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Summary Judgment Dismissing Unwitnessed Workers’ Comp Accident Affirmed: No Corroborating Evidence

Published on: October 19, 2020

The recent decision in Gibson v. Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC, 20-0033 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/27/20), 2020 WL 507804 re-affirms that a workers’ compensation claim based on an unwitnessed accident is subject to pretrial dismissal where there is no corroborating evidence.

In Gibson, the plaintiff, a department manager for Walmart, claimed injury while picking up boxes. Although no one witnessed the incident, the plaintiff claimed that two managers working nearby were made aware of the accident and injuries almost immediately.

Walmart denied the claim in response to numerous “red flags.” For example, the two managers identified by the claimant denied any knowledge. Also, the first reference in a medical record to the alleged June accident came in mid-October.

Walmart filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that plaintiff did not satisfy her evidentiary burden. In response, Gibson countered that the conflict between her testimony, the co-workers’ testimony, and the medical records created genuine issues of material fact to be decided at trial. The OWC trial court granted summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed.

In affirming the dismissal, the Fourth Circuit Court determined that Gibson’s testimony, standing alone, did not create a genuine issue of material fact. The general rule regarding unwitnessed accidents in worker’s compensation cases is well defined. Under this rule, an employee may prove by his or her testimony alone that an unwitnessed accident occurred only if the employee can establish that: (1) no other evidence discredits or casts serious doubt upon the worker's version of the incident; and (2) the worker's testimony is corroborated by the circumstances following the alleged incident. Ardoin v. Firestone Polymers, L.L.C., 10-0245 (La. 1/19/11), 56 So. 3d 215, 218.

Because evidence such as the delay in medical treatment raised doubt and Gibson lacked other corroboration, the dismissal of her claim was upheld. Gibson reminds that questionable unwitnessed accident claims without corroborating evidence can and should be dismissed via pretrial motion, notwithstanding the “relaxed rules of evidence and procedure” in workers’ compensation courts.

Ed Stauss is a partner with Keogh Cox. His practice relates mainly to workers compensation defense and the subrogation recovery. Ed is an avid and long time fan of the professional and major college sports teams in the area. He also enjoys running year-round, from 2 milers & 5Ks in the spring and summer to half marathons and full marathons in the fall and winter.

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One Particular Mosquito: West Nile Virus Found to be a Compensable Workers’ Compensation Claim

A Workers’ Compensation Judge in Monroe, Louisiana found that a claimant met his burden of proving that a specific mosquito bite at work caused him to contract the West Nile Virus, resulting in permanent total disability.

At trial, the claimant asserted that “he specifically remembers being bitten on his left leg by a mosquito” while working in the break room of his employer, Graphic Packaging. Claimant presented evidence that mosquitoes were present at the work site, although his purported eyewitness to the event (who also contracted the disease) was proven to have not been at work that day.

The director of the Ouachita Parish Mosquito Abatement District was offered by the claimant and testified that there was a prevalence of mosquitoes in Ouachita Parish during that summer which carried the West Nile Virus. Mosquitoes trapped near both the employer’s location and the claimant’s house tested positive. According to the director, the only way to determine if a mosquito is infected with West Nile is to have that particular mosquito tested. An expert epidemiologist for the employer added that the most commonly infected mosquitoes would not have been active during the middle of the day when the claimant alleges he was bitten.

Based upon the testimony of the claimant, his witness, and the experts, the Workers’ Compensation Judge ruled that the claimant had sufficiently proven that the specific mosquito infected with the West Nile Virus had bitten him at work. The court also stung the employer and its workers’ compensation insurer with penalties and attorneys' fees, finding that they had not contested the claim on a reasonable basis.

The Court of Appeal in Allen vs. Graphic Packaging, No. 51,080 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1/11/17), - - So 3d - -, upheld the Workers’ Compensation Judge. The court noted that all proof of the “accident” rested upon circumstantial evidence and that the claimant possessed no direct evidence that the break room mosquito carried the disease. In this setting, the claimant “faced a burden of proof to show circumstantially that the break room mosquito carried the disease.” Utilizing the “manifest error or clearly wrong standard,” the appellate court held that the claimant had met his burden despite his indirect proof.

The Allen court ultimately reversed the finding of permanent total disability, because the Workers’ Compensation Judge misapplied the statutory requirements. It also reversed the award of penalties and attorneys' fees noting that “there were numerous factors sufficient to validate Graphic’s reasonable controversion of Allen’s claim.”

Insight

Louisiana Supreme Court Now Allows Direct Negligence Claims Against Employer

In a previous blog, we outlined developing law in the Louisiana appeals courts, and federal district courts in Louisiana on the issue of whether a claimant may maintain a separate cause of action against an employer for independent negligence when it is stipulated that the employee was in the course and scope of employment.1 Most courts held a claimant could not maintain a separate action against the employer under these circumstances, reasoning that the employee’s fault would impute to the employer, and therefore, additional inquiry was not appropriate. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed the issue and stated:

“(A) plaintiff may pursue both a negligence cause of action against an employee for which the employer is vicariously liable and a direct claim against the employer for its own negligence in hiring, supervision, training, and retention as well as a negligent entrustment claim, when the employer stipulates that the employee was in the course and scope of employment at the time of the injury.” (Emphasis added) See Martin v. Thomas et al., 21-1490 (La. 12/21/21), 328 So. 3d 1164.

This holding notably overturned the 1st Circuit Court of Appeal ruling in Elee v. White, - - So.3d - - (La. App. 1 Cir 7/24/20), 2020 WL 4251974 and other Louisiana 5th Circuit Court of Appeals decisions. The Supreme Court in Martin reasoned that “the initial assessment of fault required by the law is not bypassed due to the employer-employee relationship” and “shielding a potential tortfeasor from liability is not compatible with a comparative negligence regime.” The Court further stated that the possibility that both the employee and employer may be at fault is not “subsumed” by the employer’s admission on course and scope. In fact, if the fault of the employee is shown, then the issue of whether there is also fault on the part of the employer remains and must be decided by the evidence on a case-by-case basis.

The consequences of this decision remain to be seen, but it is expected that claimants may also pursue employers separately on theories such as negligent hiring, supervision, and entrustment. The scope of such discovery will remain within the sound discretion of the trial judge.

By: John P. Wolff, III and Richard W. Wolff

1Louisiana Appeal Courts Prohibit Direct Negligence Claims Against Employer; US District Court Uses Rule to Limit Discovery - Keogh Cox

Insight

A Matter of Control of a Bike Results in No Liability under the LPLA

A Louisiana man logged onto eBay. To save some money, hebought a used racing bicycle. While riding this bike through his neighborhood,he noticed an unlevel section of the roadway and attempted a “bunny hop” overthe gap in the pavement. The front wheel disconnected when he landed. Thecyclist lost control and flipped over the handlebars, sustaining seriousinjuries. He later filed suit against Specialized, the manufacturer of thebicycle, under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (“LPLA”). See Delahoussaye v. Boelter, --- So.3d---,2019-0026 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/15/19).

The evidence in Delahoussaye showed that the bike wasmissing its “secondary retention device,” which keeps the wheel fromdisengaging if the “quick release” on clamp on the front fork is not engagedproperly. Also, no warnings were found on the bike. Based upon this evidence,the cyclist claimed Specialized should be liable because the bike wasdefective; unreasonably dangerous in its design, construction, and manufacture;and inadequate in its instructions and warnings.

To recover from a manufacturer under the LPLA, a plaintiffmust show that the product (here, the bike) was unreasonably dangerous atthe time it left the manufacturer’s control. Photographs of the bike showeda light, silver spot on the bike where the secondary retention device had beenlocated. This confirmed that the secondary retention device was removed afterit originally was manufactured. Evidence also showed that warning stickersoriginally on the bike had been removed.

These changes were made after Specialized lost control of the bike. Because the bike was not defective when the product left Specialized’s control, Specialized, as the bike’s manufacturer, could not be liable under the LPLA for injuries the plaintiff sustained when he lost control of the bike. In short, this case came down to a matter of control.

Reynolds LeBlanc is a partner at Keogh Cox. His practice areas include commercial litigation, personal injury claims, appeals, and other matters. Reynolds is a former teacher, who in his free time plays music and perpetually talks himself into training for his next marathon.

Edward F. Stauss III

Partner
Evidence
Injury
Workers' Compensation