Louisiana Supreme Court Confirms that Statutory Deadline to Oppose Summary Judgment Is Mandatory

A Louisiana court recently granted a motion for summary judgment in a case involving third-party criminal activity on a university campus. The motion initially was denied, but the Louisiana Supreme Court remanded the motion for reconsideration in light of its ruling in Evans v. Abubaker, Inc. After considering Evans in the context of a claim brought against an institution of higher learning, the court found Grambling University had no duty to provide additional security measures and could not have done anything within its scope of duty to prevent the murder of one of its students. See Augman v. Grambling State University.

In Augman, the plaintiff’s son, a student at Grambling University, was fatally shot at a party on the Grambling campus by another Grambling University student. The established facts confirmed the social gathering was on campus, that alcohol was consumed at the party, and that guns were present. In applying Evans to a higher education context and granting Grambling University’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Third Judicial District Court reasoned:

There are allegations of breached policies by Grambling, i.e., allowing alcohol consumption on campus, allowing a pop-up party, and not searching for weapons in all the dorm rooms. Despite those allegations, there is no evidence presented in this summary judgment that shows that by following any of those policies to the T, Grambling would have prevented this incident. Likewise, the evidence presented on summary judgment does not show that there are additional security measures that Grambling could have taken to prevent this tragedy.

There is no indication Grambling had any duty to provide any additional security measures in this case. Likewise, there is no evidence presented that Grambling could have done anything within its duty or scope of duty, analyzed with regard to Evans, to prevent this tragedy.

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s opinion in Evans explained that preventing third party criminal activity by someone who intentionally engages in criminal conduct is not within the scope of duty of a business owner. The Evans court held, “Some risks that arise because of a defendant’s conduct are not within the scope of the duty owed to a particular plaintiff because they are unforeseeable.” Augman applied Evans’ reasoning in a higher education/alleged negligence on campus context and dismissed the claims brought against Grambling University because preventing the shooting of one student by another student on its campus was not within Grambling’s scope of duty.

Just one month after the Augman ruling, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued the opinion of Campbell v. Orient-Express Hotels Louisiana, Inc. For more detailed analysis of this case, see a July 28, 2025, Keogh Cox blog by John P. Wolff III. In Campbell, the Supreme Court did not modify the duty/risk analysis but clarified the separate analyses of “duty” and “scope of duty”, concluding that the scope of the duty owed by the defendant hotel did not encompass the risk of the harm and injury suffered by the plaintiff. Again, the Campbell Court focused on “foreseeability” of the criminal activity and considered evidence that the plaintiff’s own actions placed him in the path of peril.

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s reasoning in Campbell echoes its decision in Evans, suggesting that the issue of “scope of duty” for third-party criminal activity on university campuses analyzed in Augman would apply in cases involving claims against other institutions of higher learning as well.

References:

Evans v. Abubaker, Inc., 2023-00955 (La. 5/10/24), 384 So.3d 853.

Augman v. Grambling State University, Third Judicial District Court, Parish of Lincoln, Supplemental Summary Judgment Ruling with Reasons for Ruling, Feb. 07, 2025.

Campbell v. Orient-Express Hotels Louisiana, Inc., 2024-00840 (La. 3/21/25), 403 So.3d 573.

In Hawkins v. Hi Nabor Supermarket, LLC, the First Circuit recently affirmed summary judgment in favor of Hi Nabor finding that Hi Nabor could not be liable to the plaintiff for injuries she allegedly sustained when she tripped and fell over a stocking cart while she was shopping in its store.^

The plaintiff claimed the stocking cart created an unreasonably dangerous condition that was foreseeable to the defendant. Hi Nabor filed a motion for summary judgment in response and attached affidavits of its employees, the store’s surveillance video of the incident, and excerpts of the plaintiff’s deposition.

The plaintiff failed to timely oppose Hi Nabor’s motion and then filed a motion for leave to file a late opposition. However, she did not attach or file any documents or exhibits in support of her opposition. The trial court granted Hi Nabor’s motion, and the plaintiff appealed the decision. On appeal, the plaintiff argued (1) summary judgment was granted “solely because an opposition was filed late” and (2) there was in sufficient proof that movers were entitled to judgment.

In response to the plaintiff’s first argument, the Court addressed the plaintiff’s failure to file an opposition to the defendants’ motion. See our prior blog for analysis of the impact of a party’s failure to timely oppose a motion for summary judgment here. The Court noted that a failure to timely oppose a motion for summary judgment does not automatically require that the motion be granted. However, if the mover meets its burden in its motion, and the plaintiff fails to file an opposition, the motion should be granted.

The court examined whether the defendant met its burden to support its motion in response to the plaintiff’s second argument. The Court found the defendant produced evidence to show that the stocking cart did not present an unreasonably dangerous condition such that liability could not attach.

The Court found that “stocking carts are necessary and useful in grocery stores to restock shelves, and that their common use and obviousness to a shopper make any risk slight.”* Further, surveillance video showed the size of the stocking cart (its’ tall sides were approximately the height of the plaintiff), the placement of caution cones around the stocking cart and the Plaintiff's interactions with the cart prior to the accident.

In light of the evidence filed in support of its motion, the Court found Hi Nabor met its burden of proof to show that plaintiff could not establish the stocking cart presented an unreasonable risk of harm that was reasonably foreseeable. When the plaintiff failed to produce evidence to meet her burden of showing genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the cart presented an unreasonable risk of harm, summary judgment was properly granted. The Court's decision highlights the importance of procedural requirements and reaffirms the principle that mere allegations of danger are insufficient and cannot defeat summary judgment without substantive proof.

References:

^Hawkins v. Hi Nabor Supermarket, LLC, 2023-0978 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/23/24), 2024 WL 743080.

*Citing Russell v. Morgan's Bestway of Louisiana, LLC, 47,914 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/13), 113 So. 3d 448, 453.

A worker’s benefits may be forfeited if the employee is untruthful on a medical questionnaire (if the misrepresentations directly relate to the alleged injury) or prejudices the employer’s ability to recovery from the “Louisiana Second Injury Fund.” La. R.S. 23:1208.1 Some Louisiana courts have shown reluctance to deny workers’ compensation benefits based on the employee’s alleged failure to truthfully answer a medical history questionnaire. However, the court in Spillman v. Career Adventures, Inc., --- So.3d ---- 2021 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/11/21), 2021 WL 3523959, held that benefits were forfeited because the claimant provided false responses to several medical history questions and failed to answer a number of specific questions on a post-hire medical history questionnaire provided by his employer.

At trial, it was established that Spillman had pre-incident medical conditions to include: 1) injuries related to a 2007 work-related accident; 2) regional sympathetic dystrophy of the left foot; 3) COPD; 4) chronic pain from a gunshot wound in his left leg; 5) surgery to the AC joint of his right shoulder; 6) injuries from a 2018 motor vehicle accident to the right shoulder and right knee; 7) anxiety; 8) bipolar disorder; and 9) many other ailments.

Like many other employers, Spillman’s employer Career Adventures included with its employment packet a “Office of Workers’ Compensation Second Injury Board Questionnaire.” Spillman failed to truthfully complete this questionnaire and checked “no” to specific questions which asked if he had experienced many of his known conditions such as COPD and bipolar disorder. Although Spillman took the time to respond to numerous “fill in the blank” questions, he purposefully skipped at least 10 inquiries.

Eleven months after hire, Spillman alleged he was injured at work while performing his duties as a welder. At trial, Spillman’s family physician identified a torn tendon in the left elbow as a work-related injury. He further testified that the tendon injury limited his activities and merged with his pre-existing injuries to create a greater total disability. The workers’ compensation judge (“WCJ”) ruled that Spillman violated La. 23:1208.1 by failing to truthfully answer certain questions. The Second Circuit “went further” in affirming the workers’ compensation judge, stating:

“We go further than the WCJ. All information which would have been disclosed had Mr. Spillman truthfully answered each and every question on the preemployment questionnaire must be considered …”

Therefore, the appellate court in Spillman found that both false answers and a failure to answer certain questions can qualify as a willful misrepresentation sufficient to cause a forfeiture of benefits under La. R.S. 23:1208.1 under certain circumstances.