What Mrs. O'Leary's Cow Has to Do With Spoliation

On August 28, 2015, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied a Writ Application in Leandro Carias v. Vernon A. Loren, et al. This denial signifies that the "sudden emergency" defense may be properly applied at the summary judgment level. The defense in the Carias litigation was handled by Keogh Cox attorneys Gracella Gail Simmons and Collin J. LeBlanc.

In Carias, the defendant operated his 18-wheeler traveling eastbound over the Mississippi River Bridge when, according to his testimony, a "phantom driver" abruptly entered into his lane of travel and forcefully applied their brakes. In the sliver of time allowed, the defendant sought to quickly determine if he could safely move from his lane of travel. Incorrectly, he believed that there was sufficient space in the lane to his right and impacted a truck in that lane. In turn, that vehicle rear-ended the plaintiff.

A Motion for Summary Judgment was filed and won based upon the sudden emergency defense, which provides that one is not negligent when they fail to take reasonable measures to avoid an accident when they were presented with: 1) a sudden emergency; 2) which was not of their making; and, 3) which did not allow sufficient time for deliberation. In opposition to the Motion, the plaintiff cited testimony that the defendant was "following too closely," and contended that the defendant was therefore at fault and unable to seek the protections of the defense. In response, it was argued that whether the defendant driver allowed sufficient space between his vehicle and the vehicle to the front was non-material when it was the actions of the phantom driver which exclusively created the sudden emergency.

Plaintiff appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Louisiana First Circuit. Prior to Carias, the Louisiana First Circuit had questioned whether the sudden emergency defense could ever be used at the dispositive motion stage. On this subject, the Louisiana First Circuit stated as follows in Manno v. Gutierrez, 05-0476 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/29/06); 934 So. 2d 112, 117-118: "while we cannot say that it would never be possible to apply the doctrine on a motion for summary judgment, our research has disclosed no cases from this court that have so applied it, and by the nature of the sudden emergency doctrine, it would seem rarely appropriate on a motion for summary judgment." Nevertheless, the First Circuit upheld the Carias summary judgment finding that, unlike earlier cases, there was no conflicting testimony regarding the defendant's lack of opportunity to assess the situation or take other evasive actions.

In the Writ Application to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff cited to a "split in the Circuits" concerning whether the sudden emergency defense may be used at the summary judgment stage.　 In response, it was argued that the decades of jurisprudence following the Louisiana Supreme Court’s establishment of the sudden emergency defense in Hickman v. Southern Pacific Trans. Co., 262 La. 102, 113-114, 262 So.2d 385, 389 (1972) demonstrate that the lower courts have not struggled with this doctrine and that nothing in Hickman nor the Summary Judgment Article prevent a consideration of the sudden emergency defense through motion practice.

As a practical matter, summary judgment may still be difficult to obtain in the context of the sudden emergency defense because of the highly factual context into which the defense is often sought for application. Nevertheless, after Carias, it appears likely that there is no legal prohibition to the use of the doctrine in support of a dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment

Written by:

Gracella Gail Simmons and Collin J. LeBlanc

The costs of litigation can be substantial, but a seldom used statute arms defendants with a tool to minimize these costs. If a defendant has not filed another pleading, La. R.S. 13:4522 allows the defendant to request that a court order the plaintiff to post a bond as security to cover certain costs. If the plaintiff fails to post this security in the time fixed, his case will be dismissed without prejudice.

The security identified in this statute can include expert witness fees, deposition costs, exhibit costs, and other related expenses. The defendant bears the burden of showing the amount needed for proper security. If a plaintiff’s damages are questionable, or preliminary investigation shows that the plaintiff might be apportioned most of the liability for the incident, the attorney filing the suit may think twice before pursuing the claim further, especially if a substantial amount of security is ordered.

By its terms, the statute does not apply to cases brought in forma pauperis. It also does not apply to claims filed in the Parish of Orleans. Everywhere else, the provisions of La. R.S. 13:4522 can add a layer of protection in the defense of frivolous claims.

John Grinton is a Keogh Cox associate whose practice areas include commercial and construction litigation. When not practicing law, John spends most of his time with his wife and son, and their two dogs.

Louisiana law favors the settlement of disputes. With a settlement, both sides agree to avoid costly litigation and obtain a certain, negotiated result. While neither side is completely happy with the result in a typical settlement, the case is at least closed and the financial and emotional drain of litigation is ended. But the recent decision in The Marietta Trust and The Warren Trust v. J.R. Logging, Inc., Fair Hills Farm, LLC, Jerry Avants, Jr., Thomas Keaty, Jr. and XYZ Insurance Company, 2016 CA 1136 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/11/17) shows what can happen when one of the parties change their mind. This case is important because it calls into question whether an exchange of emails is sufficient to reach a final settlement.

The Marietta Trust case involved a dispute regarding the wrongful cutting of timber and the parties seemingly came to a resolution. Via email, the case was negotiated and the terms were agreed upon. Formal settlement documents were drawn up and money was exchanged. However, when the time came to execute the final documents, one set of defendants refused to sign the paperwork. This refusal to sign came after the attorney for these defendants directly stated in an email that his "clients have agreed to the settlement." Id. at *4. In response to the refusal to sign, the other parties filed a Joint Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement which was denied by the Trial Court.

Settlement agreements are governed by the Louisiana Civil Code art. 3071 which provides that litigation can be resolved via settlement or compromise. A settlement agreement can take two forms: 1) recitation in open court; or 2) a writing. “The purpose of the writing requirement is to serve as proof of the agreement and the acquiescence therein.” Marietta Trust, 2016 CA 11336, Id. at *3. The writing must be signed by the parties or their agents. “Until the parties sign a written document or documents evincing their consent to the terms of the proposed agreement, a party is free to change his or her mind.” Id. at *3. Prior courts have found that emails meet the "writing" requirements. See, Geer v. BP America Production Co., 2014-450 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/5/14), 150 So. 3d 621; Dozier v. Rhodus, 2008-1813 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/5/09), 17 So. 3d 402.

The appellate court in Marietta Trust refused to enforce the "settlement." The court found that the exchange of emails was insufficient to meet the "writing" requirement of Civil Code article 3071 because neither the emails nor any other evidence showed that the attorney possessed "the express consent necessary to accept the terms of the settlement." Id. at *3.

When is a settlement not a settlement? Maybe when it came to you through your inbox. So, if an email from the attorney is not sufficient to perfect a settlement, what can we do? The answer offered by the 1st Circuit is to either: 1. Recite in open court; or 2. Obtain a writing that includes the client’s express consent given to the attorney to settle the case (presumably for the amount in the writing).