Leave Different: Gasquet Agreements and What Insurers Need to Know

Louisiana law requires UM coverage in automobile liability insurance policies in the same amount as the policy’s bodily injury liability coverage. UM coverage will be included in the policy unless the insured rejects UM coverage, selects lower limits, or selects economic-only coverage. This rejection, selection of lower limits, or selection of economic-only coverage must be made on a form prescribed by the commissioner of insurance and must be signed by the insured or its legal representative. See La. R.S. 22:1295. If a rejection form is not completed, UM coverage will be read into the policy. However, a valid UM waiver form executed for a policy of insurance remains in effect when that policy is renewed with a few exceptions. Generally, execution of a new waiver form is not required unless a new policy is issued or the liability limits increased. These basic principles were considered in the recent First Circuit decision in Johnson, et al. v. Bass, Geico General Ins. Co., and GoAuto Management Services, LLC, 2021 CA 0139 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/21).

In Johnson, the plaintiff obtained a policy of insurance from GoAuto on July 17, 2015 and validly rejected UM coverage on the commissioner’s UM rejection form. The plaintiff renewed the policy multiple times and also completed an “Application for Personal Automobile Insurance” on February 23, 2018 to add her husband and an additional vehicle to the policy.

The Johnson plaintiff was in a motor vehicle accident on November 26, 2019 and claimed UM benefits under the policy. She argued that the insurance application she completed in February 2018 to add a new driver and a new vehicle to the policy created a new policy of insurance that required completion of a new UM waiver form. Because a new UM waiver form was not executed in February 2018, the plaintiff argued that UM coverage should be read into the policy. Thus, the question posed to the court was whether the 2018 policy became new or was simply a renewal. The trial court found that the policy was a renewal and dismissed the UM claim.

The First Circuit affirmed and rejected the plaintiff’s argument holding, “the language of La. R.S. 22:1295 is clear and unambiguous; only changes in the ‘limits of liability’ to an existing policy will create a new policy that requires the completion of a new UM selection form.” Despite multiple renewals, the liability limits of the policy did not change from the date it was issued through the date of the accident. Importantly, the limits also did not change when the new driver and vehicle were added to the policy in February 2018. Thus, no new policy was created. The original rejection of UM coverage remained in effect, and the plaintiff’s claims against her alleged UM insurer were dismissed.

Purchase agreements for residential property routinely include financing provisions that require the buyer to show that he has applied for a loan. The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently analyzed such a provision in Abdelqader v. Ramos. The plaintiff in Abdelqader entered into a purchase agreement with the defendant for an unimproved lot on which the plaintiff planned to build his home.

The financing provision in the purchase agreement required the buyer to provide the seller with (1) written documentation; (2) from a lender; (3) that a loan application has been made; and (4) that Buyer authorized lender to proceed with the loan approval process. The provision also required that this documentation be provided to the seller “within 3 calendar days after” the date of Agreement.

After the parties executed the purchase agreement, various disputes led the seller to terminate the agreement and re-list the property for sale. The plaintiff sued for stipulated damages and attorney’s fees, which were allowed under the contract if either party breached the purchase agreement.

The buyer introduced evidence that his agent sent the seller’s broker a USDA pre-approval letter and certificate of eligibility for financing under a USDA Rural Development Program. These documents were sent to the seller’s agent before the parties executed the purchasing agreement. Generally, such pre-approval letters show the buyer appears qualified for a loan in the amount of the purchase. They do not confirm a loan was applied for or approved by the lender for the property to be purchased.

The seller argued that the pre-approval letter furnished by the buyer before the parties entered into the purchase agreement was not an actual loan application and did not verify that a loan application for the purchase had been made. The seller also argued that the buyer did not comply with the terms of the financing provision because he did not provide the subject documents within the three-day window after the purchase agreement was signed. The court rejected these arguments. The Court found the agreement did not require the buyer to produce his loan application to the seller or that the loan application be dated within three days of the Agreement. The buyer’s lender produced the pre-approval letter and the certificate of eligibility in response to the buyer’s application for financing and pursuant to the buyer’s instruction to proceed with the loan process. Though its ruling may be limited to the facts of this case, the Court found that the buyer complied with the terms of the financing agreement.

It appears the court viewed the seller’s claim that the seller did not comply with the financing provision of the purchasing agreement as after the fact justification for the seller unilaterally terminating the purchase agreement for some unrelated dispute. The Court found that the seller breached the purchase agreement and awarded the buyer stipulated damages of 10% of the contract price and attorney’s fees. This ruling also serves as a reminder that purchase agreements for residential properties are contracts, and breaches of these contracts can have consequences if terminated on a whim.

Reference:

Abdelqader v. Ramos, 2022-0305 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/30/22), 353 So.3d 750.

In a previous blog, we outlined developing law in the Louisiana appeals courts, and federal district courts in Louisiana on the issue of whether a claimant may maintain a separate cause of action against an employer for independent negligence when it is stipulated that the employee was in the course and scope of employment.¹ Most courts held a claimant could not maintain a separate action against the employer under these circumstances, reasoning that the employee’s fault would impute to the employer, and therefore, additional inquiry was not appropriate. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed the issue and stated:

“(A) plaintiff may pursue both a negligence cause of action against an employee for which the employer is vicariously liable and a direct claim against the employer for its own negligence in hiring, supervision, training, and retention as well as a negligent entrustment claim, when the employer stipulates that the employee was in the course and scope of employment at the time of the injury.” (Emphasis added) See Martin v. Thomas et al., 21-1490 (La. 12/21/21), 328 So. 3d 1164.

This holding notably overturned the 1^st Circuit Court of Appeal ruling in Elee v. White, - - So.3d - - (La. App. 1 Cir 7/24/20), 2020 WL 4251974 and other Louisiana 5^th Circuit Court of Appeals decisions. The Supreme Court in Martin reasoned that “the initial assessment of fault required by the law is not bypassed due to the employer-employee relationship” and “shielding a potential tortfeasor from liability is not compatible with a comparative negligence regime.” The Court further stated that the possibility that both the employee and employer may be at fault is not “subsumed” by the employer’s admission on course and scope. In fact, if the fault of the employee is shown, then the issue of whether there is also fault on the part of the employer remains and must be decided by the evidence on a case-by-case basis.

The consequences of this decision remain to be seen, but it is expected that claimants may also pursue employers separately on theories such as negligent hiring, supervision, and entrustment. The scope of such discovery will remain within the sound discretion of the trial judge.

By: John P. Wolff, III and Richard W. Wolff

¹Louisiana Appeal Courts Prohibit Direct Negligence Claims Against Employer; US District Court Uses Rule to Limit Discovery - Keogh Cox