Insight

Keeping Testimony of Future Medical Expenses “Out of the Gate”

Published on: June 17, 2019

Ina recent case involving Keogh Cox attorneys, the Eastern District of Louisiana in MichaelBrander, Jr. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 18-982(Feb. 14, 2019), 2019 WL 636423 barred testimony of substantial projectedmedical expenses because it was not based on a reliable methodology. Thisruling stands to impact many other cases where plaintiffs seek to usefar-reaching projections of a life-long need for radiofrequency ablations("RFAs") or other pain-management modalities to "board" sixand even seven-figure numbers for future medical expenses.

InDaubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), theUnited States Supreme Court recognized the trial judge as the “gatekeeper” of expertopinion testimony and held that only reliable and relevant expert opinions maybe admitted. The reliability requirement serves to keep expert opinions“outside the gate” when they constitute unsupported speculation or meresubjective belief; only scientifically valid expert opinions are allowedinside. To ascertain whether an expert opinion is scientifically valid, Daubertinstructs the trial court to consider:

∙ whether theexpert’s theory can or has been tested;

∙ whether it hasbeen subject to peer review and publication;

∙ the known orpotential rate of error when applying the theory;

∙ applicablestandards and controls; and,

∙ the degree towhich the theory has been generally accepted in the scientific community.

InBrander, the plaintiff advanced medical testimony that he would needRFAs every year of his expected lifetime, a period of 36 years. The courtdisallowed the testimony, noting that the plaintiff’s physicians had less thanten years personal experience in administering RFAs to patients, the medicalliterature only considered the effectiveness of RFAs over a span of seven toten years, and there was no showing that the 36-year treatment plan was ingeneral acceptance by the medical community. According to the court, theexpert opinions offered by plaintiff failed Daubert “on all points.” Asa result, the plaintiff was permitted to introduce testimony of future RFAs foronly a seven-year period.

The reasoning of Brander may be equally applicable to projections of lifetime treatment involving other medical procedures, such as medial branch blocks, Botox injections, or spinal cord stimulators, for which the long-term efficacy has not been firmly established in the medical literature. Opinions unsupported by personal treatment experience and peer-reviewed medical studies are not scientifically valid and are properly halted “at the gate.”

Nancy B. Gilbert is a partner with Keogh Cox in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. She is a puzzle-solver by nature, and specializes in providing clear and in-depth analysis of complex litigation issues.

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Insight

One More Reason: Louisiana’s “Drunk Driving” Immunity

A conviction for DWI brings the consequences you might expect, such as the loss of driving privileges, expensive attorneys’ fees, and public embarrassment. However, there is one additional, less-obvious consequence of which many are unaware; Louisiana provides immunity from claims brought by a drunk driver who was at least 25% at fault in the accident which caused his injuries, no matter how severe the injuries.

Generally stated, if you are driving drunk and are in an accident that is mostly someone else’s fault, you will not be able to recover for the injuries you sustain. Similarly, if your fault injures a drunk driver, the statute may shield you from liability. The “drunk driving” immunity is found in La. R.S. 9:2798.4. The statute provides immunity against the claims of a driver with a blood alcohol level of .08 or higher.

The immunity may even apply to defendants who were not directly involved in the accident. In Stewart v. Daiquiri Affair, Inc., 20 So.3d 1041 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2009), writ denied, 19 So.3d 477 (La. 2009), the immunity was found to apply to claims brought by an 18-year-old employee who consumed alcohol on the premises and was subsequently injured in a motor vehicle accident. Rejecting the argument that immunity should not apply when the employer arguably contributed to the under-age plaintiff’s consumption of alcohol, the appellate court in Stewart concluded that the statute’s language required immunity because the employee was more than 25% at fault and her blood alcohol content was over the legal limit.

Because the “drunk driving” immunity statute is supported by the legislature’s strong and long-standing interest in protecting citizens against drunk driving, it has been upheld and applied in many instances. Although you should not need another reason to not drive drunk, you now have one.

Insight

The New Home Warranty Act: Protections and Pitfalls

Louisiana’s New Home Warranty Act (“NHWA”) provides remedies to homeowners forcertain construction defects once the new home construction is complete. La. R.S. 9:3141 et seq. These protections can prove crucial to a homeowner’s ability to remedy defects that appear in their home, but the statutes providing these remedies establish strict guidelines that must be followed for the protections to apply. This generally post sets forth some of the key protections and obstacles/defenses that often arise. However, each specific claim should be considered under its own facts.

PROTECTIONS

The NHWA provides specific protections to homeowners. Each protection expires if not advanced within a set time-period.

Noncompliance/Defects- The NHWA protects against “any defect due to noncompliance with the building standards or other defects in materials or workmanship not regulated by building standards.” La. R.S. 9:3144(A)(1). This category includes defective construction or materials used in the construction. Even seemingly minor issues such as cracked plaster, yellowing paint, and “rubbing off” of new paint can give rise to a valid claim for recovery under this portion of the NHWA. See Bynog v. MRL, LLC, 05-122 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/1/05), 903 So.2d 1197. Deviations from the “plans and specifications” for a home may also be recoverable. See Thorn v. Caskey, 32-310 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/22/99), 745 So.2d 653.

Because this first protection is so broad, it also provides the shortest time-period to assert a claim: one year from the “warranty commencement date,” which is either the date legal title to the home is conveyed to its initial purchaser or the date the home is first occupied, whichever occurs first. La. R.S. 9:3142(7).

Plumbing/Electrical/HVAC- The NHWA also protects the homeowner from defects in the plumbing, electrical, heating, cooling, and ventilating systems. These protections exclude equipment or appliances. A homeowner must bring a claim under this second category within two years of the warranty commencement date. La. R.S. 9:3144(A)(2).

Major Structural Problems- the NHWA allows recovery for major structural defects up to five years following the warranty commencement date. La. R.S. 9:3144(A)(3). For instance, recovery was allowed for a failing foundation under this provision in Campo v. Sternberger, 15-53 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/19/15),179 So.3d 908.

PITFALLS

The most obvious – and probably most prevalent – pitfall is the timeliness of the claim. Courts do not hesitate to dismiss a claim if it is not timely filed.

The NHWA also requires that the homeowner give the builder written notice (via certified mail) of the defect before the homeowner attempts a repair, or before filing suit under the NHWA. La. R.S. 9:3145(A). This notice must be sent to the builder within one year after the homeowner has knowledge of the defect. Therefore, the one-year “clock” may begin to run when the homeowner gains knowledge of the problem even if the NHWA provides a longer time-period to advance the claim.

A failure by the homeowner to give timely notice can also diminish the claim even if it is brought within the deadlines. Under La. R.S. 9:3144(B)(4)(c), any damages caused by the homeowner’s failure to give the builder notice of the defect are not recoverable. In that circumstance, builders often contend that the severity of the problem could have been lessened had they been made aware.

RECOVERABLE DAMAGES

With some exceptions, damages under the NHWA are limited to the actual damages incurred by the homeowner, including attorney fees and court costs arising out of the builder’s violation. La. R.S. 9:3149. The actual damages cannot exceed the reasonable cost of repair or replacement necessary to cure the defect. If there are multiple defects across the home, damages are limited to the original purchase price of the home.

Consequential damages such as pain and suffering, mental anguish, or loss of use are generally not recoverable. See La. R.S. 9:3144(B); Iteld v. Four Corners Const., L.P., 12-1504 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/5/13), 157 So.3d 702. However, there may be exceptions to this general rule under certain factual circumstances beyond the scope of this post.

CONCLUSION

The NHWA provides important remedies to homeowners. But, the New Home Warranty Act is complex and balances the competing interests of the homeowners and the builders. For this reason, a failure to follow the notice and timeliness requirements will often defeat the claim.

John Grinton, is a partner at Keogh Cox whose practice areas include commercial and construction litigation. When he is not practicing law, John spends most of his time with his wife and son, and their two dogs.

Insight

When It Comes to Real Estate, Get It In Writing

As the old adage goes, it’s always safest to get an agreement in writing. In Louisiana, when an agreement is about the sale of real estate, the adage is law. A contract for sale must be in writing as provided in Louisiana Civil Code articles 1839 and 2440.

This long-standing rule was at issue in the recent case of Holmes v. Paul, 19-130 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/2/19), 279 So. 3d 1068. In Holmes, the plaintiff/seller and defendants/purchasers entered into a purchase agreement for a Metairie home which required a closing by no later than April 29, 2016. The contract was a standard form Louisiana purchase agreement which required that any change in the closing deadline be written and signed by both parties. The parties later entered a written extension of the closing deadline to May 6, 2016.

Three days before the closing, the home appraised for $14,000 below the purchase price, leading the seller’s agent to encourage the purchasers’ agent to pursue an appraisal review. However, the parties did not sign a written extension of the May 6, 2016 closing deadline. Thereafter, the seller agreed to decrease the purchase price to the appraised value, but on the same day the purchasers sent a signed cancellation. The seller sued the purchasers for breach of contract, arguing that the parties verbally agreed to extend the closing deadline and intended to execute a written extension as soon as they determined a feasible closing date.

The purchasers moved for summary judgment on the ground that the purchase agreement had expired and was unenforceable. The Court agreed. The purchase agreement expressly required that extensions be made in writing signed by both parties. Upon the expiration of the May 6, 2016 closing deadline, the contract was unenforceable.

The seller also asserted a detrimental reliance claim, arguing she was lulled into not insisting on a written extension because the purchasers’ agent agreed to it orally. However, the seller conceded her awareness that an extension had to be in writing. As such, her reliance was not reasonable. The court further noted the absence of evidence that the purchasers themselves agreed to orally extend the contract or to waive the writing requirement.

Unfortunately, business deals in the modern world cannot be finalized by a handshake. Remember that when you buy and sell property in Louisiana -- get it in writing.

Marty Golden has been practicing law based in Baton Rouge, Louisiana for over thirty years, concentrating in civil litigation primarily involving injuries, property damage, insurance coverage, and contract disputes. Much of his practice is defending and advising real estate agents in suits by property buyers and sellers, but Marty also defends other professionals, insurance companies, manufacturers, and business owners. Marty has a special interest in all things procedural, because they are the rules of the road for litigators and knowing them better than his opponent gives him a leg up in court.

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