Insight

Louisiana First Circuit Finds for State Trooper in Fatal Shooting

Published on: August 1, 2023

On July 27, 2023, the Louisiana First Circuit entered judgment in favor of Louisiana State Trooper Andre Bezou in the shooting death of Coltin LeBlanc. The case was defended by Keogh Cox attorneys Drew Blanchfield, Brian Butler, and Collin LeBlanc. In support of its ruling, the First Circuit cited La. R.S. 9:2798.1 which provides qualified immunity for an officer’s actions, unless their action constituted “criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct.” The court found Trooper Bezou was entitled to qualified immunity under the facts of this case.

After midnight in an area of Hammond, La. dotted with bars and restaurants, Trooper Bezou spotted LeBlanc driving a large Ford truck. Trooper Bezou testified that he witnessed two traffic violations and initiated a stop. “Bodycam” footage captured the interaction. LeBlanc exited the vehicle, and when the trooper asked for identification, LeBlanc indicated it was in his truck. LeBlanc moved to the cab of the truck, and Trooper Bezou followed, stopping within the open driver’s side door. Based upon his observations during this interaction, Trooper Bezou suspected LeBlanc was intoxicated. Later testing confirmed that LeBlanc had a blood alcohol level more than two times the legal limit.

But LeBlanc was not attempting to retrieve his license. Instead, he revved the engine and attempted to flee with Trooper Bezou immediately next to the vehicle. Trooper Bezou later testified he feared that LeBlanc would steer the vehicle to run him over with the back left wheel. In reaction, Trooper Bezou latched onto the truck and LeBlanc sped around a corner and down the roadway. Trooper Bezou was able to draw his weapon and gave multiple orders to stop. Trooper Bezou testified that he feared he would be thrown from the vehicle or scraped against parked cars in the area. When the trooper received no indication LeBlanc would relent, he opened fire. Thereafter, the truck came to a rest.

In the subsequent litigation, plaintiffs argued that Trooper Bezou used “excessive force” and should have attempted to move away and allow LeBlanc to flee the scene. In response, Keogh Cox cited Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159 (5th Cir. 2021), where the federal Fifth Circuit held that no “clearly established precedent” would prohibit an officer from firing while perched on the running board of a fleeing vehicle. Finding no excessive force under the facts of the case, Harmon acknowledged the simple truth that “there is an obvious threat of harm to an officer” who is “on the side of a fleeing vehicle.” The facts presented to the First Circuit showed that Trooper Bezou gave more warning to relent than was given in Harmon.

The New York Times covered this incident in an article titled, “Before the Final Frame: When Police Missteps Create Danger.” 11/17/21. In its coverage, the New York Times reported that Trooper Bezou “appeared to be in grave danger.” It then suggested that the trooper could have just backed away. However, courts are instructed not a gauge questions of immunity from an out-of-context application of “20/20 hindsight.” Because the facts in this case showed Trooper Bezou was in grave danger “at the moment” force was used and was faced with a split-second decision, he was protected from liability.

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Keogh Cox & Wilson, Ltd. provides this blog as a public service for general information only. The materials contained herein may not reflect the most current legal developments or even express the opinion of all or even most of Keogh Cox attorneys. Such material does not constitute legal advice or form any attorney-client relationship. Keogh Cox and all contributing author(s) expressly disclaim all liability to any person with respect to the contents of this Web site and Blog and expect that no reliance will be made upon the information provided.

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Insight

Louisiana Appellate Court Examines How Accidents are Defined under Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law

Generally, Louisiana Workers’ Compensation laws provide coverage for an employee who sustains personal injuries by an accident arising out of and in the course of his or her employment. La. R.S. 23:1021(1) defines “accident” as:

"An unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration."

In Rayborn, Sr. v. Continental Cement Company, LLC et al, the plaintiff-employee filed suit when the worker’s compensation carrier terminated benefits based on its assertion that the plaintiff’s left knee injury was not the result of an “accident” as defined in the statute. The evidence presented at trial established the following:

  • After returning home from work one day, the plaintiff began to feel soreness behind his left knee and believed he “may have pulled a muscle.”
  • The plaintiff sought medical attention at a local clinic 2 days later.
  • The plaintiff told clinic staff that his “leg was hurting,” and that he “was at work climbing up and jumping down off of barges all week.”
  • After returning from a pre-planned family trip one week later, the plaintiff told to his managers at work that he hurt his knee “some kind of way” and that he was “doing too much climbing up and jumping down from barges “and his knee “just started hurting.”
  • The chart from follow-up clinic visits stated, “Patient had [an] injury while at work when he jumped from a height and later that day felt a discomfort in the left lateral knee.”
  • Additional records noted the plaintiff “injured his knee on the job; however it was not readily apparent until [his] knee became stiff later that evening.”
  • The plaintiff later consulted with an orthopedic surgeon whose initial chart entry stated, “Over the course of the week, his knee began bothering him in the patellofemoral area and it started to become tight and swollen.”

At the conclusion of trial, the workers’ compensation court ruled that the plaintiff successfully proved that he sustained a work-related injury of his left knee on a particular date by climbing and jumping while performing his work duties. On appeal, the workers’ compensation carrier argued that plaintiff’s assertion that he was injured “some kind of way” over the course of a week was not sufficient to meet the requirement of a specific, identifiable accident in the course and scope of employment under La. R.S. 23:1021(1).

In affirming the decision of the OWC judge, the appellate court highlighted numerous opinions from the Louisiana Supreme Court and other courts of appeal wherein the statutory definition of “accident” was liberally construed to reject an interpretation that excluded “those workers who are worn down, rather than immediately crippled by, their work.” The opinion notes that it is well-settled in the case law that an “accident” exists when “heavy lifting or other strenuous efforts, although usual and customary, cause or contribute to a physical breakdown or accelerate its occurrence because of a pre-existing condition.”

The opinion added, “It is presumed the legislature is aware of how Louisiana courts have interpreted the statute; yet, it has taken no steps to overrule more than thirty years of Louisiana jurisprudence.” In so holding, it is unclear whether the court considered La. R.S. 23:1020.1(D), in which the Legislature specifically rejected the jurisprudential doctrine requiring a liberal interpretation of Workers Compensation statutes in favor of an employee. Despite this statement from the Legislature on the construction of Workers Compensation statutes, the Rayborn opinion suggests that courts may continue to base their decisions on the liberal interpretation of “accident” that has been developed and adopted by Louisiana courts when analyzing what types of injuries are covered under Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law.

References:

Rayborn v. Cont'l Cement Co., LLC, 2023-0403 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/10/24), 2024 WL 132802.

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Louisiana Appeal Court Finds Nonparty “Nonresident” Industrial Site Owner Is Subject to Louisiana’s Subpoena Power

Can a nonresident corporation, who is not a party to a pending action, be compelled to respond to discovery in Louisiana? The Louisiana Fifth Circuit says YES. See Molaison v Cust-O-Fab Specialty Services, LLC, a case where Keogh Cox successfully handled the appeal.

The Molaison case involved an industrial accident claim where catastrophic injuries were alleged. In this context, the appellate court found that a non-resident company has sufficient presence in Louisiana to subject it to the court’s subpoena power. However, the trial court must first assess the scope of discovery to ensure it is calculated to lead to discoverable evidence and is not too onerous.

In Molaison, the owner of an industrial plant who employed the plaintiff claimed that its nonresident status prevented the parties from requiring it to respond to discovery by deposition or otherwise. The plant owner cited a Louisiana Supreme Court case that held personal jurisdiction, without more, did not subject a nonparty, out-of-state defendant to submit to discovery in this state.

But, in this case, the nonparty maintained a facility in Louisiana and employed the plaintiff. As a consequence, the Molaison court found that the Louisiana “discovery rules control” and “the trial court did not err in finding that (the company) was subject to the subpoena power of a Louisiana court.”

The contractor established it issued the subpoena to obtain evidence from the chemical plant owner that was relevant to the allocation of fault under Louisiana’s pure comparative fault tort system. Therefore, the appeal court reasoned that the nonresident plant owner was subject to the subpoena, “even if (the company) is not obligated to pay in tort by operation of workers compensation immunity.”

Of note, the court also held that the review of a discovery order that finds a nonresident company subject to the subpoena power is a final appealable judgment, as opposed to an interlocutory order subject the discretionary review on supervisory writ.

Case Reference: Molaison v Cust-O-Fab Specialty Services, LLC, 21-585 (La. App 5 Cir. 6/1/22); 343 So. 3d 866.

Insight

Governor Issues 2025 Insurance Reforms

During week seven of the 2025 Regular Session, Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry signed the following bills into law:

HB450 legislatively overrules Housley v. Cerise, 579 So. 2d 973 (La. 1991) (which provided a presumption of medical causation where plaintiff had no pre-existing history) and became effective upon signature by the governor. The Act has prospective application only and shall not apply to causes of action arising prior to the effective date.

HB434 modifies “No Pay/No Play” and bars uninsured motorists from recovering for the first $100,000.00 of bodily injury and the first $100,000.00 of property damage based on any cause or right of action arising out of an automobile accident. The Act allows for an uninsured motorist, who institutes an action to recover damages, regardless of fault, and is awarded an amount equal to or less than $100,000.00, to be held liable for all court costs incurred by all parties to the action. The Act’s effective date is August 1, 2025.

HB436 bars unauthorized aliens from recovering general damages and past and future wages for damages arising from an automobile accident. The Act does not apply to a claim made against an uninsured or underinsured motorist policy which names the unauthorized alien as an insured. The Act’s effective date is August 1, 2025.

HB431 provides for modified comparative fault and bars claimants, who are found greater than or equal to 51% at fault, from recovering for damages. If fault attributable to the claimant is less than 51%, the amount recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the fault attributable to the claimant. The bill does not say whether this applies only to auto claims. We expect this will be clarified. The Act’s effective date is January 1, 2026.

HB549 requires a premium discount for policyholders of commercial motor vehicles with installed dashboard cameras and telematic systems and who meet the other requirements enumerated in the Act. The Act’s effective date is January 1, 2026.

HB148 requires insurance companies to display prior premium amounts in close proximity to the renewal premium. The Act also provides for rate filing standards and methods and changes the process by which the insurance commissioner can disapprove a rate if he determines it is excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory. The Act’s effective date is August 1, 2025.

Collin J. LeBlanc

Partner
Law Enforcement
Louisiana
Court of Appeals
Summary Judgment