Louisiana COVID-19 Immunity Laws

Anyone who has spent time in the humid South knows why swimming pools are popular. The Hoffmanns, Louisiana residents, tried to purchase an in-ground swimming pool to entertain their grandchildren but found the pool was far from the oasis they imagined. Recently, in Hoffmann v. B & G, Inc., 2016-1001 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/21/17), 215 So.3d 273, the First Circuit upheld an award in their favor which returned the price of the pool and additional costs related to its installation even though the seller was unaware of the problems with the pool at the time of sale.

The Hoffmanns asserted what is known in Louisiana law as a "redhibition" claim. Redhibition allows purchasers to void a sale if the thing bought has a “vice or defect” that makes it either:

(1) useless, or

(2) so inconvenient that the buyers would not have bought the thing had they known of the problem.

When the Hoffmanns purchased the pool, the seller arranged to have it installed, which was included in the price. The Hoffmanns used the pool for two summers. However, when they uncovered the pool for its third summer of use, they discovered that the pool liner had detached. The Hoffmanns later learned that the manufacturer no longer recommended their specific pool to be installed completely in-ground.

With redhibition, “good faith" sellers (sellers who did not know of the defect) must be given the chance to repair or replace the defective thing. Instead of repairing the pool, the seller of the Hoffmanns’ pool arranged for a new pool to be installed by a third party. Unfortunately, this second "replacement" pool also failed, this time because of an installation issue. After the second pool failed, the Hoffmanns filed suit.

The pool company argued that the Hoffmanns could not support a redhibition claim because the second pool they provided did not have a defect, but instead failed because of faulty installation. It claimed that it discharged its redhibition duties with respect to the first pool when it replaced the pool. The court disagreed and found that the "object" of the sale was a functioning in-ground swimming pool and that, after all of the efforts to repair and/or replace the original pool, the Hoffmanns still did not have a “defect-free useable in-ground swimming pool.”

The Hoffmanns won, making their summer a little more bearable.

Historically, Louisiana law provided that a professional rescuer injured in the performance of his or her duties “assumes the risk” of an injury and is not entitled to damages. See Worley v. Winston, 550 So.2d 694, 696 (La. App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 551 So.2d 1342 (La. 1989). This is known as the Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine and applied as a defense to claims raised by firefighters, policeman, and others. The doctrine prevented recovery because the professional rescuer “assumed the risk” of injury. Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Doe v. McKesson, 2021-00929 (La. 3/25/22) rejected the doctrine as a bar to suit by the professional rescuer.

In Doe, the Supreme Court of Louisiana accepted a certified question from the Fifth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals as to the viability of the doctrine. In response, the Supreme Court held that the Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine has been abrogated in Louisiana both legislatively under La. C.C. art. 2323 and jurisprudentially in Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So.2d 1123, 1132 (La. 1988).

The Court cited La. C.C. art. 2323(A), which provides that the fault of “all persons […] shall be determined” in a civil action. Subsection (B) of the article provides this rule applies “to any claim for recovery of damages for injury, death, or loss asserted under any law or legal doctrine or theory of liability, regardless of the basis of liability.”

In Murray, the Supreme Court previously held that the doctrine of assumption of risk no longer had a place in Louisiana tort law following the adoption of comparative fault. Nevertheless, the Murray Court identified two exceptions:

• Cases “where the plaintiff, by oral or written agreement, expressly waives or releases a future right to recover damages from the defendant,” if “no public policy concerns would invalidate such a waiver, the plaintiff's right to recover damages may be barred on a release theory;” and

• “[I]n the sports spectator or amusement park cases (common law’s “implied primary” assumption of risk cases).”

Murray, 521 So.2d at 1134. (internal citations omitted).

The Doe court observed that Murray provided no exception relative to professional rescuers. The Court further observed that, while the legislature had enacted statutes that bar plaintiff recovery in other settings, no such statute had been passed to codify the Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine.

Although professional rescuers injured in the performance of their duties may still be found at fault, the is no longer an automatic bar to suit.

Under Louisiana law, all automobile liability policies include uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (“UM coverage”) unless the insured affirmatively rejects such coverage, selects lower limits, or selects economic only coverage in writing. The question of what qualifies as a valid rejection of UM coverage has been debated in numerous lawsuits across the state. In Barbera v. Andrade, examination of this issue continued, and the court ruled that an initial rejection of UM coverage remains effective until changed by the insured’s written request.

In Barbera, the court examined whether UM coverage was triggered under a policy when the insured, who previously waived coverage, failed to respond to the insurer’s request to complete a new UM waiver form. It was undisputed that the insured executed a valid waiver of UM coverage in 2001. In 2014, the insurer sent the insured a letter that asked the insured to complete an updated coverage selection form and return it to the insurer’s office. The insured did not execute the updated form. A driver insured under the policy was involved in a motor vehicle accident in 2017 and filed a claim for UM benefits.

The insured argued the letter sent with the waiver form in 2014 was ambiguous and could be read to mean that failure to respond would mean that UM coverage would be read into the policy by default. Evidence also showed that some of the insurer’s employees also thought the failure to respond with the updated form would result in UM coverage.

However, La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(a)(ii) provides, “An insured may change the original uninsured motorist selection or rejection on a policy at any time during the life of the policy by submitting a new uninsured motorist selection form to the insurer on the form prescribed by the commissioner of insurance.” Thus, the Court ruled that the insured’s initial rejection of UM coverage could only be changed via written request by submitting a waiver form to the insurer. The intent of the parties was inconsequential.

Because the insured executed a valid UM waiver in 2001, it remained part of the existing policy. No event, such as a change in the policy’s liability limits, occurred that required the execution of a new UM selection waiver form, and the insured did not submit a new form to the insurer to obtain UM coverage. Therefore, UM coverage was not afforded under the policy, and summary judgment was affirmed in favor of the insurer.

Case Reference: Barbera v. Andrade, 22-147 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/30/22), 2022 WL 1733087, --- So.3d ---.