Insight

Volunteer Firemen "On the Hook" in Louisiana

Published on: March 26, 2013

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently held that the workers' compensation tort immunity provided by LSA-R.S. 23:1032 does not apply to suits by one volunteer fireman against another volunteer. See Champagne v. American Alternative Insurance Corp., 12-1697 (La. 3/19/13), -- So.3d ---. LSA-R.S. 23:1036 provides that workers' compensation is the sole and exclusive remedy provided to a volunteer fireman against a fire company. Champagne clarified that this immunity does not similarly apply to claims for personal injury brought by one volunteer fireman against another.

The last sentence of LSA- R.S. 23:1036(A) states as follows:

The remedies provided herein shall constitute the exclusive remedy of the volunteer member against the fire company as provided in R.S. 23:1032.

In Champagne, the attorney for the defendants argued that the legislature's incorporation of LSA-R.S. 23:1032 reflected the intent to extend immunity beyond the language provided by LSA-R.S. 23:1036(A). The defendants asserted that this last sentence has internal inconsistencies; the first portion of the sentence "standing in isolation, can be read to limit workers' compensation immunity solely to the fire company, whereas its last phrase specifically incorporates La. R.S. 23:1032, which applies workers' compensation tort immunity to officers and employees of the employer or principal." Defendants further argued that, "to not include co-volunteers as co-employees under La. R.S. 23:1032 is to render the phrase, 'as provided in La. R.S. 23:1032,' superfluous and meaningless."

The Supreme Court disagreed with the defendants' statutory interpretation arguments. The Court stated: "[t]he fundamental question in all cases of statutory construction is legislative intent and the reasons that prompted the legislature to enact the law." In assessing the legislative intent, the Court gave a "narrow construction" of the statute because the statute sought to provide immunity in derogation of "the delictual rights of injured workers existing in the Louisiana Civil Code." Under this narrow construction, "every presumption should be on the side of preserving the general tort or delictual rights of an injured worker..."

Utilizing a narrow (or "strict") construction of LSA-R.S. 23:1036, the Court found that the legislature did not expressly provide immunity to volunteer firemen. Further, the Court did not find intent to provide such immunity in the legislative history.

Champagne is not the first time a Louisiana court has commented on the application of Louisiana's Workers' Compensation Law to volunteer firemen. In 1994, the First Circuit held that a volunteer fireman was not an "employee" of the fire district and therefore was not eligible for workers' compensation benefits. See Genusa v. Pointe Coupee Volunteer Fire Dist. No. 4, 93-2214 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/7/94); 644 So.2d 851. The Genusa Court reasoned that workers' compensation did not apply when there was no employer-employee relationship, and that an employer-employee relationship does not exist without compensation.

The Champagne Court expressed its belief that LSA-R.S. 23:1036 was likely enacted in response to Genusa. However, the statute only granted volunteer members of fire companies "some workers' compensation benefits" and did not change "the law to define a volunteer member... as an 'employee' of the fire company for the purposes of immunity under the workers' compensation law." Emphasis added.

Both the Supreme Court and the appellate court in Champagne observed that a denial of immunity to volunteer firemen "may make members of the community reluctant to act as volunteers at their local department." However, the legislature did not clearly provide for such immunity according to Champagne. It would not be surprising to see the Louisiana legislature address the issue of immunity for volunteer firemen moving forward.

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One Particular Mosquito: West Nile Virus Found to be a Compensable Workers’ Compensation Claim

A Workers’ Compensation Judge in Monroe, Louisiana found that a claimant met his burden of proving that a specific mosquito bite at work caused him to contract the West Nile Virus, resulting in permanent total disability.

At trial, the claimant asserted that “he specifically remembers being bitten on his left leg by a mosquito” while working in the break room of his employer, Graphic Packaging. Claimant presented evidence that mosquitoes were present at the work site, although his purported eyewitness to the event (who also contracted the disease) was proven to have not been at work that day.

The director of the Ouachita Parish Mosquito Abatement District was offered by the claimant and testified that there was a prevalence of mosquitoes in Ouachita Parish during that summer which carried the West Nile Virus. Mosquitoes trapped near both the employer’s location and the claimant’s house tested positive. According to the director, the only way to determine if a mosquito is infected with West Nile is to have that particular mosquito tested. An expert epidemiologist for the employer added that the most commonly infected mosquitoes would not have been active during the middle of the day when the claimant alleges he was bitten.

Based upon the testimony of the claimant, his witness, and the experts, the Workers’ Compensation Judge ruled that the claimant had sufficiently proven that the specific mosquito infected with the West Nile Virus had bitten him at work. The court also stung the employer and its workers’ compensation insurer with penalties and attorneys' fees, finding that they had not contested the claim on a reasonable basis.

The Court of Appeal in Allen vs. Graphic Packaging, No. 51,080 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1/11/17), - - So 3d - -, upheld the Workers’ Compensation Judge. The court noted that all proof of the “accident” rested upon circumstantial evidence and that the claimant possessed no direct evidence that the break room mosquito carried the disease. In this setting, the claimant “faced a burden of proof to show circumstantially that the break room mosquito carried the disease.” Utilizing the “manifest error or clearly wrong standard,” the appellate court held that the claimant had met his burden despite his indirect proof.

The Allen court ultimately reversed the finding of permanent total disability, because the Workers’ Compensation Judge misapplied the statutory requirements. It also reversed the award of penalties and attorneys' fees noting that “there were numerous factors sufficient to validate Graphic’s reasonable controversion of Allen’s claim.”

Insight

Workers' Comp: "Failure to Answer" Results in Forfeiture of Benefits

A worker’s benefits may be forfeited if the employee is untruthful on a medical questionnaire (if the misrepresentations directly relate to the alleged injury) or prejudices the employer’s ability to recovery from the “Louisiana Second Injury Fund.” La. R.S. 23:1208.1 Some Louisiana courts have shown reluctance to deny workers’ compensation benefits based on the employee’s alleged failure to truthfully answer a medical history questionnaire. However, the court in Spillman v. Career Adventures, Inc., --- So.3d ---- 2021 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/11/21), 2021 WL 3523959, held that benefits were forfeited because the claimant provided false responses to several medical history questions and failed to answer a number of specific questions on a post-hire medical history questionnaire provided by his employer.

At trial, it was established that Spillman had pre-incident medical conditions to include: 1) injuries related to a 2007 work-related accident; 2) regional sympathetic dystrophy of the left foot; 3) COPD; 4) chronic pain from a gunshot wound in his left leg; 5) surgery to the AC joint of his right shoulder; 6) injuries from a 2018 motor vehicle accident to the right shoulder and right knee; 7) anxiety; 8) bipolar disorder; and 9) many other ailments.

Like many other employers, Spillman’s employer Career Adventures included with its employment packet a “Office of Workers’ Compensation Second Injury Board Questionnaire.” Spillman failed to truthfully complete this questionnaire and checked “no” to specific questions which asked if he had experienced many of his known conditions such as COPD and bipolar disorder. Although Spillman took the time to respond to numerous “fill in the blank” questions, he purposefully skipped at least 10 inquiries.

Eleven months after hire, Spillman alleged he was injured at work while performing his duties as a welder. At trial, Spillman’s family physician identified a torn tendon in the left elbow as a work-related injury. He further testified that the tendon injury limited his activities and merged with his pre-existing injuries to create a greater total disability. The workers’ compensation judge (“WCJ”) ruled that Spillman violated La. 23:1208.1 by failing to truthfully answer certain questions. The Second Circuit “went further” in affirming the workers’ compensation judge, stating:

“We go further than the WCJ. All information which would have been disclosed had Mr. Spillman truthfully answered each and every question on the preemployment questionnaire must be considered …”

Therefore, the appellate court in Spillman found that both false answers and a failure to answer certain questions can qualify as a willful misrepresentation sufficient to cause a forfeiture of benefits under La. R.S. 23:1208.1 under certain circumstances.

Insight

Court Finds University Not Liable for Criminal Act of its Student

A Louisiana court recently granted a motion for summary judgment in a case involving third-party criminal activity on a university campus. The motion initially was denied, but the Louisiana Supreme Court remanded the motion for reconsideration in light of its ruling in Evans v. Abubaker, Inc. After considering Evans in the context of a claim brought against an institution of higher learning, the court found Grambling University had no duty to provide additional security measures and could not have done anything within its scope of duty to prevent the murder of one of its students. See Augman v. Grambling State University.

In Augman, the plaintiff’s son, a student at Grambling University, was fatally shot at a party on the Grambling campus by another Grambling University student. The established facts confirmed the social gathering was on campus, that alcohol was consumed at the party, and that guns were present. In applying Evans to a higher education context and granting Grambling University’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Third Judicial District Court reasoned:

There are allegations of breached policies by Grambling, i.e., allowing alcohol consumption on campus, allowing a pop-up party, and not searching for weapons in all the dorm rooms. Despite those allegations, there is no evidence presented in this summary judgment that shows that by following any of those policies to the T, Grambling would have prevented this incident. Likewise, the evidence presented on summary judgment does not show that there are additional security measures that Grambling could have taken to prevent this tragedy.

There is no indication Grambling had any duty to provide any additional security measures in this case. Likewise, there is no evidence presented that Grambling could have done anything within its duty or scope of duty, analyzed with regard to Evans, to prevent this tragedy.

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s opinion in Evans explained that preventing third party criminal activity by someone who intentionally engages in criminal conduct is not within the scope of duty of a business owner. The Evans court held, “Some risks that arise because of a defendant’s conduct are not within the scope of the duty owed to a particular plaintiff because they are unforeseeable.” Augman applied Evans’ reasoning in a higher education/alleged negligence on campus context and dismissed the claims brought against Grambling University because preventing the shooting of one student by another student on its campus was not within Grambling’s scope of duty.

Just one month after the Augman ruling, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued the opinion of Campbell v. Orient-Express Hotels Louisiana, Inc. For more detailed analysis of this case, see a July 28, 2025, Keogh Cox blog by John P. Wolff III. In Campbell, the Supreme Court did not modify the duty/risk analysis but clarified the separate analyses of “duty” and “scope of duty”, concluding that the scope of the duty owed by the defendant hotel did not encompass the risk of the harm and injury suffered by the plaintiff. Again, the Campbell Court focused on “foreseeability” of the criminal activity and considered evidence that the plaintiff’s own actions placed him in the path of peril.

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s reasoning in Campbell echoes its decision in Evans, suggesting that the issue of “scope of duty” for third-party criminal activity on university campuses analyzed in Augman would apply in cases involving claims against other institutions of higher learning as well.

References:

Evans v. Abubaker, Inc., 2023-00955 (La. 5/10/24), 384 So.3d 853.

Augman v. Grambling State University, Third Judicial District Court, Parish of Lincoln, Supplemental Summary Judgment Ruling with Reasons for Ruling, Feb. 07, 2025.

Campbell v. Orient-Express Hotels Louisiana, Inc., 2024-00840 (La. 3/21/25), 403 So.3d 573.

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