Skip to main content
Insight

Simmons: No Bright-Line Rule as to Future Medical Specials?

Published on: June 25, 2021

The difference between the amount charged and the amount paid for medical treatment can be substantial. Knowing the dollar amount of the medical specials that a plaintiff will be allowed to seek at trial is often critical in case evaluation and resolution. In this context, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided a “bright-line” rule in Bozeman v. State, 03-1016 (La. 7/2/04), 879 So. 2d 692, that a plaintiff can only seek the amount actually paid for medical treatment, when it is funded by Medicaid. Our state’s highest court then added, in Simmons v. Cornerstone Investments, LLC, 18-0735 (La. 5/8/19), 282 So.3d 199, that only the amount actually paid for medical specials may be sought, when it is funded by workers’ compensation insurance. The “written off” amount is considered a “phantom charge” that the plaintiff will never pay. Some questions remain as to how courts will apply the holding and analysis of Simmons.

The rationale behind Simmons is that any discount in the amount of medical expenses given to the workers’ compensation carrier does not constitute a “collateral source” because the plaintiff did not give anything in exchange for the discount. Roughly six months after Simmons, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of the plaintiff’s total past medical expenses. Love v. Nelson, 2020-1050 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1/13/21), 2021 WL 118936, *1. Relying solely upon Simmons, the appellate court stated, “[T]he amount of medical expenses charged above the amount actually incurred is not a collateral source … . Accordingly, we find the trial court abused its discretion, and the motion in limine is granted and evidence of medical expenses not actually owed and paid by or on behalf of plaintiff … is excluded from evidence at the trial.” Id.

Federal courts, relying upon Simmons, have held that the collateral source rule does not apply to third-party-funded past medical expenses. See Collins v. Benton, Civ. A. No. 18-7465, 2021 WL 638116, *5, 8 (E.D. La. Feb. 17, 2021). However, see Lee v. United Rentals, Inc., Civ. A. No. 18-977, 2021 WL 2184763, *3 (M.D. La. May 28, 2021), where the court granted the defendant’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of the plaintiff’s past medical expenses not paid by workers’ compensation. Only the amounts paid by the employer/workers’ compensation carrier would be presented to the jury in support of the plaintiff’s past medical expenses. The court then added:

“However, there are two matters left in contention: first, may the Plaintiff offer evidence of the amounts charged by Plaintiff’s providers in connection with his back injury which [the employer] refused to pay? Second, may Plaintiff present evidence of the market rate for Plaintiff’s future medical needs or is he relegated to the amounts set out in the Workers’ Compensation Fee Schedule? As to both items, Simmons is not controlling.”

In other words, the federal court in Lee found that Simmons applied only to past medical expenses, but it did not apply to future medical expenses (i.e., the plaintiff would be allowed to present the full amount of anticipated future medical charges to the jury). As a federal court sitting in diversity, the Lee court applied the law of the state. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). The findings in Lee may be correct, but, until it is definitively resolved by legislative act or by the Louisiana Supreme Court, parties will likely continue to debate what impact the reasoning of Simmons will have as to future medical charges past the date of trial. If, as held in Lee, the reduced workers’ compensation rate is irrelevant to future medical specials, then plaintiffs will seek the full future medical charges. This blog does not address the potential impact of the “Civil Justice Reform Act of 2020” which can reduce a plaintiff’s ability seek full medical charges for cases arising after January 1, 2021 in some circumstances.

Posted by:

Disclaimer

Keogh Cox & Wilson, Ltd. provides this blog as a public service for general information only. The materials contained herein may not reflect the most current legal developments or even express the opinion of all or even most of Keogh Cox attorneys. Such material does not constitute legal advice or form any attorney-client relationship. Keogh Cox and all contributing author(s) expressly disclaim all liability to any person with respect to the contents of this Web site and Blog and expect that no reliance will be made upon the information provided.

Continue Reading

Explore legal perspectives on the issues shaping Louisiana's key industries and courtrooms.

Insight

Coronavirus and Workers Compensation in Louisiana

In Louisiana, workers compensation benefits can beowed if an employee sustains an accident or develops an occupational diseasearising out of and occurring during the course and scope of theiremployment. The definitions and burdens of proof differ for each.

An accident is defined by La. R.S. 23:1021 as:

(1) “Accident” means an unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable,precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault,and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which ismore than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration.

An occupational disease is defined by La. R.S.23:1031.1 as:

B. An occupational disease means only that disease or illnesswhich is due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to theparticular trade, occupation, process, or employment in which the employee isexposed to such disease. Occupational disease shall include injuries due towork-related carpal tunnel syndrome. Degenerative disc disease, spinalstenosis, arthritis of any type, mental illness, and heart-related or perivasculardisease are specifically excluded from the classification of an occupationaldisease for the purpose of this Section.

C. Notwithstanding the limitations of Subsection B hereof, everylaboratory technician who is disabled because of the contraction of anydisease, diseased condition, or poisoning which disease, diseased condition, orpoisoning is a result, whether directly or indirectly, of the nature of thework performed, or the dependent of a laboratory technician whose death is theresult of a disease, diseased condition, or poisoning, whether directly orindirectly, of the nature of the work performed shall be entitled to thecompensation provided in this Chapter the same as if said laboratory technicianreceived personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of hisemployment.

As used herein, the phrase “laboratory technician” shall mean anyperson who, because of his skills in the technical details of his work, isemployed in a place devoted to experimental study in any branch of the naturalor applied sciences; to the application of scientific principles ofexamination, testing, or analysis by instruments, apparatus, chemical orbiological reactions or other scientific processes for the purposes of thenatural or applied sciences; to the preparation, usually on a small scale, ofdrugs, chemicals, explosives, or other products or substances for experimentalor analytical purposes; or in any other similar place of employment.

Except as otherwise provided in this Subsection, any disabilityor death claim arising under the provisions of this Subsection shall be handledin the same manner and considered the same as disability or death claimsarising due to occupational diseases.

In general, if an employee can prove that they were exposed toCoronavirus at work, and that the particular exposure caused them to contractCoronavirus disease, they may be able to prove a compensable accident. The burden of proof is a tough one, of course, because it would seem to benearly impossible for an employee who contracts the Coronavirus to prove thecontraction resulted from work as opposed to exposure in some otherenvironment. However, it is important to note that one Louisiana courtdid find that a claimant was able to meet that burden when he contracted theWest Nile Virus by proving to the satisfaction of the Workers CompensationJudge, rather incredibly, that a particular mosquito bite occurring at work wasthe cause. Allen v. Graphic Packaging, 51,080 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1/11/17), 211 So.3d 1219. If a claimant isable to prove the occurrence of an accident, then the usual workerscompensation medical and indemnity benefits would be payable depending onmedical needs, disability status, or even death benefits if the employeeexpired as the result of such an accident.

For an employee to be able to prove that theircontraction of Coronavirus disease fits within the definition of anoccupational disease, they would have to prove that it was “due to causes andconditions characteristic of and peculiar to” their employment. Somehealthcare workers and others in related fields who become infected would seemto have an easier time proving their cases than others whose work would notcustomarily lead to such exposures. The definition above includeslaboratory technicians (which could be an expansive list as defined) whocontract a disease as the result exposure to something that they are workingon/with. The statute also provides some timing elements for claim filingand causation presumption, most of which would not seem to apply because ofnovel nature of the current Coronavirus outbreak. As with claims assertedas accidents, the usual medical and indemnity benefits would be payabledepending on the circumstances of the individual worker.

For additional details on the Allencase, please review Keogh Cox blog “One Particular Mosquito: West Nile Virus Foundto be a Compensable Workers’ Compensation Claim” by clicking here: https://keoghcox.com/one-particular-mosquito-west-nile-virus-found-compensable-workers-compensation-claim/.

Insight

An Exercise in Inaction

"I never worry about action, only inaction."

- Winston Churchill

The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision not to take up a case is sometimes just as important as a decision to grant Writs and issue a ruling. Recently, much attention has been given to the Court's decision not to grant a Writ filed by Louisiana State University.

On August 28, 2013, the Court denied a Writ brought by LSU in a case filed by local media outlets in the 19th JDC demanding access to information regarding LSU's presidential candidates. The media appears interested in the interview process and why only one of the 35 candidates was formally interviewed. The media outlets argue that the information concerning the candidates is "public record" under Louisiana law.

Prior to the Writ filing, the state District Court had ruled that the information was public record and ordered LSU to produce the requested documents. LSU did not comply with this order. On August 14, 2013, LSU was held in contempt of court and fined $500 per day. LSU filed a Writ to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the Writ, stating that LSU had a "sufficient remedy" through a suspensive appeal. The Court offered no further explanation of its ruling.

Attorneys on both sides have publically offered differing opinions as to the significance of the Court's Writ denial. The attorney for the media outlets stated to Nola.com that LSU now must comply with the district court's order and produce the requested information. However, the attorney for LSU argues that the Court's Writ denial is functionally a "stay" of the District Court's order because the Supreme Court specifically expressed that LSU could file a suspensive appeal. LSU has expressed an intention to appeal the entire case to the Louisiana First Circuit.

Insight

Workers’ Compensation: A Recent Louisiana Decision Revisits a Fundamental Issue

Historians call it "The Grand Bargain." At its heart, the workers’ compensation law is a bargain, an exchange between the employer and the employee. In this bargain, the employee without having to prove his employer's negligence receives the benefit of continued income and medical treatment. In return, the employer, even if it is at fault, receives protection from tort suits. However, for this bargain to apply, the accident must have occurred within the "course and scope" of employment. But the question of when an accident is considered to have occurred in the "course and scope" is not always as simple to answer as it might otherwise appear.

The issue of course and scope has been litigated many times, in many forums. The recent decision in Jackie Holden v. Mike’s Catfish Inn, Inc. and Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company, 2017 CA 1056 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/27/18) explores course and scope in the context of an employee who was on break.

In Holden, the plaintiff was "clocked in" and on the premises of her employer. When her daughter called and asked to meet her outside, the plaintiff took an employer-sanctioned work break, walked outside, and fell on the steps, causing injury to her left knee. She filed a tort suit against her employer alleging negligence for failing to remove a foreign substance which allegedly caused her to fall. The employer sought to dismiss the suit under the contention that the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy for the fall was workers’ compensation.

The trial court dismissed the suit as barred by the employer's workers’ compensation protections and plaintiff appealed. The sole issue before the appellate court was whether the plaintiff was in the course and scope. Plaintiff argued that she was on break and had left her designated work duties to speak with her daughter such that her activities at the time of the fall were not work-related. The employer countered that plaintiff remained on the clock during her break and was on the employer’s premises when she fell.

In assessing course and scope, courts consider the time of the accident, the place where the accident occurred, and the employee’s activities at the time of the accident. “An accident occurs in the course and scope of employment when the employee sustains an injury while actively engaged in the performance of her duties during work hours, either on the employer’s premises or at other places where employment activities take the employee.” Holden at p. 6, citing, McLin v. Industrial Specialty Contractors, Inc., 02-1539 (La. 7/2/03), 851 So. 2d 1135.

In ruling against the plaintiff, the Holden court colorfully concluded:

"An employee who is getting paid, is on her employer’s premises, and is on an approved work break is in the course and scope of her employment whether she is visiting her daughter, getting a breath of fresh air, smoking a cigarette, or walking outside to drink a diet coke."

While workers’ compensation is a bargain, Holden reminds that it is a bargain workers will continue to try to escape.

Virginia “Jenny” McLin is a partner at Keogh Cox who practices in the fields of corporate litigation, insurance defense, and workers' compensation defense. When she is not practicing law, Jenny can be found volunteering with the Junior League of Baton Rouge; cheering for the LSU Tigers with her husband, Ryan; or shuffling her two kids to and from dance practice.

Catherine S. Giering

Partner
Louisiana Supreme Court
Medical
Workers' Compensation