Insight

Is Texting While Driving The New Drunk Driving?

Published on: August 11, 2017

Earlier this year, Apple was sued in the California class action of Ceja v. Apple, BC #647057, Superior Ct. of California, County of Los Angeles. In the Ceja suit, it was alleged that Apple is liable for automobile-related injuries and death. The “theory of recovery” against Apple is fairly straight-forward: 1) since 2008, Apple has possessed the “lock-out” ability to prevent texting while driving; and, 2) it is liable because it failed to do so. Whether or not the plaintiffs prevail against Apple, the national trend is toward stricter anti-texting laws and harsher consequences for those who text and drive. While this post does not intend to suppose a moral equivalence between drunk driving and driving while texting, the building momentum against texting while driving is reminiscent of the development of the anti-drunk driving laws and message.

It was not until 1938 when 0.15 became the first commonly-used blood alcohol level for intoxication (nearly two times today’s legal limit). Today, driving with a .08 will land you in a Louisiana jail. Many states such as Louisiana have enacted punitive damage statutes that allow for substantial money awards against drunk drivers. For instance, under Civil Code Article 2315.4, punitive damages (a.k.a. “exemplary” damages) are available against any driver whose intoxication causes injury. The message has been heard: drunk driving is illegal and may costs you your freedom, your money, or both.

The prohibitions against texting while driving (and even the broader category of “distracted driving”) are expanding. The State of Washington was the first state to ban texting while driving in 2007. Almost every state has since followed suit. Attitudes are also changing, perhaps in response to public service announcements and targeted media campaigns.

While once legal here, Louisiana, at least on paper, now completely bans texting while driving under La. R.S. 32:300.5. This law was later expanded to prohibit driving while accessing, reading, or posting to a “social networking site.” Last year, related fines and penalties were increased.

The practice of texting while driving has been said to involve three forms of distraction:

1. Manual distraction- taking your hands away from the wheel;

2. Visual distraction- diverting your eyes away from the road;

3. Cognitive distraction- taking your attention away from safely driving.

In the last few years, at least two drivers (one in New Jersey and one in Pennsylvania) have been sued under allegations that they are liable for injury because they sent texts to persons they knew or should have known were driving. Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214 (2013) and Gallatin v, Gargiulo, #10401 of 2015, Lawrence County, PA.

At some point, auto manufacturers and phone/electronics suppliers may choose or be forced to render texting while driving impossible. Until such a time, the trend against texting while driving continues.

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Keogh Cox & Wilson, Ltd. provides this blog as a public service for general information only. The materials contained herein may not reflect the most current legal developments or even express the opinion of all or even most of Keogh Cox attorneys. Such material does not constitute legal advice or form any attorney-client relationship. Keogh Cox and all contributing author(s) expressly disclaim all liability to any person with respect to the contents of this Web site and Blog and expect that no reliance will be made upon the information provided.

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Insight

Louisiana Legislature Passes the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2020

On June 30, 2020, the last day of the 2020 First Extraordinary Session, the Louisiana legislature passed HB 57 legislation designed to revise tort law legislation. Although not yet signed by Governor Edwards, it appears he is likely to sign this legislation into law. The highlights of this new legislation include the following:

  • The jury trial threshold has been lowered from $50,000 to $10,000;
  • If the tort demand is between $10,000 and $50,000, the party demanding a jury must post a cash deposit of $5,000 within sixty (60) days of the jury demand;
  • The existence of insurance coverage will not be communicated to the jury unless (a) the jury will decide a coverage issue; (b) “the existence of insurance would be admissible to attack the credibility of the witness under Article 607;” or (c) bad faith is claimed under La. R.S. 22:1973 or against the insurer alone under the Direct Action statute;
  • The identity of the insurer will not be communicated to the jury “unless the identity of the insurer would be admissible to attack the credibility of a witness under Article 607.” The Judge will instruct the jury at the opening and closing of trial that there is insurance coverage for the damages claimed by the plaintiff;
  • If Medicaid or workers’ compensation pays medical bills, the amount recoverable is limited to the amount actually paid. If health insurance or Medicare pays medical bills, the amount recoverable is limited to the amount actually paid (plus any co-pays, deductibles, etc.). Additionally, the Court shall award 40% of the difference between the amount of the bill and the amount paid. If anyone other than health insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, or workers’ compensation pays the medical bills, the amount recoverable is the amount actually paid and amounts remaining owed;
  • Except for Medicaid and workers’ compensation the jury will only know the amount of medical treatment billed. After trial, the Judge will take evidence relevant to any discounts;
  • Failure of the plaintiff to wear a seat belt is now admissible evidence of comparative fault or failure to mitigate.

Importantly, if signed by the Governor, HB 57 will become effective on January 1, 2021. It will have prospective application only and will not apply to a cause of action arising or action pending prior to January 1, 2021.

Chris Jones is a partner with Keogh Cox in Baton Rouge, LA. He focuses his practice on class actions and mass torts, and handles these matters in courts throughout the country. He is a life-long resident of Baton Rouge, where he lives with his wife and four children

Insight

Louisiana Legislature Sets New Prescription Period for Tort Claims

The Louisiana legislature recently enacted laws that set new prescription periods for most delictual/tort actions and claims for damage caused to immovable property. Civil Code articles 3492 and 3493 previously established a prescription period of one year for these types of claims. The legislature repealed these articles and enacted Louisiana Code Articles 3493.1 and 3493.2 in their place.

Louisiana Code Article 3493.1 now establishes a prescriptive period of two (2) years for delictual actions/tort claims that runs from the day injury occurred or damage is sustained. It contains language previously included in Louisiana Civil Code Article 3492, which states that prescriptive period does not run against minors or interdicts in actions involving permanent disability and brought pursuant to the Louisiana Products Liability Act or state law governing product liability actions in effect at the time of the injury or damage.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 3493.2 also establishes a prescriptive period of two (2) years when damage is caused to immovable property. This prescriptive period runs from the day the owner of the immovable acquired, or should have acquired, knowledge of the damage.

These changes went into effect of July 1, 2024. Louisiana Civil Code Articles 3493.1 and 3493.2 apply prospectively only and apply to delictual actions arising after July 1, 2024.

Insight

Employer Finds Safe Harbor for Mailing Benefits Timely

When an employee is injured on the job and the employee’s request for workers’ compensation benefits is disputed, La. R.S. 23:1201.1 allows an employer to request a preliminary determination hearing (“PDH”) with the Office of Workers’ Compensation (“OWC”). If the workers’ compensation judge rules at the PDH that benefits are owed, the employer has ten days to comply with the judge’s ruling. The First Circuit recently ruled that an employer can find “safe harbor” if it technically complies with the rigorous deadlines of the statute, which if missed can have profound consequences, subjecting the employer to penalties and attorney fees.

In Kilbourne v. Dixon Correctional Institute, the court recently affirmed a ruling that found an employer complied with La. R.S. 23:1201.1 and could not be subject to penalties or attorney’s fees when it mailed the disputed workers compensation benefits within ten days of the judge’s ruling at the PDH. The ruling was affirmed even though the employee did not receive payment within ten days of the hearing.

The employer in Kilbourne stopped issuing weekly workers compensation benefits after two doctors found the claimant’s ongoing complaints were unrelated to the work accident and the claimant could return to full duty work. The employee then filed a disputed claim with the OWC and requested reinstatement of his benefits. He also requested an award of penalties and attorney’s fees because he claimed the employer’s suspension of indemnity benefits was arbitrary and capricious. The employer requested a PDH to address these issues.

The OWC judge issued a preliminary determination that although the employee was owed supplemental benefits from the date his payments of benefits stopped, the employer was not arbitrary and capricious in its decision to stop payment. Within ten days of the mailing of the PDH ruling, the employer issued and mailed benefit checks to the employee and filed a form with the OWC to provide notice the employer was paying the benefits. Nevertheless, the employee disagreed with the PDH ruling and the matter went to trial.

At trial, the employee argued that he should have received penalties, attorney fees, and interest on the back benefits paid after the PDH ruling. The employee argued the employer failed to comply with section 1201.1 because he did not receive the indemnity benefits until more than ten days after the PDH ruling. However, evidence showed the benefit payments were postmarked and mailed within ten days of the receipt of PDH ruling.

Accordingly, the trial court found that the employer was immune from an award of penalties and attorney fees pursuant to the “safe harbor” provision of section 1201.1. Interest also could not be owed on back pay when the employer complied with the statute. The First Circuit affirmed this decision on appeal. Although providing the claimant funds within 10 days of the PDH ruling remains the best practice for an employer, this ruling informs employers that they should find safe harbor from what could be significant penalties and attorney’s fees if they meet the technical requirements of the statute and mail their compliance with the judge’s ruling within ten days of the PDH.

Case Reference: Kilbourne v. Dixon Correctional Institute, 2022-0455,(La. App. 1 Cir. 11/4/22) ____So. 3d ___,2022 WL 16706951.

Collin J. LeBlanc

Partner
Louisiana