party argued that the contract was invalid. This misrepresentation to the Court satisfied the statute’s narrow grounds for invalidating an arbitration award.**

As a final consideration, non-signatories such as subcontractors or sureties may be compelled to arbitrate where their subcontract or bond incorporates by reference the contract containing the arbitration clause and where the language in that arbitration clause is sufficiently broad, for example – any controversy or claim arising out of or related to the contract. See The Jewish Federation of Greater New Orleans, et al. v. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland, holding that the surety was bound by the arbitration clause in the construction contract because its bond incorporated it by reference, even on its counterclaim for declaratory relief based on a defense that the performance bond had lapsed.

* See Harp v. Succession of Bryan, 2019-0062 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/3/20), 313 So.3d 284; La. Civil Code art. 1927.

** La. R.S.9:4210(A).

References:

PatriotConstruction & Industrial, LLC v. Buquet & LeBlanc, Inc., 2023-557 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/24/24), 387So.3d 784.

Hurley v. Fox, 520 So.2d 467 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1988).

Rainey v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 2009-572 (La.3/16/10), 35 So.3d 215.

Huckaba v. Ref-Chem, LP, 892 F.3d 686 (5th Cir.2018).

Mapp, LLC v. Floor and Decor Outlets of America, Inc., 2026WL 2265969, 25-30536 (5th Cir. 2026).

Carver Theater, LLC v. Melancon, 2024-0468 (La. App.4 Cir. 5/5/25), 417 So.3d 676. The court determined that the FederalArbitration Act and its severability doctrine did not apply in this case. Theresults may have been different under the FAA.

The Jewish Federation of Greater New Orleans, etal.  v. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland, 273 F.3d 1094,2001 WL 1085096 (5th Cir. 2001) (unpublished).

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In Ralser v. Harrah’s New Orleans, the claimant tripped over the extended arm of a forklift while walking toward the employee entrance for the defendant’s casino. A third-party construction contractor had parked the forklift adjacent to the employee entrance while doing work on the premises. Surveillance footage showed that no warning signs, barricades, or other safety devices had been placed around the forklift. Evidence also showed that another employee tripped over the same forklift on the same day.

Generally, an employee's injuries sustained while traveling to or from a place of employment are not compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Law. This is known as the “going-and-coming rule.” However, at trial, the workers’ compensation judge applied the Threshold Doctrine, an exception to this general rule, and found the accident occurred in the course and scope of the claimant’s employment. Under Louisiana law, the Threshold Doctrine applies when:

1. A distinctive or unusual travel risk exists; and
2. The risk is immediately  adjacent to the employer’s premises.

On appeal, the employer argued that the trial judge was manifestly erroneous in applying the Threshold Doctrine. However, in affirming the trial court’s determination, the appellate court emphasized several factual findings that supported application of the doctrine:

• The forklift created a  distinctive travel hazard.
• The hazard was  immediately adjacent to the employee entrance.
• Employees regularly traversed the route where the forklift was located.
• The risk arose from construction activities associated with Harrah’s premises.
• No warnings, barricades,  or protective measures were in place to protect employees from the hazard.

Under the facts of this case, the court found the Threshold Doctrine applied. Even though the employer did not own the forklift, evidence showed the forklift was within the defendant-employer’s control and presented a distinct travel risk immediately adjacent to the casino.  

While it may be limited to its facts, this decision is significant because it appears to extend application of the Threshold Doctrine and suggest employers may be held responsible for dangers created by conditions near workplace access points, even when those conditions arise from the activities of third parties. Because Ralser presented very unique circumstances, it remains to be seen whether the decision will impact the well-established Threshold Doctrine beyond its facts.

References:

 Ralser v. Harrah’s New Orleans, ___ So. 3d ___, 2026WL 1090787 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/22/26).

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