Insight

To Be or Not To Be Specific—Fact Pleading in Louisiana

Published on: March 9, 2022

Louisiana is a fact-pleading state. Accordingly, Louisiana law requires that a petition contain “a short, clear and concise statement of all causes of action and material facts arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation.” See La. C.C.P. art. 891. Generally, the pleader must state what act or omission he will establish at trial. Legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations do not meet the pleading standards required by Louisiana law.

This concept recently was examined in Henderson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2021-0654 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/17/21), 2021 WL 7162224, where the court considered bad faith allegations the plaintiff tried to assert against an insurer in his petition for damages. At the time of the underlying accident, the plaintiff was a passenger in a Lyft vehicle that was struck by an unknown driver. Steadfast Insurance Company was the Lyft driver’s insurer, and the plaintiff named Steadfast as a defendant to recover damages under its policy.

The plaintiff later amended his petition to seek uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits under the Steadfast policy. He also sought penalties from Steadfast for alleged bad faith and dealing in its insurance practices. In turn, Steadfast filed an exception of no cause of action, arguing that plaintiff’s petition only contained legal conclusions and not specific facts, which were insufficient to support a cause of action. The trial court overruled the exception.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the decision. Plaintiff’s amended petition alleged that Steadfast “refused to deal with him in good faith, including but not limited to, refusing to issue unconditional (McDill) tenders and taking actions in violation of La. R.S. 22:1892 and La. R.S. 22:1973.” The plaintiff also generally alleged the insurer acted “arbitrarily, capriciously and without probable cause” in its failure to pay money under its policy.

The Court noted that the plaintiff’s allegations were legal conclusions asserted as facts, which could not be considered as well-pleaded factual allegations for purposes of a no cause of action. Importantly, the court reiterated that a court may not consider legal conclusions “clothed as facts,” citing Hooks v. Treasurer, 06-0541, p. 10 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/4/07), 961 So.2d 425, 431-32. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s allegations, absent additional information, were insufficient to state a cause of action. The plaintiff failed to state specific actions or omissions that would be established at trial. Hence, he failed to state a cause of action.

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Insight

Limitation of Liability under the LPLA: Can Internet Retailers be Manufacturers?

The Louisiana Products Liability Act (“LPLA”) contains the exclusivetheories of recovery against a manufacturer for damages caused by its product.The term “manufacturer” within the LPLA includes “the seller of a product whoexercises control over or influences a characteristic of the design,construction, or quality of the product that causes damage.” The rapid growthof e-commerce raises a unique question – how do we classify internet retailers?

Internet retailers generally act as a middleman for third partymanufacturers and online consumers. In this respect, they are not technically“sellers” as defined by the LPLA because they typically do not have controlover the design or construction of the products they sell. Nevertheless, theproper categorization of internet retailers may become important when someoneis injured by a product, as was the case in State Farm Fire and CasualtyCompany v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2019 WL 5616708 (Miss. N.D. 10/31/19) ---F.Supp.3d ---.

In State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Amazon.com, Inc., two hoverboards purchased through Amazon caught fire inside a Mississippi home and the home was destroyed. In considering Amazon’s possible liability, the Mississippi Court asked whether Amazon was a “service provider” or a “marketplace.” In Mississippi, a finding that Amazon was a “service provider” would insulate it from the claim. However, if Amazon acted as a “marketplace,” it could be exposed by the common law to a negligent failure-to-warn claim. The Mississippi Court held that, because Amazon operated as a marketplace, the claim against it could go forward.

If similar facts arose in Louisiana, could Amazon or similar retailers be exposed under the LPLA? If an internet retailer established policies that forced a “true” manufacturer to negatively alter product quality, would the LPLA provide a remedy? For example, if an internet retailer sets a price ceiling, this artificial figure, especially if unreasonably low, might pressure a manufacturer to lower product safety. Is setting a price range the exercise of enough control or influence over the “design, construction, or quality of a product” to render internet retailers subject to suit under the LPLA? That is a question likely to be answered in cases to come.

Insight

A Decade Old Article Finds New Life: Televised Testimony

Courts across the country now grapple with the changing face of trials in a time of social distancing and spikes of COVID-19 complicated by the confines of the courtroom. Attorneys and litigants must also adapt to this new “normal.” In this setting, an older law may help to bring new technology into the courtroom.

COVID-19 spawned the immediate use of videoconferencing and other technology in the courtroom. Fortunately, over a decade prior to the current pandemic, the Louisiana Legislature adopted Louisiana Civil Code of Procedure article 1633.1 which expressly provides for live televised testimony at a trial. Pursuant to Article 1633.1:

The court may order, upon a showing of appropriate safeguards, live testimony of a witness to be presented in open court by teleconference, video link, or other visual remote technology, if the witness is beyond the subpoena power of the court or when compelling circumstances are shown. The order may be entered at a pretrial conference or, in exceptional circumstances, on motion set for hearing at least ten days prior to trial or at another time that does not prejudice the parties.

The Article, titled “Live trial testimony by video,” does not limit the live video testimony feature only at trial. Commentary suggests that the term “trial” is intended to include evidentiary hearings on exceptions as well as summary matters. The comments further provide that a showing must be made to the court's satisfaction of appropriate safeguards, such as (1) reliable transmission procedures and image quality, (2) an orderly process for reference to exhibits by the witness and all counsel or parties conducting the examination, and (3) an absence of any outside influence on the witness during testimony. Even if all the parties agree to the use of live televised testimony, the Article nevertheless requires a court order.

Pursuant to the Article, the court may order televised testimony when “compelling circumstances are shown.” These circumstances may exist where a witness has a pre-existing condition or is restricted from live attendance by their physician. They may also exist for witnesses barred from work-related travel by their employer.

Although adopted in 2007, Article 1633.1 remains largely unused by both courts and litigants; it appears its time has come.

Insight

Coronavirus and Workers Compensation in Louisiana

In Louisiana, workers compensation benefits can beowed if an employee sustains an accident or develops an occupational diseasearising out of and occurring during the course and scope of theiremployment. The definitions and burdens of proof differ for each.

An accident is defined by La. R.S. 23:1021 as:

(1) “Accident” means an unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable,precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault,and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which ismore than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration.

An occupational disease is defined by La. R.S.23:1031.1 as:

B. An occupational disease means only that disease or illnesswhich is due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to theparticular trade, occupation, process, or employment in which the employee isexposed to such disease. Occupational disease shall include injuries due towork-related carpal tunnel syndrome. Degenerative disc disease, spinalstenosis, arthritis of any type, mental illness, and heart-related or perivasculardisease are specifically excluded from the classification of an occupationaldisease for the purpose of this Section.

C. Notwithstanding the limitations of Subsection B hereof, everylaboratory technician who is disabled because of the contraction of anydisease, diseased condition, or poisoning which disease, diseased condition, orpoisoning is a result, whether directly or indirectly, of the nature of thework performed, or the dependent of a laboratory technician whose death is theresult of a disease, diseased condition, or poisoning, whether directly orindirectly, of the nature of the work performed shall be entitled to thecompensation provided in this Chapter the same as if said laboratory technicianreceived personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of hisemployment.

As used herein, the phrase “laboratory technician” shall mean anyperson who, because of his skills in the technical details of his work, isemployed in a place devoted to experimental study in any branch of the naturalor applied sciences; to the application of scientific principles ofexamination, testing, or analysis by instruments, apparatus, chemical orbiological reactions or other scientific processes for the purposes of thenatural or applied sciences; to the preparation, usually on a small scale, ofdrugs, chemicals, explosives, or other products or substances for experimentalor analytical purposes; or in any other similar place of employment.

Except as otherwise provided in this Subsection, any disabilityor death claim arising under the provisions of this Subsection shall be handledin the same manner and considered the same as disability or death claimsarising due to occupational diseases.

In general, if an employee can prove that they were exposed toCoronavirus at work, and that the particular exposure caused them to contractCoronavirus disease, they may be able to prove a compensable accident. The burden of proof is a tough one, of course, because it would seem to benearly impossible for an employee who contracts the Coronavirus to prove thecontraction resulted from work as opposed to exposure in some otherenvironment. However, it is important to note that one Louisiana courtdid find that a claimant was able to meet that burden when he contracted theWest Nile Virus by proving to the satisfaction of the Workers CompensationJudge, rather incredibly, that a particular mosquito bite occurring at work wasthe cause. Allen v. Graphic Packaging, 51,080 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1/11/17), 211 So.3d 1219. If a claimant isable to prove the occurrence of an accident, then the usual workerscompensation medical and indemnity benefits would be payable depending onmedical needs, disability status, or even death benefits if the employeeexpired as the result of such an accident.

For an employee to be able to prove that theircontraction of Coronavirus disease fits within the definition of anoccupational disease, they would have to prove that it was “due to causes andconditions characteristic of and peculiar to” their employment. Somehealthcare workers and others in related fields who become infected would seemto have an easier time proving their cases than others whose work would notcustomarily lead to such exposures. The definition above includeslaboratory technicians (which could be an expansive list as defined) whocontract a disease as the result exposure to something that they are workingon/with. The statute also provides some timing elements for claim filingand causation presumption, most of which would not seem to apply because ofnovel nature of the current Coronavirus outbreak. As with claims assertedas accidents, the usual medical and indemnity benefits would be payabledepending on the circumstances of the individual worker.

For additional details on the Allencase, please review Keogh Cox blog “One Particular Mosquito: West Nile Virus Foundto be a Compensable Workers’ Compensation Claim” by clicking here: https://keoghcox.com/one-particular-mosquito-west-nile-virus-found-compensable-workers-compensation-claim/.

Brandi A. Barze

Partner
Court of Appeals
Insurance
Louisiana