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Insurance Coverage for “Temporary Substitute Autos” in Louisiana

Published on: May 25, 2022

Louisiana insurance law recognizes a practical problem faced by many: the need to obtain alternative transportation when the car won’t start. Under La. R.S. 22:1296, any insurance on your personal vehicle must also extend to vehicles that are used as “temporary substitute autos.”

The statute provides that a car’s status as a “temporary substitute auto” depends on how the term is defined in the particular auto policy at issue. However, some rules typically apply to determine whether the auto is a “temporary substitute.” First, the use must be temporary, i.e. limited in duration. Second, the car must be a substitute for the auto insured under the policy and used for the same purpose. Third, policies typically limit coverage to substitute vehicles that the driver does not own.

Some policies also limit coverage by requiring that the substitution be needed for a purpose identified in the policy, such as the breakdown, repair, or destruction of the covered auto.

While the statute generally defers to the definition of “temporary substitute auto” provided in the policy, sometimes courts will overrule the insurer’s definition. For instance, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Safeway Insurance Company, 50-098 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/30/15), 180 So.3d 450, the relevant policy defined a “temporary substitute auto” as a substitute for the owned auto when the owned auto was “being serviced or repaired by a person engaged in the business of selling, repairing, or servicing motor vehicles.” The case involved a motor vehicle accident that occurred while the policy holder operated a borrowed vehicle but before she brought her usual vehicle to a mechanic.

Citing the terms of the policy, the insurer denied coverage on grounds that the policy required the “temporary substitute auto” not only take the place of the driver’s usual vehicle, but also that the driver take the car to a mechanic before coverage would extend to the substitute vehicle. However, the court found this requirement to be against the public policies behind La. R.S. 22:1296 and found coverage under the policy extended to the borrowed vehicle.

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Keogh Cox & Wilson, Ltd. provides this blog as a public service for general information only. The materials contained herein may not reflect the most current legal developments or even express the opinion of all or even most of Keogh Cox attorneys. Such material does not constitute legal advice or form any attorney-client relationship. Keogh Cox and all contributing author(s) expressly disclaim all liability to any person with respect to the contents of this Web site and Blog and expect that no reliance will be made upon the information provided.

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La. Supreme Court Determines Impact of Failure to Pay Filing Fee in Medical Review Panel

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently held that failure to pay filing fees necessary to add a defendant does not invalidate the proceeding as to other defendants. Prior to the ruling, Louisiana courts held that a failure to pay for one defendant invalidated the entire proceeding.

In Kirt v. Metzinger 2019-C-1162 (La. 04/03/20), plaintiffs requested a medical review panel after the death of their mother due to complications after surgery. Plaintiffs named three defendants—two doctors and the hospital. A letter from the Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board (PCF) was mailed to the plaintiffs, confirming that the defendants were qualified under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act, and informing the plaintiffs that they were required by La. R.S. 40:1231.8 to pay a filing fee of $100 per named defendant within forty-five days of the mailing of the letter. Plaintiffs responded, requesting to add two additional defendants to the panel, one of whom was an unidentifiable nurse. Plaintiffs also included payment of $500.

The PCF responded that it was unable to add the nurse without proper identification. Three weeks later, plaintiffs notified the PCF they were also unable to identify the nurse. Upon request, Parish Anesthesia was added to the panel instead. Nearly five months later, plaintiffs provided the PCF with the identity of the nurse in question and requested she be added. The PCF sent confirmed the addition and requested another $100 filing fee which was never paid. Nevertheless, the medical review panel thereafter determined that none of the defendants, including the nurse, breached their standard of care. Suit followed against all defendants.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the failure to pay the additional filing fee invalidated the proceeding as to all defendants. The trial court granted this motion, and the appellate court affirmed. Reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court found that the failure to pay the additional $100 filing fee did not invalidate the entire proceeding. The court observed that separate confirmation letters sent by the PCF provided a different forty-five day period during which to pay the filing fee tied to each individual defendant.

The Kirt court stated: “[t]he notion of ‘one filing fee’ for every panel proceeding cannot be reconciled with the different payment deadlines that arise when the PCF sends separate letters confirming defendants’ qualified status. A single filing fee cannot be subject to different payment deadlines.” The court dismissed only the nurse and remanded the remainder of case to the lower courts.

Chad A. Sullivan is a partner with Keogh, Cox & Wilson, Ltd. Prior to becoming an attorney, he worked as a licensed Registered Nurse. He utilizes his background in nursing on a daily basis in his law practice that primarily focuses on automobile liability, medical malpractice, nursing home litigation, healthcare professional licensure and discipline, and products liability.

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A Matter of Control: Vicarious Liability in Construction Projects

Under Louisiana’s comparative fault system, each party in a lawsuit generally is only liable for their own percentage of fault. However, in some instances, a party may be “vicariously” liable for the fault of another party. One example of vicarious liability is an employment relationship, where an employer can be liable for the fault of its employees. On the other hand, vicarious liability generally does not apply when the alleged “employee” is found to be an independent contractor. Whether a worker qualifies as an employee or an independent contractor often becomes an important issue in suits related to construction projects.

The test for determining whether a party is an employee or an independent contractor involves analysis of who has the right to control his or her work. In the construction context, courts distinguish between “operational control” (which suggests an employment relationship) and control as it relates to the results of the work (which suggests an independent contractor relationship). Two recent cases examine this issue and provide examples of how courts analyze the type of control necessary to establish vicarious liability in the construction projects.

In Stonetrust Com. Ins. Co. v. TBT Contracting, Inc. of LA, homeowners hired a general contractor to renovate their home. During the project, an electrical subcontractor was injured after falling through an attic space. It was alleged that the general contractor created a hazard by cutting a hole in the attic and concealing it. The plaintiff sued the general contractor and the homeowner. The court had to determine whether the homeowner could be liable for the subcontractor’s injuries, which would require a finding that the homeowner was vicariously liable for the general contractor’s fault.

The plaintiff argued that the homeowners were particularly involved in the project. It presented evidence to show the homeowners would give suggestions regarding the work to be performed and also directed alterations or additions to the work. The plaintiff argued that this demonstrated control over the general contractor’s work. However, the court disagreed. Despite the homeowners’ level of involvement, the court held that their control was limited to the results of the work, and was not “operational control.” The general contractor therefore was an independent contractor, and the homeowners were not vicariously liable for its acts.

In Baham v. Fisk Elec. Co., a city worker brought suit against a general contractor after suffering injuries from an electrical shock. The worker alleged that the general contractor was vicariously liable for the fault of its subcontractor. While evidence showed the subcontractor relied on the general contractor for the location of its work, the court found that this was not “operational control.” The court observed that general contractors are entitled to exercise supervisory control over its independent contractors to ensure compliance with the contract. It further found that suggestions or instructions given to an independent contractor do not equate to control over the methods or details of the work. Absent such “operational control” vicarious liability could not be imposed.

Though they may be limited to their facts, these cases show courts usually require a showing of more than suggestions or instructions regarding the work to establish the “operational control” necessary to trigger vicarious liability. Absent such a showing, independent contractors usually remain independent.

Case References:

Stonetrust Com. Ins. Co. v. TBT Contracting, Inc. of LA, 2022-0971 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/14/23), 2023 WL 2947826

Baham v. Fisk Elec. Co., 2022-0551 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/22/23), 2023 WL 2595253

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Hurricane Ida: Governor Extends Legal Deadlines

We previously reported that the Louisiana Supreme Court issued Orders suspending prescriptive, peremptive and abandonment periods for thirty days in the wake of Hurricane Ida. Governor John Bel Edwards has now issued a Proclamation. In addition to other actions, the Proclamation provides that legal deadlines applicable to “legal proceedings in all courts, administrative agencies, and boards” are suspended until September 24, 2021.

The Proclamation also authorizes hotels and motels to cancel reservations which would result in the displacement or eviction of first responders, health care workers, or anyone performing disaster-related work.

Sydnee D. Menou

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