Here Comes Hurricane Ida: What To Do If Your Home is Damaged by a Storm or Flood

Recently, a Louisiana appellate court found that images fromGoogle Earth images were admissible. In Walker v. S.G.B.C., LLC,2019-506 (La.App. 3Cir. 2/5/20); --- So.3d ---, 2020 WL 563818, theLouisiana Third Circuit rejected a challenge to the use of the images on thebasis that they were not properly authenticated.

In this case, the plaintiff sought recognition of ahistorical servitude of passage from his landlocked property. During the trial,the plaintiff offered Google Earth images of the property to show a gravelpathway on the alleged right of way. The images were dated January 2004,November 2005, and December 2017. Multiple witnesses identified the pathon the images. Thereafter, the trial court admitted the images into evidenceover the defendant’s objections.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the images were notproperly authenticated under La. C.E. art. 901 because the plaintiff did not:(1) have the creator of the images testify to their authenticity; (2) get acertification from Google that the images were what they purported to be; and(3) have an expert testify that the images were accurate depictions of whatthey claimed to be.

The Walker court affirmed the trial court ruling thatthese images were admissible. Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 901(B)(1)provides the testimony of a witness with personal knowledge may supply theauthentication of evidence required for its admission. Because the plaintiffidentified various landmarks on each image, and each image was subsequentlyrecognized by multiple witnesses (including the defendant’s witnesses), theCourt concluded there was sufficient support for finding the images authentic.

In Walker, the precise dates the photographs were taken were not critical. Under different facts, courts may choose to apply the authentication rules of Article 901 more stringently.

Chris Jones is a partner with Keogh Cox in Baton Rouge, LA. He focuses his practice on class actions and mass torts, and handles these matters in courts throughout the country. He is a life-long resident of Baton Rouge, where he lives with his wife and four children.

What does it mean to “waive” something? To an insurer in Louisiana, the meaning is clear; a waiver can mean thousands or even millions of dollars in insurance coverage that may otherwise be excluded. Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Forvendel v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 2017-C-2074 (June 27, 2018) clarified when an insurer will be found to have waived coverage defenses.

Waiver is generally understood as the “intentional relinquishment of a known right, power, or privilege.” Waiver occurs when there is: 1) a right; 2) that is known; and, 3) an actual intention to forego the right or conduct so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the right so as to induce a reasonable belief that it has been relinquished. The waiver rule is generally applied to an insurer who defends itself and its insured without having obtained a nonwaiver agreement to preserve its coverage defense. The joint defense of the insured and the insurer, without asserting a known defense, is deemed to be conduct inconsistent with the enforcement of the coverage defense and therefore a waiver.

In Forvendel, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered whether an insurer’s waiver of a coverage defense in a prior claim served to waive the coverage defense in a subsequent claim involving the same insured and similar circumstances. The key issue in the case was whether the insurer’s conduct in allowing the same insured to "stack" two UM coverages contrary to Louisiana's "anti-stacking" law (La. R.S. 22:1295 (1)(c)) when adjusting an accident claim in 2007 served as a waiver of the right to assert the anti-stacking law when adjusting a 2013 accident claim.

Luckily for insurers, who could be forever bound by past mistakes in their handling of claims, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the two lower courts and found the right was not waived. In so ruling, the Court distinguished prior case law in which a coverage defense was found to have been waived because the insurer’s conduct took place while handing the same claim, not a prior claim. The Louisiana Supreme Court also drew on a line of cases that allowed insurers to recover previously made payments under well-established principles of Louisiana law allowing for the recoupment of payments not due.

The Forvendel case provides a common-sense result by relieving insurers from unintended consequences from past omissions in the handling of an insured’s new claim.

Nancy B. Gilbert is a partner with Keogh Cox. She is a puzzle-solver by nature and uses these skills to provide clear and in-depth analysis of complex litigation issues. Nancy is a devoted grandmother, an avid camper and gardener, and enjoys renovating her 80-year-old home.

Ina recent case involving Keogh Cox attorneys, the Eastern District of Louisiana in MichaelBrander, Jr. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 18-982(Feb. 14, 2019), 2019 WL 636423 barred testimony of substantial projectedmedical expenses because it was not based on a reliable methodology. Thisruling stands to impact many other cases where plaintiffs seek to usefar-reaching projections of a life-long need for radiofrequency ablations("RFAs") or other pain-management modalities to "board" sixand even seven-figure numbers for future medical expenses.

InDaubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), theUnited States Supreme Court recognized the trial judge as the “gatekeeper” of expertopinion testimony and held that only reliable and relevant expert opinions maybe admitted. The reliability requirement serves to keep expert opinions“outside the gate” when they constitute unsupported speculation or meresubjective belief; only scientifically valid expert opinions are allowedinside. To ascertain whether an expert opinion is scientifically valid, Daubertinstructs the trial court to consider:

∙ whether theexpert’s theory can or has been tested;

∙ whether it hasbeen subject to peer review and publication;

∙ the known orpotential rate of error when applying the theory;

∙ applicablestandards and controls; and,

∙ the degree towhich the theory has been generally accepted in the scientific community.

InBrander, the plaintiff advanced medical testimony that he would needRFAs every year of his expected lifetime, a period of 36 years. The courtdisallowed the testimony, noting that the plaintiff’s physicians had less thanten years personal experience in administering RFAs to patients, the medicalliterature only considered the effectiveness of RFAs over a span of seven toten years, and there was no showing that the 36-year treatment plan was ingeneral acceptance by the medical community. According to the court, theexpert opinions offered by plaintiff failed Daubert “on all points.” Asa result, the plaintiff was permitted to introduce testimony of future RFAs foronly a seven-year period.

The reasoning of Brander may be equally applicable to projections of lifetime treatment involving other medical procedures, such as medial branch blocks, Botox injections, or spinal cord stimulators, for which the long-term efficacy has not been firmly established in the medical literature. Opinions unsupported by personal treatment experience and peer-reviewed medical studies are not scientifically valid and are properly halted “at the gate.”

Nancy B. Gilbert is a partner with Keogh Cox in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. She is a puzzle-solver by nature, and specializes in providing clear and in-depth analysis of complex litigation issues.