Court Finds University Not Liable for Criminal Act of its Student

The liability of a premises owner for third-party criminal acts has been the subject of many decisions issued by the Louisiana Supreme Court. But recently, the Court clarified how to analyze this issue in the context of summary judgment. In Campbell v. Orient-Express Hotels Louisiana, Inc. (Windsor Court), the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and held that Windsor Court was not liable for a robbery that occurred in its courtyard.

The factual background is simple: Campbell was a frequent guest at the Windsor Court. He decided to approach a vehicle near the entrance to the courtyard when he pulled a “substantial amount of cash” to show the female occupants in the vehicle. He placed the money back in his pocket and talked with them for one minute and forty-six seconds. When he pulled the cash from his pocket a second time, one of the occupants grabbed the cash and the vehicle sped away dragging him with it. Campbell then sued the Windsor Court alleging negligence, strict liability, failure to warn, failure to ensure the safety of its guests, etc.

The importance of this decision is found in how the Court analyzed the case to reach its conclusion that summary judgment was proper: The Court noted that it was not modifying prior duty/risk analysis but was clarifying how the analysis is to be conducted—The issues of “duty” and “scope of duty” are separate inquiries that require separate analysis.

In Campbell, the Court acknowledged that “duty” is a question of law for the court. It then concluded that “(w)hether a particular risk falls within the scope of that duty, by contrast, ‘is fact sensitive and ultimately turns on a question of policy as to whether the particular risk falls within the scope of that duty.’” However, the court continued, “‘(t)he determination of legal cause/scope of the duty involves a purely legal question.’” The Court conducted an historical analysis noting that prior decisions had “merged the concept of duty and scope of duty into a single consideration.”

On the threshold question of duty, the Court acknowledged that in the context of third-party criminal activity, Windsor Court, as an innkeeper, owed a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect its patrons from criminal acts of third parties. Having found this duty, the Court then concluded that “Campbell cannot meet the ‘scope of the duty’ element of his claim.” In other words, “the scope of the duty owed by the Windsor Court did not encompass the risk of the particular harm and Injury Mr. Campbell suffered.”

Here the court asked whether this particular risk and injury were “foreseeable.” The Court examined multiple factors to find that the robbery was not foreseeable, but the Court further noted “perhaps even more important to our decision is the manner in which the robbery occurred.” Campbell was not unexpectedly accosted, but his own actions placed him in peril. As such, the Court found no “ease of association” between Windsor Court’s duty to take reasonable precautions to protect its guests and the risk that the guest would voluntarily approach an unknown vehicle and flash a sizable pile of cash.

Justice Crain concurred in the opinion and noted that “scope of duty can be resolved on summary judgment if reasonable persons could not disagree that the manner of the injury is either within or beyond the scope of the duty.” Justice Crain also noted that the manner of injury must be analyzed in the context of “foreseeability” from the perspective of the premises owner and have an “ease of association” between the duty and the manner of injury—this analysis is necessary to “avoid making a defendant the insurer of all persons against all harms.” Thus, he agreed with the majority that Campbell was unable to establish the scope of duty element.

Reference:

Campbell v. Orient-Express Hotels Louisiana, Inc., 2024-00840 (La. 3/21/25), 403 So. 3d 573.

"I never worry about action, only inaction."

- Winston Churchill

The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision not to take up a case is sometimes just as important as a decision to grant Writs and issue a ruling. Recently, much attention has been given to the Court's decision not to grant a Writ filed by Louisiana State University.

On August 28, 2013, the Court denied a Writ brought by LSU in a case filed by local media outlets in the 19th JDC demanding access to information regarding LSU's presidential candidates. The media appears interested in the interview process and why only one of the 35 candidates was formally interviewed. The media outlets argue that the information concerning the candidates is "public record" under Louisiana law.

Prior to the Writ filing, the state District Court had ruled that the information was public record and ordered LSU to produce the requested documents. LSU did not comply with this order. On August 14, 2013, LSU was held in contempt of court and fined $500 per day. LSU filed a Writ to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the Writ, stating that LSU had a "sufficient remedy" through a suspensive appeal. The Court offered no further explanation of its ruling.

Attorneys on both sides have publically offered differing opinions as to the significance of the Court's Writ denial. The attorney for the media outlets stated to Nola.com that LSU now must comply with the district court's order and produce the requested information. However, the attorney for LSU argues that the Court's Writ denial is functionally a "stay" of the District Court's order because the Supreme Court specifically expressed that LSU could file a suspensive appeal. LSU has expressed an intention to appeal the entire case to the Louisiana First Circuit.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently held that the New Home Warranty Act ("NHWA") is not the exclusive remedy for a purchaser of a new home where the builder fails to disclose known defects in the Residential Property Disclosure Act ("RPDA"). Stutts v. Melton, 2013-0557, -- So.2d. ----. The Court also upheld an award of damages and attorney fees for fraud victims who elect not to seek rescission of a sales contract despite no Civil Code article expressly allowing for attorney fees in such instances.

Builder Chad Melton completed a home in Walker, Louisiana in 2004. He and his wife lived in the home for approximately nine months prior to selling the home to James and Lisa Stutts. The Residential Property Disclosure Act, La. R.S. 9:3196, et seq., requires disclosures of known problems with a home prior to sale. Melton provided the Stutts with a disclosure form, but failed to mention that color had previously been observed bleeding onto the walls of the home from the roof.

In Stutts, it was factually established that Melton was aware of the roof defect because he had entered into a $13,600 settlement with the roof manufacturer to fund the replacement of the roof. Nevertheless, Melton cleaned the walls and installed gutters instead of the more expensive roof replacement.

Melton's gutter solution was ill-advised and unsuccessful. After discovering the problem in the summer of 2006, the Stutts filed suit seeking as damages: the repair costs for the roof; costs for additional repairs; and attorney fees.

The Stutts filed a motion for summary judgment on their fraud claim citing La. C.C. art. 1953. The Meltons opposed the motion, arguing that the NHWA provides the "exclusive remedy" available to the Stutts. The motion was granted and, after a bench trial on damages, the trial judge awarded damages to include attorney fees.

The court of appeal reversed both the summary judgment and the money judgment, holding that the Stutts' claims were untimely under the NHWA.The NHWA provides a one year warranty period for new home construction and an additional thirty day period in which to file suit under the Act. By its terms, the NHWA provides the "exclusive remedies" between a builder and an owner relative to home construction.

The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and reinstated that lower court's judgment. The Court held that the RPDA applied in this case because the home had been occupied by the Meltons after construction was completed. Even though the NHWA claims were prescribed, the Stutts possessed a timely claim that Melton had provided a fraudulent disclosure in violation of the RPDA.

The Court next addressed the Stutts' claim for attorney fees. The Court observed that no statute specifically authorized attorney fees where the plaintiff does not seek rescission of the sale. However, the Court reasoned, citing principles of equity found in Louisiana Civil Code article 4, that the legislature surely did not intend for victims of fraud to go uncompensated if they elect not to seek full rescission of the sale. Accordingly, attorney fees were held appropriate where fraud is committed but the victim elects not to seek rescission of the contract.

The Court's holding in Stutts may have a limited impact on the NHWA because of the peculiar facts of the case, i.e. the builder of the new construction living in the completed home before selling it to plaintiffs. However, the Court's award of attorney fees is an interesting development in the law. Time will tell whether the Court may be inclined to create further exceptions to the established rule that attorney fees cannot be awarded in the absence of statutory or contractual language awarding attorney fees.