Throw Me Something Mister? Liability for Mardi Gras Krewes

The Louisiana legislature recently enacted laws that set new prescription periods for most delictual/tort actions and claims for damage caused to immovable property. Civil Code articles 3492 and 3493 previously established a prescription period of one year for these types of claims. The legislature repealed these articles and enacted Louisiana Code Articles 3493.1 and 3493.2 in their place.

Louisiana Code Article 3493.1 now establishes a prescriptive period of two (2) years for delictual actions/tort claims that runs from the day injury occurred or damage is sustained. It contains language previously included in Louisiana Civil Code Article 3492, which states that prescriptive period does not run against minors or interdicts in actions involving permanent disability and brought pursuant to the Louisiana Products Liability Act or state law governing product liability actions in effect at the time of the injury or damage.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 3493.2 also establishes a prescriptive period of two (2) years when damage is caused to immovable property. This prescriptive period runs from the day the owner of the immovable acquired, or should have acquired, knowledge of the damage.

These changes went into effect of July 1, 2024. Louisiana Civil Code Articles 3493.1 and 3493.2 apply prospectively only and apply to delictual actions arising after July 1, 2024.

Pursuant to House Bill 291, Louisiana modified the prescriptive dates for wrongful death and survival actions. Survival actions are brought to recover damages a deceased person suffered before his or her death. For survival actions, La. Civil Code Article 2315.1 (A) now provides as follows:

If a person who has been injured by an offense or quasi offense dies, the right to recover all damages for injury to that person, his property or otherwise, caused by the offense or quasi offense, shall survive for a period of one year from the death of the deceased or two years from the day that injury or damage is sustained, whichever is longer.

A wrongful death claim can compensate the surviving family members for their own suffering following someone’s death. Similar amendments were made for the wrongful death statute. La. Civil Code Article 2315.2(B) now provides that the right of action for wrongful death prescribes one year from the death of the deceased or two years from the day that injury or damage is sustained, whichever is longer.

The changes to these articles went into effect August 1, 2025.

In a case handled by our firm, a Lafayette-based global catering and life support client was sued by an employee based in Dubai for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The jury unanimously found that the employer (1) did not discriminate against the plaintiff because of a disability or (2) retaliate against him because he raised a complaint regarding the alleged discrimination.

The plaintiff had a written contract of employment with a one-year term that automatically renewed if he was not terminated. Upon the contract expiration date, the employer advised plaintiff that the contract would not be renewed for a successive term.

Plaintiff, an Army veteran, suffered from PTSD following his military service and deployment in Iraq. He claimed defendant discriminated against him on the basis of his PTSD, which he claimed as a mental health disability. Plaintiff further claimed that defendant retaliated against him after he complained to his direct supervisor and the head of human resources about the alleged discrimination. To support his case, plaintiff claimed he was not disciplined before his termination and did not receive negative performance reviews during employment. Significant pre-trial motion practice occurred and framed the issues for trial in two ways.

First, the defense learned of actions taken by plaintiff following the termination of his employment that would have provided a legitimate basis for termination had the actions been discovered before he was terminated. The defense argued that evidence of such “after-acquired” misconduct was relevant to credibility and independently relevant to calculate backpay that plaintiff sought, citing McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co. and McClung v. Hajek. Over defendant’s objection, the Trial Court excluded the evidence as highly prejudicial, instead finding that back pay was an equitable remedy to be decided by the Court in a subsequent evidentiary hearing related to the issue of back pay.

Second, the defense argued that non-certified medical record evidence submitted by plaintiff was hearsay and thus inadmissible to prove a disability. The Court agreed with the defendant and issued a limiting instruction that the jury was not to consider uncertified medical records for the truth of the matter asserted.

At trial, our client presented ample evidence of plaintiff’s performance deficiencies with respect to the vetting of vendors, which jeopardized the employer’s government contracts and the jobs of other employees. The majority of plaintiff’s performance issues arose in Dubai, plaintiff’s key area of oversight. Therefore, it was unbelievable that he would not know of, or take responsibility for, those performance deficiencies. In addition, the language of the written employment contract allowed for non-renewal of the contract. In a unanimous verdict as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 48, the jury ultimately found that although the plaintiff proved he suffered a disability, he failed to prove discrimination or retaliation under the Act.

References:

Staples v. Taylor International Services, Inc., et al., 6:20-cv-00192-RRS-CBW.

McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 361–62, 115 S. Ct. 879, 886, 130 L. Ed. 2d 852 (1995).

McClung v. Hajek, 79 F.3d 1145 (5th Cir. 1996).