"Cash Balance" Retirement Plan Bounces

A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device a party can use to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. La. C.C.P. art. 966 is the statute that governs motions for summary judgment in Louisiana. The statute was amended in 2015 to establish some new procedural rules for filing summary judgment motions. Before the statue was amended, the deadline for opposing a motion for summary judgment was set in the District Court Rules, and courts frequently allowed oppositions to motions for summary judgment to be filed after the statutory delay.

In 2015, the Legislature amended the statute to state that “absent the consent of the parties and the court, an opposition shall be filed” within the new fifteen-day deadline established by the article. In Auricchio v. Harriston, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled the amendments to the statute removed the discretionary language that previously allowed a court to allow a party additional time to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court ruled the amendments to art. 966 made the opposition deadline mandatory, and late-filed oppositions should not be considered in connection with a ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently revisited this issue in Mahe v. LCMC Health Holdings LLC. The Court considered whether a trial court may grant a continuance of a hearing on a motion for summary judgment when a party fails to file its opposition within the fifteen-day deadline set in La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2).

In Mahe, a party requested a continuance of the hearing after the fifteen-day deadline passed. While subsection 966(C)(2) provides that a continuance of the hearing is permitted “for good cause shown,” the Court held that the requested continuance could not serve to circumvent the mandatory deadline for filing an opposition, as described in the Auricchio case. Accordingly, the order granting the continuance was reversed, and the trial court was instructed to rule on the motion for summary judgment without consideration of the untimely filed opposition. In so holding, the Court reinforced the mandatory deadlines set in La. C.C.P. art. 966 and provided additional guidance on the procedural rules for filing and opposing motions for summary judgment.

Sometimes, a number of people or parties will file claims, in which each party alleges the same or similar injuries that were caused by the same or similar conduct. In these circumstances, federal and Louisiana law recognize class actions as procedural devices that can be used to aggregate the parties’ claims into a single action.

The purpose and intent of class action procedure is to adjudicate and obtain res judicata effect on all common issues applicable to the representatives who bring the action. However, this res judicata effect also applies to all others who are “similarly situated,” provided they are given adequate notice of the pending class action and do not timely exercise the option to exclude themselves from the class. Class actions are commonly filed in matters that involve common facts and damages such as plant explosions, claims based upon allegedly defective products, or claims involving employment practices or civil rights violations.

Before a court can hold a trial on the merits of a class action, the court must determine whether all of the procedural requirements are met for certification of the class. In making this determination, the court rules on whether the matter may proceed as a class action or whether the named parties must bring individual claims. In Louisiana, the threshold requirements for class certification are found in La. C.C.P. art. 591(A), which provides:

A. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all, only if:

(1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

(2) There are questions of law or fact common to the class.

(3) The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.

(4) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

(5) The class is or may be defined objectively in terms of ascertainable criteria, such that the court may determine the constituency of the class for purposes of the conclusiveness of any judgment that may be rendered in the case.

Every one of these requirements must be met for an action to be maintained as a class action. Stated differently, the class cannot be certified if even one of these threshold requirements is not met. A party seeking class certification must also establish one of the additional requirements outlined in La. C.C.P. art. 591(B).

In Doe v. Southern Gyms, LLC, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a court must conduct a “rigorous analysis” of the class certification requirements, to ensure that every one of them are satisfied before a case is certified as a class action. Moreover, it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove that every requirement of La. C.C.P. art. 591 is satisfied. While only the procedural requirements for class certifications are relevant to determine if a matter should be certified, the “rigorous analysis” required of the court oftentimes requires analysis of the overlapping merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.

Whether a matter should be certified as a class action is often a contested issue involving high stakes. If it is certified, the matter proceeds as a class action, where the claims are asserted on behalf of the entire class and can result in substantial damage awards. If the matter is not certified, the claim representatives must pursue their claims individually, which leads to significantly less exposure for defendants named in the action.

Case References:

Doe v. Southern Gyms, LLC, 2012-1566 (La. 3/19/13), 112 So.3d 822, 829.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, --- U.S. ---, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011).

In a 68 page decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Hayes Fund for the First United Methodist Church of Welsh, LLC, et al. v. Kerr-McGee Rocky Mountain LLC, et al. forcefully explained the role of an appellate court. It is axiomatic that Louisiana appellate courts are courts of review. Louisiana law specifically sets the standard of review an appellate court must apply when reviewing a trial court’s factual decisions (manifest error) or its legal decisions (de novo). According to Hayes Fund, a failure to faithfully apply the “manifest error” standard of review where applicable causes an appellate court to function as a “choice-making court” when its proper role is to serve as an “errors-correcting court.”

The plaintiffs in Hayes Fund alleged that negligence by Kerr-McGee caused two wells to stop producing, leaving valuable assets out of reach. After a lengthy bench trial which spanned a ten-month period and involved over twenty-five days of live testimony, the trial court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to prove that the defendants caused the loss. Thereafter, the Third Circuit reversed the finding of the trial court as an abuse of discretion.

The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the ruling in favor of defendants. The Court found that the primary issues in the trial court were factual issues concerning whether the experts were credible or factually correct, thus the “manifest error” standard of review should have been applied.

According to Hayes Fund, the manifest error standard of review is accomplished by undertaking a two-step process which asks: 1) whether there was any factual basis for the trial court’s conclusions; and, 2) whether the findings of the trial court were “clearly wrong.” Applying this test requires the appellate court to do more than “simply review the records for some evidence, which supports or controverts the Trial Court’s finding.” Instead, the appellate court must review the “entire record.” The Court cautioned that an appellate court is not to “re-weigh the evidence or to substitute its own factual findings just because it would have decided the case differently.”

Through its conclusion, the Hayes Fund Court provided clear guidance moving forward, stating:

Rarely should a District Court’s choice of expert(s) be found clearly wrong because it is so difficult to find a reasonable basis does not exist for the expert’s opinion relied upon by the District Court. It is destructive to the manifest error analysis for a reviewing Court to make its choice of the evidence rather than look for clear error in the reasonable basis found by the trier of fact. We have tortuously studied this scientific and voluminous record to demonstrate a proper manifest error review.

By its own terms, the Court intends the Hayes Fund decision in to provide “guidance” as to the “proper analysis for the reviewing Court(s).” While the principles discussed in Hayes Fund are not new or novel, the emphasis given by the Court was uniquely passionate and likely to quickly become a focus of future appellate argument and briefing.