Andrew ‘Drew’ Blanchfield

In Saizon v. Dow Chem. Co., the plaintiff was injured while he was working for Turner Industrial Group at the Dow Chemical Plant in Plaquemine, Louisiana. The plaintiff named Dow and three of its employees as defendants. The Dow defendants moved for summary judgment on grounds that the plaintiff was Dow’s statutory employee at the time of the accident and therefore the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law (“LWCL”) provided plaintiff with his exclusive remedy for the claims he asserted against Dow and its employees.

The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The First Circuit affirmed summary judgment on appeal.

The Court found the contract executed between Dow and Turner Industries created a rebuttable presumption under La. R.S. 23:1061(A)(3) that Dow was the plaintiff’s statutory employer at the time of the accident. The plaintiff failed to produce evidence to rebut this presumption. Accordingly, the defendants argued plaintiff’s exclusive remedy was found in workers’ compensation, not in tort.

The LWCL generally holds that an employer is immune from tort actions brought against it by its employee. However, the LWCL includes an “intentional act exception,” where an employee can maintain a tort claim if he can show that his accident and injuries resulted from his employer’s intentional act. A plaintiff can establish the intentional act exception if he can show the employer “knows that the result is substantially certain to follow from his conduct.”

The plaintiff argued that the defendants were aware of the risk that a fire or explosion could occur before the accident. He also argued the defendants failed to follow Dow’s safety policies and OSHA guidelines at the time of the accident. Plaintiff argued this created an issue of fact regarding whether the accident was “substantially certain.”

The First Circuit disagreed, finding this evidence amounted to only “generalized knowledge of risk” that “falls short of the kind of actual intention to injure that robs the injury of accidental character.” In short, the court agreed with the defendants’ position that “an employer’s generalized knowledge of risk does not meet the intentional act test without proof of specific knowledge of risk to this plaintiff and moving ahead with operations anyway.” Plaintiff had no such evidence, and his claims were dismissed.

Reference:

Saizon v. Dow Chem. Co., 2025-1139 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/24/26), 2026 WL 1122621

Until recently, tort claims in Louisiana were subject to a one-year prescriptive period.* In Carollo v. Tulane Univ., the plaintiff’s claim was subject to that one-year prescriptive period, but she filed her suit more than one year after she was injured. Thus, the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed as prescribed. In so holding, the court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that her execution of a waiver form prevented her from timely filing suit for her alleged injuries.

The plaintiff was a member of Tulane’s Swim and Dive Team. As a team member, she signed Tulane’s Concussion Education Form, which concluded with the following statement: “I understand that this release means that, among other things, I am giving up my right to sue the institution for any such losses, damages, injury, or costs that I may incur.” Plaintiff sustained a concussion during practice on January 9, 2021. In her Petition, she alleged she discovered the full extent of her injuries on August 5, 2021. However, she did not file suit until February 17, 2023, which was beyond the one-year prescription period.

When a claim is prescribed on the face of the petition, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove her claim is not prescribed. Carollo first argued (1) the Concussion Education Form was a contract, (2) her claim arose from that contract, and (3) personal claims under contracts should be subject to a ten-year prescriptive period under La. C.C. art. 3499. The court rejected this argument because the concussion form did not meet the requirements for a valid contract under Louisiana law.

The plaintiff then argued that the doctrine of contra non valentem should apply. This doctrine provides “prescription does not run against one who is ignorant of the facts upon which their cause of action is based and applies an exception to the statutory prescriptive period where in fact and for good cause a plaintiff is unable to exercise his cause of action when it accrues.”

Contra non valentem can apply when there is some condition coupled with a contract that prevented the plaintiff from filing suit. The court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments asserting this theory. Even if Carollo could establish a contract with Tulane under the concussion form, she could not point to any physical, mental, or procedural condition that prevented her from investigating her tort claims and filing suit against it.

Contra non valentem can also apply when the defendant does some act effectually to prevent the plaintiff from availing herself from her cause of action. The plaintiff argued that she was forced to sign the concussion form as a member of the Swim and Dive Team and that the form prevented her from filing suit within the prescriptive period. The court also rejected this argument, holding the plaintiff “knew about her concussion related injuries but did not perform her due diligence within the prescriptive period to determine whether she could file suit.”

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s execution of a waiver form stating she agreed not to sue the defendant for injuries could not interrupt prescription for the plaintiff’s claim.

*La. C.C. art. 3493.1, which went into effect on July 1, 2024, now provides delictual actions/tort claims are subject to a liberative prescription of two years.

References:

Carollo v. Tulane Univ., 2024-0038 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/9/25), --- So.3d ---, 2025 WL 52557.

For medical malpractice claims in Louisiana, the general rule is that a plaintiff has one year from the date of the alleged malpractice to bring his claim for damages. However, La. R.S. 9:5628 also recognizes an exception to this one-year prescription period, when the plaintiff claims he was unaware of the malpractice and there was a delay in the discovery of the alleged malpractice. This is known as the “discovery rule.”

Under the discovery rule, the prescriptive period begins to run on the date the injured party obtains actual or constructive knowledge of facts “indicating to a reasonable person that he or she is the victim of a tort.”^ Constructive knowledge is “whatever notice is enough to excite attention and put the injured person on guard and call for inquiry.”^ When a plaintiff has knowledge of facts strongly suggesting that the complaint may be the result of improper treatment, and the medical provider has not misled the patient, then “the cause of action is reasonably knowable to plaintiff.”*

The court recently examined these principles in In re Singleton, where the plaintiff relied upon the discovery rule to assert a malpractice claim against his medical provider. The plaintiff alleged his physician negligently performed a lumbar procedure in May 2017. The plaintiff initiated proceedings against the medical provider on February 6, 2019, alleging he did not discover the alleged malpractice until February 10, 2018, when he experienced a “sudden onset of excruciating pain.”

In response to the plaintiff’s claim, the medical provider produced evidence to show the plaintiff went to the emergency room on November 21, 2017, with complaints of severe lower back pain that radiated into his hips and legs. Based upon this evidence, the defendant doctor argued the actual date of delayed discovery was November 21, 2017, and that the plaintiff’s claims prescribed because they were filed more than one year after that date.

The court agreed. It held the medical provider met his burden of proof when he presented evidence that “severe” or “excruciating” pain, which allegedly advised plaintiff of his claim, was first experienced in November 2017, not February 2018 as alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint. The plaintiff was unable to produce any evidence to support the allegations in his complaint about the timing of his episode of pain or to refute the medical provider’s arguments. Therefore, the plaintiff could not show his claim of delayed discovery until February 2018 was “reasonable.” The court affirmed that the date of discovery was in November 2017, and therefore the plaintiff’s claims prescribed before suit was filed in February 2019.

References:

In re Singleton, 23-190 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/28/24), 2024 WL 826169.

^Campo v. Correa, 01-2707 (La. 6/21/02), 828 So.2d 502.

*Carter v. Haygood, 892 So.2d 1261, 1273 (La. 2005).