Supreme Court Clarifies Requirements of Unjust Enrichment Claim

In a case handled by our firm, a Lafayette-based global catering and life support client was sued by an employee based in Dubai for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The jury unanimously found that the employer (1) did not discriminate against the plaintiff because of a disability or (2) retaliate against him because he raised a complaint regarding the alleged discrimination.

The plaintiff had a written contract of employment with a one-year term that automatically renewed if he was not terminated. Upon the contract expiration date, the employer advised plaintiff that the contract would not be renewed for a successive term.

Plaintiff, an Army veteran, suffered from PTSD following his military service and deployment in Iraq. He claimed defendant discriminated against him on the basis of his PTSD, which he claimed as a mental health disability. Plaintiff further claimed that defendant retaliated against him after he complained to his direct supervisor and the head of human resources about the alleged discrimination. To support his case, plaintiff claimed he was not disciplined before his termination and did not receive negative performance reviews during employment. Significant pre-trial motion practice occurred and framed the issues for trial in two ways.

First, the defense learned of actions taken by plaintiff following the termination of his employment that would have provided a legitimate basis for termination had the actions been discovered before he was terminated. The defense argued that evidence of such “after-acquired” misconduct was relevant to credibility and independently relevant to calculate backpay that plaintiff sought, citing McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co. and McClung v. Hajek. Over defendant’s objection, the Trial Court excluded the evidence as highly prejudicial, instead finding that back pay was an equitable remedy to be decided by the Court in a subsequent evidentiary hearing related to the issue of back pay.

Second, the defense argued that non-certified medical record evidence submitted by plaintiff was hearsay and thus inadmissible to prove a disability. The Court agreed with the defendant and issued a limiting instruction that the jury was not to consider uncertified medical records for the truth of the matter asserted.

At trial, our client presented ample evidence of plaintiff’s performance deficiencies with respect to the vetting of vendors, which jeopardized the employer’s government contracts and the jobs of other employees. The majority of plaintiff’s performance issues arose in Dubai, plaintiff’s key area of oversight. Therefore, it was unbelievable that he would not know of, or take responsibility for, those performance deficiencies. In addition, the language of the written employment contract allowed for non-renewal of the contract. In a unanimous verdict as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 48, the jury ultimately found that although the plaintiff proved he suffered a disability, he failed to prove discrimination or retaliation under the Act.

References:

Staples v. Taylor International Services, Inc., et al., 6:20-cv-00192-RRS-CBW.

McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 361–62, 115 S. Ct. 879, 886, 130 L. Ed. 2d 852 (1995).

McClung v. Hajek, 79 F.3d 1145 (5th Cir. 1996).

On June 30, 2020, the last day of the 2020 First Extraordinary Session, the Louisiana legislature passed HB 57 legislation designed to revise tort law legislation. Although not yet signed by Governor Edwards, it appears he is likely to sign this legislation into law. The highlights of this new legislation include the following:

• The jury trial threshold has been lowered from $50,000 to $10,000;

• If the tort demand is between $10,000 and $50,000, the party demanding a jury must post a cash deposit of $5,000 within sixty (60) days of the jury demand;

• The existence of insurance coverage will not be communicated to the jury unless (a) the jury will decide a coverage issue; (b) “the existence of insurance would be admissible to attack the credibility of the witness under Article 607;” or (c) bad faith is claimed under La. R.S. 22:1973 or against the insurer alone under the Direct Action statute;

• The identity of the insurer will not be communicated to the jury “unless the identity of the insurer would be admissible to attack the credibility of a witness under Article 607.” The Judge will instruct the jury at the opening and closing of trial that there is insurance coverage for the damages claimed by the plaintiff;

• If Medicaid or workers’ compensation pays medical bills, the amount recoverable is limited to the amount actually paid. If health insurance or Medicare pays medical bills, the amount recoverable is limited to the amount actually paid (plus any co-pays, deductibles, etc.). Additionally, the Court shall award 40% of the difference between the amount of the bill and the amount paid. If anyone other than health insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, or workers’ compensation pays the medical bills, the amount recoverable is the amount actually paid and amounts remaining owed;

• Except for Medicaid and workers’ compensation the jury will only know the amount of medical treatment billed. After trial, the Judge will take evidence relevant to any discounts;

• Failure of the plaintiff to wear a seat belt is now admissible evidence of comparative fault or failure to mitigate.

Importantly, if signed by the Governor, HB 57 will become effective on January 1, 2021. It will have prospective application only and will not apply to a cause of action arising or action pending prior to January 1, 2021.

Chris Jones is a partner with Keogh Cox in Baton Rouge, LA. He focuses his practice on class actions and mass torts, and handles these matters in courts throughout the country. He is a life-long resident of Baton Rouge, where he lives with his wife and four children

A design professional’s duties and responsibilities on a construction project generally are outlined in its contract with the owner. Does a design professional’s duty extend to third parties? The Supreme Court recently addressed this issue and held that the design professional’s duty to third parties is limited to the terms of the contract documents.

In Bonilla, a construction worker was injured while performing demolition work on a construction project. The worker, who was a subcontractor on the project, filed suit against the architect and the engineer on the project alleging that these design professionals failed to monitor and supervise the execution of the plans to ensure safety on the job site.

The engineer and the architect filed summary judgment motions arguing that they owed no duty to oversee, supervise, or maintain the construction site. The trial court granted their motions. However, the appellate court found the contract between the architect and the owner may have inferred a duty was owed to the worker.

The appellate court referenced contract provisions that required the architect to make weekly site visits and to report to the owner any deviations from the plans. The court noted that the architect was on site the day of the accident and photographed potential unsafe conditions, which would have deviated from the plans. The appeal court reversed the trial court’s ruling granting summary judgment.

The architect filed a writ with the Louisiana Supreme Court, which reversed the appellate court’s ruling and reinstated summary judgment in favor of the design professionals. The Supreme Court emphasized “the duty owed to an employee of a contractor by an engineer or architect is determined by the express provisions of the contract between the parties.”

While the contract documents required the architect to make weekly visits to the jobsite, the purpose of this duty was to ensure that the owner received the building it paid for and that the progress and quality of the work met the plans. More importantly, the contract also provided that these site visits did not create a duty to supervise construction. In contrast, under the terms of the contract, the contractor had control over construction means and methods and responsibility for site safety, specifically including site safety for all employees.

The clear and unambiguous language of the contract dictated that the design professions owed the worker no duty. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the architect could not be held liable for failing to perform a duty that it had no responsibility to undertake.

Reference:

Bonilla v. Verges Rome Architects, 2023-00928 (La. 3/22/24), 382 So. 3d 62.