Personal Liability of an LLC Member – Can an Informal Contract Create Liability?

On July 27, 2023, the Louisiana First Circuit entered judgment in favor of Louisiana State Trooper Andre Bezou in the shooting death of Coltin LeBlanc. The case was defended by Keogh Cox attorneys Drew Blanchfield, Brian Butler, and Collin LeBlanc. In support of its ruling, the First Circuit cited La. R.S. 9:2798.1 which provides qualified immunity for an officer’s actions, unless their action constituted “criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct.” The court found Trooper Bezou was entitled to qualified immunity under the facts of this case.

After midnight in an area of Hammond, La. dotted with bars and restaurants, Trooper Bezou spotted LeBlanc driving a large Ford truck. Trooper Bezou testified that he witnessed two traffic violations and initiated a stop. “Bodycam” footage captured the interaction. LeBlanc exited the vehicle, and when the trooper asked for identification, LeBlanc indicated it was in his truck. LeBlanc moved to the cab of the truck, and Trooper Bezou followed, stopping within the open driver’s side door. Based upon his observations during this interaction, Trooper Bezou suspected LeBlanc was intoxicated. Later testing confirmed that LeBlanc had a blood alcohol level more than two times the legal limit.

But LeBlanc was not attempting to retrieve his license. Instead, he revved the engine and attempted to flee with Trooper Bezou immediately next to the vehicle. Trooper Bezou later testified he feared that LeBlanc would steer the vehicle to run him over with the back left wheel. In reaction, Trooper Bezou latched onto the truck and LeBlanc sped around a corner and down the roadway. Trooper Bezou was able to draw his weapon and gave multiple orders to stop. Trooper Bezou testified that he feared he would be thrown from the vehicle or scraped against parked cars in the area. When the trooper received no indication LeBlanc would relent, he opened fire. Thereafter, the truck came to a rest.

In the subsequent litigation, plaintiffs argued that Trooper Bezou used “excessive force” and should have attempted to move away and allow LeBlanc to flee the scene. In response, Keogh Cox cited Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4^th 1159 (5^th Cir. 2021), where the federal Fifth Circuit held that no “clearly established precedent” would prohibit an officer from firing while perched on the running board of a fleeing vehicle. Finding no excessive force under the facts of the case, Harmon acknowledged the simple truth that “there is an obvious threat of harm to an officer” who is “on the side of a fleeing vehicle.” The facts presented to the First Circuit showed that Trooper Bezou gave more warning to relent than was given in Harmon.

The New York Times covered this incident in an article titled, “Before the Final Frame: When Police Missteps Create Danger.” 11/17/21. In its coverage, the New York Times reported that Trooper Bezou “appeared to be in grave danger.” It then suggested that the trooper could have just backed away. However, courts are instructed not a gauge questions of immunity from an out-of-context application of “20/20 hindsight.” Because the facts in this case showed Trooper Bezou was in grave danger “at the moment” force was used and was faced with a split-second decision, he was protected from liability.

Generally, Louisiana Workers’ Compensation laws provide coverage for an employee who sustains personal injuries by an accident arising out of and in the course of his or her employment. La. R.S. 23:1021(1) defines “accident” as:

"An unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration."

In Rayborn, Sr. v. Continental Cement Company, LLC et al, the plaintiff-employee filed suit when the worker’s compensation carrier terminated benefits based on its assertion that the plaintiff’s left knee injury was not the result of an “accident” as defined in the statute. The evidence presented at trial established the following:

• After returning home from work one day, the plaintiff began to feel soreness behind his left knee and believed he “may have pulled a muscle.”
• The plaintiff sought medical attention at a local clinic 2 days later.
• The plaintiff told clinic staff that his “leg was hurting,” and that he “was at work climbing up and jumping down off of barges all week.”
• After returning from a pre-planned family trip one week later, the plaintiff told to his managers at work that he hurt his knee “some kind of way” and that he was “doing too much climbing up and jumping down from barges “and his knee “just started hurting.”
• The chart from follow-up clinic visits stated, “Patient had [an] injury while at work when he jumped from a height and later that day felt a discomfort in the left lateral knee.”
• Additional records noted the plaintiff “injured his knee on the job; however it was not readily apparent until [his] knee became stiff later that evening.”
• The plaintiff later consulted with an orthopedic surgeon whose initial chart entry stated, “Over the course of the week, his knee began bothering him in the patellofemoral area and it started to become tight and swollen.”

At the conclusion of trial, the workers’ compensation court ruled that the plaintiff successfully proved that he sustained a work-related injury of his left knee on a particular date by climbing and jumping while performing his work duties. On appeal, the workers’ compensation carrier argued that plaintiff’s assertion that he was injured “some kind of way” over the course of a week was not sufficient to meet the requirement of a specific, identifiable accident in the course and scope of employment under La. R.S. 23:1021(1).

In affirming the decision of the OWC judge, the appellate court highlighted numerous opinions from the Louisiana Supreme Court and other courts of appeal wherein the statutory definition of “accident” was liberally construed to reject an interpretation that excluded “those workers who are worn down, rather than immediately crippled by, their work.” The opinion notes that it is well-settled in the case law that an “accident” exists when “heavy lifting or other strenuous efforts, although usual and customary, cause or contribute to a physical breakdown or accelerate its occurrence because of a pre-existing condition.”

The opinion added, “It is presumed the legislature is aware of how Louisiana courts have interpreted the statute; yet, it has taken no steps to overrule more than thirty years of Louisiana jurisprudence.” In so holding, it is unclear whether the court considered La. R.S. 23:1020.1(D), in which the Legislature specifically rejected the jurisprudential doctrine requiring a liberal interpretation of Workers Compensation statutes in favor of an employee. Despite this statement from the Legislature on the construction of Workers Compensation statutes, the Rayborn opinion suggests that courts may continue to base their decisions on the liberal interpretation of “accident” that has been developed and adopted by Louisiana courts when analyzing what types of injuries are covered under Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law.

References:

Rayborn v. Cont'l Cement Co., LLC, 2023-0403 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/10/24), 2024 WL 132802.

Imagine you are a defendant sued because you negligently injured someone in Louisiana. In the accident, the plaintiff received extensive medical treatment. The health insurer paid $50,000 for medical costs even though the doctors billed $150,000 for the plaintiff’s care. The plaintiff was only out-of-pocket $500 for his health insurance deductible. What amount should you have to pay: $150,000, $50,000, or only $500?

The answer to this question is not so simple. You will certainly have to pay more than the plaintiff’s deductible, that much is clear. But whether you are required to pay the medical providers’ full rate of $150,000, the insurer’s discounted rate of $50,000, or some other amount for the medical services provided is a more complicated issue.

This blog is broken down in a two-part series. This installment will address the background of the collateral source rule and the public policy behind the rule.

What is the Collateral Source Rule?

The collateral source rule provides that a tortfeasor is generally not entitled to a credit for payments made to a plaintiff through “collateral sources,” i.e., sources not provided by the defendant. Under this rule, a tortfeasor’s exposure for damages should be the same regardless of whether or not the plaintiff purchased health insurance.

The collateral source rule permits the plaintiff to recover medical expenses in excess of the amounts actually paid by the plaintiff or their insurer. Critics therefore assert that the rule provides a “windfall” to the plaintiff that violates the goal of Louisiana tort law, namely to make the victim “whole.” As applied, the rule can make the victim more than whole.

Origins of the Collateral Source Rule

To understand the collateral source rule, it helps to look at its origins. The rule in the United States at least dates back to the 1854 case The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152, 15 L.Ed. 68 (1854). In Propeller Monticello, two ships wrecked and one sank. The insurer of the ship that sank paid for the loss. The owner of the at fault ship asserted that the plaintiff had been fully compensated by the insurer’s payment and that it was therefore not obligated to pay for the damage. In rejecting this argument, the Propeller Monticello Court held the defendant was not a party to the insurance contract and could not reduce exposure by citing to the insurance available to the plaintiff.

Policies Behind the Collateral Source Rule

In Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 846 So. 2d 734 (La. 5/20/03), the Louisiana Supreme Court detailed the public policy concerns that support the collateral source rule. According to the court, the policies in favor of the rule include:

i. Fairness- a defendant should not gain an advantage from benefits provided to the plaintiff independent of any act of the defendant;

ii. Deterrence- the rule provides a deterrence to negligent conduct; and,

iii. Promotion of Insurance- victims could be dissuaded from purchasing insurance if that act could affect tort recovery.

So, how much do you owe: $50,000, $150,000, or some other amount? We’ll tell you in Part II of this blog.