Insight

Throw Me Something Mister? Liability for Mardi Gras Krewes

Published on: January 17, 2020

As part of the unique aura that surrounds Mardi Gras inSouth Louisiana, the expression “Laissez les bons temps rouler” is foreverlinked to the spirit of the season. The Cajun French phrase meaning “Let thegood times roll” captures the eccentric soul of Carnival. However, it might bedifficult to let the good times roll after being struck by a bag of beadshurled from the second deck of float. If the spectator suffers a severe injuryas a result, who is liable? Does the injured party have any recourse againstthe person who threw the beads? Against the Mardi Gras krewe organizers?

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held that spectatorsassume the risk of injury when attending a parade. Citron v. Gentilly CarnivalClub, Inc., 14-1096 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/15/15), 165 So.3d 304. The foundation ofthe decision was based on the Mardi Gras Immunity Statute, La. R.S. 9:2796,which has two parts: (1) creates broad immunity for krewes which sponsorparades; and (2) states that anyone who attends such a parade “assumes the riskof being struck by any missile whatsoever which has been traditionally thrown,tosses or hurled by members,” which include, but are not limited to: beads,cups, doubloons, and many other things.

To impose liability on a krewe, there must be evidence ofthe krewe’s—as opposed to its member’s—gross negligence. Palmer v. Zulu Soc.Aid & Pleasure Club, Inc., 09–0751 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/1/10), 63 So.3d 131(emphasis added). Furthermore, a carnival krewe or organization may not bevicariously liable for its members' acts. To the contrary, Louisianajurisprudence has rejected the argument that a krewe is vicariously liable forits members' acts. Kibble v. B.P.O. Elks Lodge No. 30, 640 So.2d 267, 269 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1993).

The Mardi Gras Immunity Statute imposes an extremely high burden of proving the “loss or damage was caused by the deliberate and wanton act or gross negligence” of the krewe or organization. Gross negligence has been defined as the “entire absence of care” and an “extreme departure from ordinary care or the want of even scant care.” Ambrose v. New Orleans Police Department Ambulance Service, 93–3099 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 216. In calculating whether an act was grossly negligent in the context of Mardi Gras Immunity Statute, the Citron court considered several factors: (1) the weight of the object thrown, (2) the distance the object was throw, and (3) the manner in which the object was thrown. Citron, 165 So.3d at 317.

Ultimately, the statute absolves krewes from liability for injuries caused by objects thrown to parade spectators, except in extreme and unusual circumstances. Therefore, be alert during parades this Mardi Gras season and Laissez les bons temps rouler.

Cole Frazier joined Keogh Cox as an associate in 2019 after working at the firm as a law clerk during law school. He earned his J.D. and Diploma in Comparative Law from Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert Law Center. During his time at LSU Law, he also studied comparative law at Jean Moulin Lyon 3 University in Lyon, France. Cole received his Bachelor’s degree in Business Administration with a concentration in Pre-law from Nicholls State University in 2015. He was elected to the Southland Conference all-academic team twice as a member of the Nicholls State football program.

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Insight

Governor Issues 2025 Insurance Reforms

During week seven of the 2025 Regular Session, Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry signed the following bills into law:

HB450 legislatively overrules Housley v. Cerise, 579 So. 2d 973 (La. 1991) (which provided a presumption of medical causation where plaintiff had no pre-existing history) and became effective upon signature by the governor. The Act has prospective application only and shall not apply to causes of action arising prior to the effective date.

HB434 modifies “No Pay/No Play” and bars uninsured motorists from recovering for the first $100,000.00 of bodily injury and the first $100,000.00 of property damage based on any cause or right of action arising out of an automobile accident. The Act allows for an uninsured motorist, who institutes an action to recover damages, regardless of fault, and is awarded an amount equal to or less than $100,000.00, to be held liable for all court costs incurred by all parties to the action. The Act’s effective date is August 1, 2025.

HB436 bars unauthorized aliens from recovering general damages and past and future wages for damages arising from an automobile accident. The Act does not apply to a claim made against an uninsured or underinsured motorist policy which names the unauthorized alien as an insured. The Act’s effective date is August 1, 2025.

HB431 provides for modified comparative fault and bars claimants, who are found greater than or equal to 51% at fault, from recovering for damages. If fault attributable to the claimant is less than 51%, the amount recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the fault attributable to the claimant. The bill does not say whether this applies only to auto claims. We expect this will be clarified. The Act’s effective date is January 1, 2026.

HB549 requires a premium discount for policyholders of commercial motor vehicles with installed dashboard cameras and telematic systems and who meet the other requirements enumerated in the Act. The Act’s effective date is January 1, 2026.

HB148 requires insurance companies to display prior premium amounts in close proximity to the renewal premium. The Act also provides for rate filing standards and methods and changes the process by which the insurance commissioner can disapprove a rate if he determines it is excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory. The Act’s effective date is August 1, 2025.

Insight

Louisiana Second Circuit Applies Anti-Dram Shop Statute to Grant Summary Judgment

Louisiana’s “anti-dram shop” statute, La. R.S. 9:2800.1, limits the ability of a claimant to hold a provider of alcohol liable for damages resulting from the acts of an intoxicated patron. Subsection A of the statute declares that the consumption of intoxicating beverages, rather than the sale, serving, or providing of those beverages, is the proximate cause of any injury or property damage that the consumer may cause. Under Subsection B, anyone who lawfully serves alcohol to a person of legal age is provided immunity for any injury caused by the consumer that occurs “off the premises.” This immunity extends to sellers of alcohol and social hosts.

The Louisiana Second Circuit recently examined these provisions of this statute in Rugg v. Horseshoe Entertainment, et. al. The plaintiff alleged she was injured when an intoxicated patron (John Doe) fell onto her at a hotel bar. She alleged that the defendant, which operated a casino bar, was liable because it ignored multiple complaints about John Doe’s drunken state prior to the incident and failed to escort him out.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Louisiana’s anti-dram shop statute prevented any finding of liability on its part. In opposing the summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that the statute did not rule out liability because the injury occurred on the premises.

The Second Circuit determined that the immunity afforded in Subsection B of the statute was not available because, as the plaintiff argued, the injury occurred on the premises. However, Subsection A of the statute, which declares the consumption, not the serving, of alcohol is the proximate cause of injury inflicted by an intoxicated person, still applied.

Under these circumstances, the Court held it had to determine whether the bar owner violated general negligence principles. In conducting this analysis, the court was required to focus on two issues: 1) whether the alcohol provider acted reasonably under the circumstances, and 2) whether the alcohol provider took any “affirmative acts” that increased the chances of the incident.

The Court of Appeal granted summary judgment under the facts of the case. The court found no evidence in the record that Horseshoe acted unreasonably leading up to the incident. Testimony indicated that the complaints about John Doe’s behavior arose after the incident occurred, not before. Similarly, the court reasoned that the failure to escort John Doe out of the bar was not an “affirmative act” that increased the risk of the incident because the record did not indicate Horseshoe had any reason to do so prior to the injury.

In conclusion, the court noted “that in no case will the serving of alcohol be held as the proximate cause of a tort in which alcohol was involved.” Therefore, the plaintiff had to show Horseshoe did something more to cause her injury than just serve John Doe alcohol. Because the plaintiff failed to do so, summary judgment was granted. Under these facts, Louisiana’s dram shop statute still applied to protect the defendant provider of alcohol, even though the injury occurred on its premises and the statutory immunity was not available.

References:

La. R.S. 9:2800.1

Mechelle Rugg v. Horseshoe Entertainment, et al., 55,239 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/24), 2024 WL 104143.

Insight

Make Sure You Are Sure! – A Comment on the Finality of Settlement Agreements under Louisiana Law

Preparing for a trial is a tense and stressful process for attorneys and their clients. Sometimes, during trial preparation, a crucial piece of evidence can come to light that may push a case from a path towards trial to a path towards a settlement agreement. A “settlement” or “compromise” under Louisiana law is just that – an agreement between the parties to settle the dispute raised in the lawsuit, usually with the exchange of a sum of money. Often, settlements are reached in the weeks leading up to trial or even on the courthouse steps.

This type of scenario occurred in Nola Title Company, LLC v. Archon Information Systems. While in the thick of trial preparation, audio recordings from one of the parties were discovered. That party concluded this evidence would be prejudicial to its case at trial, which spurred settlement negotiations. The parties eventually agreed to a compromise and notified the court of the settlement via an email to the judge’s law clerk. The next day, the attorneys reported to court and verbally outlined the terms of the settlement agreement on the official court record.

Two weeks later, the defendants hired new counsel. Two months after that, counsel for the plaintiff forwarded the formal settlement documents to memorialize the agreement that was made between the parties and entered into the court’s record. However, the defendants refused to sign the paperwork and did not timely make the payments that previously were agreed upon. Therefore, the plaintiff filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement.

In opposition to the motion to enforce, the defendants argued: 1) that their prior counsel did not have authority to enter into the settlement agreement; and 2) that the agreement on the record of the court was invalid because it did not include a provision about the audio recording, which the defendant claimed was a key element of the agreement between the parties. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the settlement that was stated on the record was an enforceable settlement agreement.

The Louisiana Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the trial court. In its opinion, the appellate court includes a summary of the law governing settlements in Louisiana. After a thorough review of the applicable law, the court came to the following conclusions:

  • The settlement agreement on the record of the court was a binding settlement agreement, even if the parties contemplated a future formal written agreement;
  • When a compromise is placed on the record, the recital must include full disclosure of the material terms;
  • Any “missing terms” from the recorded settlement agreement were not a material element of the settlement; and
  • The defendants’ prior counsel had authority to enter into the settlement as written.

Based upon the court’s ruling, if the parties have a meeting of the minds and settlement terms are entered on the trial court record, there are no “do-overs” or “take-backs.” It is important to “make sure you are sure” when entering the crucial courthouse steps settlement agreement.

References:

Nola Title Company, LLC v. Archon Information Systems, et. al., 2022-CA-0967 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/13/23), 360 So. 3d 166.

Cole C. Frazier

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