C. Reynolds LeBlanc

The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court’s ruling that granted summary judgment in a premises liability case filed following an accident that occurred at the LSU Hilltop Arboretum. The Louisiana Supreme Court recently denied writs seeking review of the lower courts’ rulings. Keogh Cox attorneys, Brian T. Butler and C. Reynolds LeBlanc, defended the case.

In Hebert v. Louisiana State Univ. Sys. Bd. of Supervisors Through Louisiana State Univ., the plaintiff went to the LSU Hilltop Arboretum to attend a wedding. Before the wedding, she went to the ladies’ room located in the outdoor pavilion area. The door to the restroom is controlled by an automatic door closer. The plaintiff alleged that the door began to close with “excessive force” when she exited the ladies’ room, and her finger was injured when it slid into the hinge-side of the door.

The plaintiff claimed the automatic door closer was defective because it was not properly adjusted at the time of the accident. The plaintiff retained an expert professional engineer to support her claims. The expert inspected the door and the door closer approximately 19 months after the incident. He testified that when he inspected the door, it was closing too fast, was out of adjustment, and had been improperly maintained. The plaintiff argued these findings showed the door was also defective at the time of the accident.

The expert also said the doors should have been inspected and adjusted every six months. The plaintiff argued the alleged problem with the door would have been discovered if it was inspected as her expert recommended.

Keogh Cox filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf of the defendants. First, we argued the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that the door was defective on the date of the accident. While the expert opined the door was defective when it was inspected nineteen months after the accident, the plaintiff had no evidence to show the alleged defect existed at the time of the accident. Keogh Cox asserted that the expert’s testimony claiming a defect was pure speculation. The court agreed and found the plaintiff failed to show the door presented an unreasonable risk of harm.

Second, we argued the plaintiff could not show LSU had prior notice that the door was defective at the time of the accident. As the door to the primary restroom on the premises, it was frequently used. There was no evidence of any prior complaints or reports of problems with the door before the accident. The plaintiff argued that notice could be found because LSU did not have a set inspection plan for the door as her expert recommended.

The court rejected this argument, stating “The opposite is true; in the absence of other facts such as recorded complaints about a defect or hazard, the lack of a plan of inspection implies that the public entity has no knowledge of dangerous defects or conditions.” Thus, the court found the plaintiff failed to show LSU had notice of the alleged problem with the door.

Reference:

Hebert v. Louisiana State Univ. Sys. Bd. of Supervisors Through Louisiana State Univ., 2025-0246 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/7/25), 424 So. 3d 809, writ denied, 2025-01542 (La. 2/10/26), 425 So. 3d 1205.

A Louisiana litigant has a right to appeal a judgment rendered against it at trial and has two options to appeal the judgment. The litigant can take a suspensive appeal, which suspends the execution of the judgment pending the outcome of the appeal, or it can take a devolutive appeal, which does not. La. C.C.P. art. 2124 provides that when the judgment if for a sum of money, a party seeking a suspensive appeal must post security, or a bond, “equal to the amount of the judgment,” including interest.

What happens when a monetary judgment is cast against an insurer (and its insureds) and the amount of the judgment exceeds the limits of the insurer’s policy? Can the insurer be required to post bond in excess of its policy limits to suspensively appeal the judgment? The Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed this issue and ruled an insurer is required to post a security bond covering only its policy limits.

In Martinez v. Am. Transp. Grp. Risk Retention Grp., Inc., a jury cast judgment against a transportation group, its driver, and its insurer for damages the plaintiff sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The trial court rendered a judgment in the amount of $2,802,054.66, which was in excess of the $1,000,000 limits of the insurer’s policy. The insurer moved for a suspensive appeal and requested a reduced bond because its insured was no longer in existence and could not post a bond. Nevertheless, the trial court set the appeal bond at $2,802,054.66, plus interest. The insurer posted a bond in the amount of its policy limits plus interest and costs and sought appellate review of the trial court’s appeal bond order.

The Supreme Court observed that the contracts clauses of the federal and state constitutions prohibit the enactment of any law “impairing the obligation of contracts.” Therefore, the Court found that to require an insurer to post a bond for suspensive appeal in excess of its policy limits would render meaningless, and therefore impair, the terms of the insurance contract setting the policy’s limits. Thus, the Martinez court should have set security to allow the insurer to suspensively appeal the portion of the judgment up to its policy limit.

However, the Court refused to reduce the suspensive appeal bond for all the defendants cast in judgment. Instead, the Court ruled the insurer could suspensively appeal the judgment up to the amount of its policy limits, stay execution of that portion of the judgment, and devolutively appeal the remainder of the case for its insureds.

References:

Martinez v. Am. Transp. Grp. Risk Retention Grp., Inc., 2023-01716 (La. 10/25/24) 2024 WL 4579047.

A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device a party can use to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. La. C.C.P. art. 966 is the statute that governs motions for summary judgment in Louisiana. The statute was amended in 2015 to establish some new procedural rules for filing summary judgment motions. Before the statue was amended, the deadline for opposing a motion for summary judgment was set in the District Court Rules, and courts frequently allowed oppositions to motions for summary judgment to be filed after the statutory delay.

In 2015, the Legislature amended the statute to state that “absent the consent of the parties and the court, an opposition shall be filed” within the new fifteen-day deadline established by the article. In Auricchio v. Harriston, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled the amendments to the statute removed the discretionary language that previously allowed a court to allow a party additional time to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court ruled the amendments to art. 966 made the opposition deadline mandatory, and late-filed oppositions should not be considered in connection with a ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently revisited this issue in Mahe v. LCMC Health Holdings LLC. The Court considered whether a trial court may grant a continuance of a hearing on a motion for summary judgment when a party fails to file its opposition within the fifteen-day deadline set in La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2).

In Mahe, a party requested a continuance of the hearing after the fifteen-day deadline passed. While subsection 966(C)(2) provides that a continuance of the hearing is permitted “for good cause shown,” the Court held that the requested continuance could not serve to circumvent the mandatory deadline for filing an opposition, as described in the Auricchio case. Accordingly, the order granting the continuance was reversed, and the trial court was instructed to rule on the motion for summary judgment without consideration of the untimely filed opposition. In so holding, the Court reinforced the mandatory deadlines set in La. C.C.P. art. 966 and provided additional guidance on the procedural rules for filing and opposing motions for summary judgment.