Kirk L. Landry

In a case of first impression, the United States Court of Appeal for the 5^th Circuit concludes that a maritime tort plaintiff’s overdose from illegal drugs was a superseding cause of his death that was not traceable to his maritime work injury. Therefore, damages stemming from his death could not be recovered.

In Bommarito v. Belle Chasse Marine Transportation, L.L.C., the plaintiff was injured on the job while constructing a launch site on the Mississippi River. The plaintiff’s injuries included a concussion, a fractured eye socket, and a displaced disc that required emergency surgery. He was advised additional surgeries were needed to address his complaints of pain. His prescription medication ran out, and the plaintiff tried to control his pain with over-the-counter medication while he waited for an appointment with his doctor.

One day, the plaintiff’s mother found him unconscious from what a pathologist determined was an overdose of street fentanyl mixed with Xylazine, a horse tranquilizer not available for human use. The autopsy revealed his blood contained more than six times what is considered a lethal dose of fentanyl.

The plaintiff’s estate brought claims against various defendants under the Jones Act and general Maritime Law and subsequently added a claim under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Following a bench trial, the District Court Judge awarded damages, including damages for wrongful death.

The Court of Appeal reversed. The court applied the “superseding cause doctrine” to its proximate cause analysis. The court found that where the defendant’s negligence in fact substantially contributed to the plaintiff’s injury, but the death was actually brought about by a later cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable, the superseding cause doctrine applies.

While the court noted that few federal courts have addressed the issue of overdose from illegal drugs as a superseding cause, various state court cases had. The court found those cases that found ingesting illegal drugs to be a superseding cause to be persuasive. Citing its own precedent on the superseding cause doctrine, the court noted that it “is predicated on the notion that there must be some terminus somewhere, short of eternity, at which the second party becomes responsible in lieu of the first.” Noting that foreseeability is a continuum, the court added that “at some point, there is no causation as a matter of law.”

References:

Bommarito v. Belle Chasse Marine Transportation, L.L.C., 159 F.4th 297 (5th Cir. 2025)

The Judicial Interest Rate for 2024 in the State of Louisiana has been set at 8.75%. This is the highest the rate has been since 2007.

Generally, judicial interest is interest payable on a judgment that has not been satisfied. Depending on the underlying basis for the judgment, the date that the interest begins to accrue can be before the judgment is rendered. For example, La. R.S. 13:4203 provides, “Legal interest shall attach from date of judicial demand, on all judgments, sounding in damages, ‘ex delicto’, which may be rendered by any of the courts.”

In Workers Compensation matters, La. R.S. 23:1201.3 states, “Any compensation awarded and all payments thereof directed to be made by order of the workers' compensation judge shall bear judicial interest from the date compensation was due until the date of satisfaction. The interest rate shall be fixed at the rate in effect on the date the claim for benefits was filed with the office of workers' compensation administration.”

La. R. S. 13:4202 sets forth the method for the annual calculation of judicial interest in Louisiana: “The commissioner of financial institutions shall ascertain, on the first business day of October of each year, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors approved ‘discount rate’ published daily in the Wall Street Journal. The effective judicial interest rate for the calendar year following the calculation date shall be three and one-quarter percentage points above the discount rate as ascertained by the commissioner.” In consideration of these factors set by statute, the Judicial Interest Rate for 2024 will be set at 8.75%.

For context, the historic rates for the last 20 years are:

2023- 6.50%

2022- 3.50%

2021- 3.50%

2020- 5.75%

2019- 6.00%

2018- 5.00%

2017- 4.25%

2016- 4.00%

2015- 4.00%

2014- 4.00%

2013- 4.00%

2012- 4.00%

2011- 4.00%

2010- 3.75%

2009- 5.50%

2008- 8.50%

2007- 9.50%

2006- 8.00%

2005- 6.00%

2004- 5.25%

The Louisiana Supreme Court in Petit- Blanc vs. Charles and State Farm, 2021-CC-00094 (La. 4/20/21), ____ So. 3d ______ reaffirmed a strict reading of La. R.S. 13:850. This statute allows the filing of pleadings with a Clerk of Court by facsimile transmission. As currently drafted, the statute provides that the parties shall “deliver” the original document to the clerk within 7 days of the facsimile transmission. In Petit-Blanc, the Supreme Court considered what happens when the original pleading is sent through the mail but not received by the clerk within the 7-day period. Under the facts of the case, the plaintiff’s suit would be prescribed if the act of mailing was insufficient delivery.

Citing Black’s Law Dictionary, the Court found that “delivery” is defined as “the act by which the res or substance thereof is placed within the actual or constructive possession or control of another.” The Court concluded that “merely transmitting an original document within the deadline is insufficient; rather, a litigant must establish the document was delivered to the clerk within the deadline.”

The Court noted that, while the plaintiff established she sent her original petition to the clerk’s office well within the 7-day deadline, “she cannot establish the petition was placed in the actual or constructive possession of the clerk’s office” in a timely manner. As such, the Court found that the “facsimile filing is without force and effect and could not serve to interrupt the prescriptive period.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the writ filed by the defendants, maintained their peremptory exception of prescription, and dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit with prejudice.