Insight

Supreme Court Abrogates Louisiana’s “Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine”

Published on: May 11, 2022

Historically, Louisiana law provided that a professional rescuer injured in the performance of his or her duties “assumes the risk” of an injury and is not entitled to damages. See Worley v. Winston, 550 So.2d 694, 696 (La. App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 551 So.2d 1342 (La. 1989). This is known as the Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine and applied as a defense to claims raised by firefighters, policeman, and others. The doctrine prevented recovery because the professional rescuer “assumed the risk” of injury. Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Doe v. McKesson, 2021-00929 (La. 3/25/22) rejected the doctrine as a bar to suit by the professional rescuer.

In Doe, the Supreme Court of Louisiana accepted a certified question from the Fifth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals as to the viability of the doctrine. In response, the Supreme Court held that the Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine has been abrogated in Louisiana both legislatively under La. C.C. art. 2323 and jurisprudentially in Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So.2d 1123, 1132 (La. 1988).

The Court cited La. C.C. art. 2323(A), which provides that the fault of “all persons […] shall be determined” in a civil action. Subsection (B) of the article provides this rule applies “to any claim for recovery of damages for injury, death, or loss asserted under any law or legal doctrine or theory of liability, regardless of the basis of liability.”

In Murray, the Supreme Court previously held that the doctrine of assumption of risk no longer had a place in Louisiana tort law following the adoption of comparative fault. Nevertheless, the Murray Court identified two exceptions:

  • Cases “where the plaintiff, by oral or written agreement, expressly waives or releases a future right to recover damages from the defendant,” if “no public policy concerns would invalidate such a waiver, the plaintiff's right to recover damages may be barred on a release theory;” and
  • “[I]n the sports spectator or amusement park cases (common law’s “implied primary” assumption of risk cases).”

Murray, 521 So.2d at 1134. (internal citations omitted).

The Doe court observed that Murray provided no exception relative to professional rescuers. The Court further observed that, while the legislature had enacted statutes that bar plaintiff recovery in other settings, no such statute had been passed to codify the Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine.

Although professional rescuers injured in the performance of their duties may still be found at fault, the is no longer an automatic bar to suit.

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Insight

Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Making Smart People Feel Dumb

I have met smart, sophisticated “business” people whose eyes glass over when they try to explain their understanding of “UM” coverage. The picture becomes murkier when discussing “economic-only UM,” a form of UM coverage many people purchase without even knowing it. Through many years and conversations, I have come to conclude that there is a general fogginess that obscures this entire subject with many, if not most, people. This blog is an effort to improve understanding on the subject.What is “UM” Coverage?“UM” signifies “uninsured motorist” insurance coverage, but is more properly described as “uninsured/underinsured” motorist coverage. A person, family, business, or group purchases UM coverage to respond to damages caused in an accident by someone who has either no insurance or not enough to cover the loss. You purchase UM insurance to protect yourself or those connected to you. Without UM, you are gambling that the person who caused the accident (the “tortfeasor”) will have insurance coverage, and enough coverage, to respond to the injuries and damages they have caused.Why UM?This question is simply answered in a two-part response:#1- The roads are dangerous-Unless you are a crop duster or an undercover agent, the most dangerous thing you will likely do on any given day is to drive on a public road, even more so in the age of “smartphones” and distracted-driving.#2- Many drivers lack sufficient liability coverage- An unhealthy portion of drivers have either no insurance on insufficient insurance coverage to address an accident involving severe injuries or damages. The State of Louisiana requires motorists to obtain at least the minimum insurance of $15,000 “per person,” $30,000 “per accident,” and $25,000 to address property damage. If you do not purchase UM, you are trusting that these limits will be enough, as they might be in a minor accident. But what if the injuries are severe or you have multiple passengers in your car, van, or suburban?Often, the same people who reject UM, will buy “collision” coverage on their car to make sure they are not left paying for a car note after the car is destroyed in an accident. In this limited way, you can think of UM insurance as collision coverage on you, your family, passengers, or employees.While perfect statistics are not available, many drivers on the road have no insurance. Frequently, drivers will obtain minimum limits insurance through a “premium finance” arrangement, but will have stopped paying the premiums (thereby losing coverage) by the time of an accident.What is “Economic-Only” UM?In Louisiana, UM coverage will be afforded to you unless you “waive” the coverage under La. R.S. 22:1295. Louisiana residents are presented with a form that allows them to waive or select UM coverage. They are also allowed to select “economic-only” UM. People often choose this option because it is cheaper, but economic-only UM coverage will only pay for economic damages such as lost wages, medical bills, funeral costs, and other monetary damages. Economic-only UM will not pay money to compensate for pain and suffering/mental anguish, scarring and disfigurement, or other non-economic damages.FAQS

  • Can UM protect me from a hit-and-run driver? Yes.
  • What if another driver’s negligence caused the accident, but there was no physical contact with that driver’s vehicle and they fled? In this scenario, UM may be available under La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(f); however, you will need to identify an “independent and disinterested witness” to establish the actions of the unidentified driver.
  • Will UM protect me if I am at fault in an accident? No. The law would consider that a “moral hazard” and invite unscrupulous individuals to cause an accident in hopes of recovering under the policy they purchased.
  • Will UM protect me if I am a pedestrian? It may, depending upon the terms of your insurance policy.
  • What if an object falls from a vehicle and causes an accident? UM may be available in this circumstance. The ultimate answer may depend upon whether the “falling object” had come to rest before the accident. Rener v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 99-1703 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/05/2000), 759 So.2d 214, 215.

CONCLUSIONRational people may decide to reject UM to save money; and this decision may be the right one if they have health insurance, short-term disability, long-term disability, or others such protections. However, people often make such decisions with less than full information. Hopefully, you will make the smart choice.

Insight

Court Finds Legal Malpractice Claim Perempted Because the Client Knew It Received “Bad Advice” More than One Year Before Suit Was Filed

Legal malpractice claims in Louisiana are governed by a peremption period that cannot be interrupted or suspended. La. R.S. 9:5605(A) provides that a legal malpractice claim must be brought one year from the date of the alleged malpractice, or within one year from the date the alleged malpractice should have been discovered. However, even when a claim is filed within one year of discovery, it must be filed within three years of the date of the alleged malpractice. If a party fails to assert a legal malpractice claim before the peremption period expires, the right to bring the claim is lost.

The Louisiana Supreme Court holds that “peremption commences to run in a legal malpractice case when a claimant knew or should have known of the existence of facts that would have enabled him to state a cause of action for legal malpractice.” In Crosby v. Waits, Emmett, Popp & Teich, LLC, the court recently examined the types of circumstances that should inform a plaintiff that an act of alleged malpractice occurred, which would trigger the peremptive period in which the plaintiff’s claim must be filed.

The plaintiff in Crosby owned 75% of a company and was in the process of buying out the minority stakeholder. The company was involved in litigation at the time. Initially, the minority stakeholder maintained all of the recovery and risk related to the suit. In April 2016, an attorney advised the plaintiff to accept an offer to split the recovery and risk in the suit 50/50 as part of the sale. The plaintiff then accepted the 50/50 offer. The litigation concluded after the sale, in February 2018, and resulted in an adverse judgment for which the plaintiff was responsible pursuant to the 50/50 agreement.

The plaintiff filed suit on February 12, 2019, within one year of the verdict in the underlying litigation, and claimed that its attorney committed malpractice when he advised that plaintiff accept the offer to split the recovery and risk in the suit. Specifically, it was alleged the attorney failed to examine the nature of the litigation or discover that the seller’s employees were aware the suit bore serious risk. The plaintiff’s representative testified that he did not keep track of the litigation and therefore could not have known the attorney engaged in the alleged malpractice until the jury rendered its verdict in the underlying suit.

However, the minority stakeholder testified that he knew the 50/50 offer was a bad deal for the plaintiff. Another employee testified he thought the risk of loss in the underlying suit was apparent to everyone involved. The court agreed. Based upon the evidence presented, “it should have been obvious to all concerned that the 50/50 option was favorable” to the minority stakeholder, who was adverse to the plaintiff’s interest.

The court held that the plaintiff should have known its attorney may have committed an act of malpractice when he advised it to accept the 50/50 split before the underlying litigation concluded. Accordingly, suit was not filed within one year of when the plaintiff should have known the alleged act of malpractice occurred. The plaintiff’s claims that it lacked such knowledge could not stand up to conflicting evidence. Thus, the claim was peremepted, and the plaintiff’s suit was dismissed.

Case References:

Crosby v. Waits, Emmett, Popp & Teich, LLC, 2022-0395 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/21/22), 352 So. 3d 145.

Jenkins v. Starns, 2011-1170, p. 15 (La. 1/24/12), 85 So.3d 612, 621.

Insight

Sudden Emergency Defense: Now More Dispositive

On August 28, 2015, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied a Writ Application in Leandro Carias v. Vernon A. Loren, et al. This denial signifies that the "sudden emergency" defense may be properly applied at the summary judgment level. The defense in the Carias litigation was handled by Keogh Cox attorneys Gracella Gail Simmons and Collin J. LeBlanc.

In Carias, the defendant operated his 18-wheeler traveling eastbound over the Mississippi River Bridge when, according to his testimony, a "phantom driver" abruptly entered into his lane of travel and forcefully applied their brakes. In the sliver of time allowed, the defendant sought to quickly determine if he could safely move from his lane of travel. Incorrectly, he believed that there was sufficient space in the lane to his right and impacted a truck in that lane. In turn, that vehicle rear-ended the plaintiff.

A Motion for Summary Judgment was filed and won based upon the sudden emergency defense, which provides that one is not negligent when they fail to take reasonable measures to avoid an accident when they were presented with: 1) a sudden emergency; 2) which was not of their making; and, 3) which did not allow sufficient time for deliberation. In opposition to the Motion, the plaintiff cited testimony that the defendant was "following too closely," and contended that the defendant was therefore at fault and unable to seek the protections of the defense. In response, it was argued that whether the defendant driver allowed sufficient space between his vehicle and the vehicle to the front was non-material when it was the actions of the phantom driver which exclusively created the sudden emergency.

Plaintiff appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Louisiana First Circuit. Prior to Carias, the Louisiana First Circuit had questioned whether the sudden emergency defense could ever be used at the dispositive motion stage. On this subject, the Louisiana First Circuit stated as follows in Manno v. Gutierrez, 05-0476 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/29/06); 934 So. 2d 112, 117-118: "while we cannot say that it would never be possible to apply the doctrine on a motion for summary judgment, our research has disclosed no cases from this court that have so applied it, and by the nature of the sudden emergency doctrine, it would seem rarely appropriate on a motion for summary judgment." Nevertheless, the First Circuit upheld the Carias summary judgment finding that, unlike earlier cases, there was no conflicting testimony regarding the defendant's lack of opportunity to assess the situation or take other evasive actions.

In the Writ Application to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff cited to a "split in the Circuits" concerning whether the sudden emergency defense may be used at the summary judgment stage.  In response, it was argued that the decades of jurisprudence following the Louisiana Supreme Court’s establishment of the sudden emergency defense in Hickman v. Southern Pacific Trans. Co., 262 La. 102, 113-114, 262 So.2d 385, 389 (1972) demonstrate that the lower courts have not struggled with this doctrine and that nothing in Hickman nor the Summary Judgment Article prevent a consideration of the sudden emergency defense through motion practice.

As a practical matter, summary judgment may still be difficult to obtain in the context of the sudden emergency defense because of the highly factual context into which the defense is often sought for application. Nevertheless, after Carias, it appears likely that there is no legal prohibition to the use of the doctrine in support of a dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment

Written by:

Gracella Gail Simmons and Collin J. LeBlanc

Cole C. Frazier

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Louisiana Supreme Court
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