Appellate Court Rules a Waiver of UM Coverage Can Only Be Changed at the Insured’s Written Request

Louisiana has exhibited a certain double standard when it comes to seat belts. For years, Louisiana participated in the “Click It or Ticket” public service campaign that lectured on the grave dangers caused by a failure to wear seat belts and the criminal consequences for a failure to comply. Nevertheless, and for decades, the failure to wear a seat belt was off limits as evidence to reduce a plaintiff’s recovery in a personal injury context. But, the rule was changed: effective January 1, 2021, the “gag rule” against evidence that a plaintiff failed to wear a seat belt in an accident has been lifted. La. R.S. 32:295.1. Louisiana has no recent history with the “seat belt defense,” such that many questions arise. To frame these questions, this blog takes a quick look to cases from other states and certain guideposts that may already exist in Louisiana jurisprudence.

Like several other states, Florida has a history with the defense. In Smith v. Butterick, 769 So.2d 1056, 1058-9 (Fla.2d DCA 2000), the court outlined three elements of proof a defendant must show to prevail on the defense. Similar elements have been identified in other states. See, e.g., Law v. Superior Court In and For Maricopa County, 157 Ariz. 147, 755 P.2d 1135 (1988). Louisiana may adopt similar elements or chart a different course. The elements outlined in Smith were as follows:

1-Failure to use an available, operational seat belt

This element can be proven through testimony from the plaintiff, passengers, responding law enforcement, or other such testimony or evidence to show that a seat belt was not in use at the time of the accident. Similarly, testimony or photographs may be used to show that the seat belt was operational.

2- Failure to use seat belt was unreasonable under the circumstances

Insofar as Louisiana and most states generally mandate the use of seatbelts, this element should be easy to demonstrate. Therefore, unusual facts may be necessary to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to use a seat belt such as an emergency trip to the hospital.

3-Plaintiff’s failure to use a seat belt substantially caused or contributed to the damages

Of the three possible elements, this is likely to be the battleground. In some cases, the issue may be simple. For instance, if a plaintiff’s failure to use a seatbelt allows their body to strike (or travel through) a windshield, it may be simple to show that the plaintiff’s (or decedent’s) failure to use a seatbelt magnified the injuries. Expert testimony may not even be needed. In Smith, testimony from a mechanical engineer that the passenger would not have hit interior surfaces had they used a seat belt was allowed. However, will expert testimony be required in most cases and what type of expert will be needed? Engineer? Physician? Biomechanical?

Will the defendant bear the burden to prove the aggravation like they have in many national cases? Will Louisiana courts fashion an inference or “shifting burden” approach where a prima facie showing that a plaintiff’s whose failure to wear a seat belt increased the possibility of injury would possess the burden to show their injuries would have occurred even had they used a seat belt. In Anderson v. Watson, 953 P. 2d 1284 (Colo. 1998), the court required the defendant to only show a prima facie case of seat belt nonuse to allow the fact of nonuse to go to the jury.

Seat belts are required because they can prevent or lessen injury. Does a defendant have to show the precise details as to how seat belt nonuse caused or magnified the injury? In Louisiana, these answers remain unclear; but these are some of the questions.

Further complications are present in cases involving alleged traumatic brain injury (TBI) and the new frontier of vestibular injuries. Louisiana courts have often rejected testimony from accident reconstruction or bio-mechanical experts for a variety of reasons, but with this statutory defense, such testimony may be critical to determine who is responsible for an alleged catastrophic loss. States that recognize this rule have examined many factors that relate to the injuries that arise from the failure to use a seatbelt. As such, it seems inevitable that expert testimony on this issue must be considered in many nonuse cases.

No doubt, many of these questions will be the subject of litigation arising from accidents which occur after January 1, 2021. Louisiana’s double standard has ended. What is certain is that a failure to wear a seat belt now has the potential to harm not only a plaintiff’s health, but also their chances of recovery in civil litigation.

Collin is a Keogh Cox partner who litigates injury, commercial, and legal malpractice disputes. He lives in nearby Zachary, Louisiana with his wife Melissa and three all too active children. He is an outdoorsman, a tennis player, a cook, and a hobbyist writer.

This blog was written in partnership with John P Wolff, III.

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The country was recently captivated by the Johnny Depp and Amber Heard trial, arguably the most high-profile defamation case in recent history. Following a colorful trial, a Virginia jury found that a 2018 Washington Post op-ed by Heard defamed Depp. As a result, Depp was awarded $10 million in compensatory damages and $350,000 in punitive damages. At the same time, the jury awarded Heard $2 million dollars in compensatory damages for defamatory statements made by one of Depp’s attorneys, ostensibly on Depp’s behalf. The trial had millions of people asking a number of different questions, including the basic question “What is defamation?” Recent Louisiana cases such as Yanong v. Coleman, 53-933 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/21), 317 So. 3d 905, 911, reh’g denied (June 24, 2021), writ denied, 21-01107 (La. 11/10/21), 326 So. 3d 1249 help to provide an answer.

As explained in Yanong, a party claiming defamation in Louisiana must prove four elements:

(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;

(2) an unprivileged publication to a third party;

(3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher; and

(4) resulting injuries.

**To prove the third element of “fault,” malice must be shown.

The Yanong court explained that claims of defamation must be balanced against the right to free speech found in the state and federal Constitutions.

Louisiana recognizes two categories of defamatory words: (1) words that are defamatory per se and (2) words that are defamatory in meaning. Id. at 9. Words that are defamatory per se “expressly or implicitly accuse another of criminal conduct, or which by their very nature tend to injure one’s personal or professional reputation, without considering extrinsic facts or circumstances.” Id. When words are deemed defamatory per se, there is a presumption of fault on the part of the defendant that may be rebutted by showing that the statement was true or protected by a privilege such as fair commentary on a matter of public concern. Id. Words that are defamatory in meaning are words that, when taken in context, “a listener could have reasonably understood the communication to have been intended in a defamatory sense.” Id. at 9-10. Proof of words that are defamatory in meaning creates no presumption of fault.

Louisiana defamation suits frequently arise in the employment context. However, defamation claims in the employment context face obstacles. Such cases sometimes fail on the second element, publication to a third party, because “inter-corporate communications…[are] merely a communication of the corporation itself,” meaning an employer may need to communicate the alleged defamatory statement to an outside third party outside for it to be considered “published to a third party.” Cook v. Par. Of Jefferson, 2022 WL 19350, at *11 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2022). However, defamation claims do not always fail on the publication element and they are not limited to “A-list” celebrities or multi-million dollar cases.

In Yanong, the Louisiana Second Circuit affirmed a $15,000 compensatory damage award to a plaintiff who successfully proved that statements made by defendants on a podcast show and on Facebook were defamation per se. Yanong, p. 8. Under the facts of the case, the defendants on a live “podcast” expressed on multiple occasions their belief that the plaintiff was a victim of sex-trafficking and that she was purchased by her much-older husband. Id. at 1. The defendant(s) also labeled the plaintiff’s marriage as “legalized prostitution,” and stated that they had contacted foreign authorities to inform them the plaintiff was a victim of “trafficking.” Id. at 2. The statements continued onto social media, where one defendant insinuated the plaintiff’s husband purchased her from a catalogue or an internet matchmaking site. Id.

On appeal, the defendants argued the plaintiff did not prove the publication element of her case. Id. at 5. The appellate court found this contention meritless. The defendants “were fully aware they were engaging” in communications with third parties, they were recoding a podcast, were “shown onscreen on all the broadcasts,” and made comments that showed “they were aware that they had an audience and third parties were engaged in the interactive broadcast.” Id. at 17-19. Thus, the Second Circuit found Plaintiff met her burden on the publication element and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id. at. 20.

While the publication element can present a hurdle in some cases, the publication need not be in a national media source as featured in the Depp-Heard case. The Yanong decision reminds that statements made on social media and podcasts can meet the required standard.

A Decade Old Article Finds New Life: Televised Testimony - Keogh Cox.

Effective August 1, 2021, La. R.S. 23:291.2 will impact the hiring practices used by many employers. Under the new statute, unless otherwise allowed by law, “when making a hiring decision, an employer shall not request or consider an arrest record or charge that did not result in a conviction, if such information is received in the course of a background check.” This is a dramatic change for employers who consider arrest histories in the hiring process. But the statute does not stop with arrest records.

When considering “other” types of criminal history records, i.e., convictions or pleas, an employer “shall make an individual assessment of whether an applicant’s criminal history record has a direct and adverse relationship with the specific duties of the job that may justify denying the applicant the position.” In this assessment, the employer is to consider:

(1) The nature and gravity of the offense or conduct;

(2) The time that has elapsed since the offense, conduct, or conviction; and,

(3) The nature of the job sought.

Upon written request, an employer shall also make available to the applicant any background check information used during the hiring process. While an arrest is not proof an applicant engaged in criminal conduct, a conviction record is usually sufficient to show criminal conduct. See EEOC guidance at https://www.eeoc.gov/pre-employment-inquiries-and-arrest-conviction.

With convictions, the new Louisiana statute places a burden on the employer to make an assessment as to whether the criminal offense has a direct relationship to the specific job duties of the applicant. The statute gives little guidance as to how employers are to reach a conclusion.

At its core, the statute prohibits requests for arrests records and requires an employer to conduct an analysis as to whether a conviction is relevant to the job function before refusing to hire an employee on the basis of a conviction. The statute minimizes administrative burdens when it bars a consideration of arrests. Yet, it sets forth three factors employers must now weigh and measure for other criminal records. One reasonably asks how this statute- which appears designed to limit discretion in rejecting applicants with documented criminal records- will impact “negligent hiring” claims and other areas of the law.