Court Finds Signing of Waiver Form Does Not Extend Prescriptive Period

Keogh Cox attorneys Andrew Blanchfield, Chris Jones, and Chelsea Payne successfully defeated class certification in an action students brought to recover a partial refund of tuition and fees they claim they were owed after in-person classes were converted to remote learning because of the COVID-19 global pandemic. See Miazza v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College.

In 2021, plaintiffs Taylor Gunter and Michael Miazza filed a lawsuit seeking a partial refund of the tuition they paid to LSU for Spring 2020 classes. They alleged that they were entitled to a partial refund of tuition and certain fees because in-person classes were cancelled in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. In lieu of in-person classes, remote learning went into effect after spring break, from March 30, 2020 through the end of the spring semester.

In addition to their own claims for partial refunds, the plaintiffs tried to bring the case as a class action and moved to certify a class defined as: “All students who, as of March 13, 2020, were enrolled at Louisiana State University's main campus in Baton Rouge who paid Tuition and/or Fees for the Spring 2020 semester, or on whose behalf such payment was made.”

After the completion of discovery for class certification, and after the dismissal of Plaintiff Michael Miazza’s claim, Plaintiff Taylor Gunter filed a Motion for Class Certification. After hearing, the Trial Court certified the class as alleged, finding all the requirements for class certification set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 591 were satisfied. LSU appealed the decision to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.

The First Circuit reversed the Trial Court’s judgment and found the Plaintiff failed to satisfy all of the requirements for class certification. After conducting a rigorous analysis of the class certification requirements, the Court concluded that “a multitude of individualized inquiries and proof make up the liability and damages issues essential to the putative plaintiffs’ implied contract claims.” The Court identified some of these “individualized inquiries” as follows:

• which representations in each school’s or college’s catalogs, bulletins, and website materials did the putative plaintiff rely upon in developing his or her expectation and what particular facilities and on-campus opportunities did a putative plaintiff expect to utilize;

• whether the putative plaintiff has historically utilized on-campus facilities and opportunities; which facilities and/or on-campus opportunities, if any, were necessary for a particular school's or college's course completion;

• whether a putative plaintiff was satisfied with the online instruction, course credits received, and grading options provided; and

• whether a putative plaintiff actually suffered any financial loss, mindful of each student’s particular situation.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that the record lacked sufficient evidence to support findings of offers and acceptances, where were necessary (1) to establish meetings of the mind and (2) conclude each putative plaintiff and LSU consented to an implied contract. Any determination of liability for an implied contract also is dependent upon proof of facts individual to each putative class member. Therefore, the class would degenerate into a series of individual trials.

The First Circuit concluded that certification of the case as a class action was an abuse of discretion. It reversed the Trial Court’s judgment and decertified the matter. Plaintiff filed a Writ Application with the Louisiana Supreme Court. On January 14, 2025, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s Writ Application, finally resolving the class certification issue. As a result, Plaintiff cannot pursue class certification, but rather may only pursue her own individual claim.

References:

Miazza v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 2023-1194 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/9/24), 394 So.3d 874, writ denied, 2025 WL 87255 (La. 1/14/25).

“Prescription” is the timeperiod in which a litigant must file suit, or the action is barred. Oneof the first lessons a Louisiana law student learns is the importance ofdetermining the prescriptive period of a cause of action. Filing a causeof action too late is fatal. A recent decision from the Louisiana FifthCircuit Court of Appeal reads like a law school exam and illustrates thatdetermining which prescriptive period applies is sometimes the key to the case.

In DeFelice v. FederatedNat'l Ins. Co., 18-374 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/9/19), mold was discovered inplaintiff’s home on June 10, 2016. Plaintiffs notified their insurancecompany, who hired a mold remediation company to inspect the home. Whenthe home was inspected on June 22, 2016, the inspector verbally informedplaintiffs that the home was safe. On the same day, a separate moldinspector collected samples. The second mold inspector issued a report on June23, 2016 advising that mold remediation may be necessary. This reportspecifically stated that “certain mold and mold spores in buildings and housingcan result in mild to severe health effects in humans and can deteriorate thestructure of the dwelling resulting in content or structure damage.” Thesecond report was provided to the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs continued to live inthe home. In August of 2016, plaintiffs’ infant son was born. Shortly thereafter, the infant began to experience breathing issues and wasdiagnosed with a lung condition by December of 2016. Plaintiffs vacatedthe premises in January of 2017.

More than one year after receiptof the second mold report, plaintiffs filed suit on July 24, 2017 against theirinsurer and the inspector who advised that the home had no mold problems. Plaintiffs raised claims for property damage, damage to the health of theparents, damage to the health of the minor child, and consortium claims onbehalf of the parents for the damage to the minor child.

The DeFelice court foundthat prescription began to run on June 23, 2016 with regard to the parents’individual and property damage claims. Because suit was not filed withina year of the second mold report advising of possible health and propertydamages, the parents’ individual health claims and the claims for propertydamage were prescribed under the one-year period set by Civil Code article3492.

The minor child was not bornwhen the report was issued on June 23, 2016. Plaintiffs argued that thoseclaims were brought within a year of the child’s birth, and were thereforetimely. The DeFelice court agreed and held that prescription could notbegan to run until the child was born. While Louisiana law provides that a childis a “person” upon conception, this “legal fiction” applies only to protect theinterests of the child. The court reasoned that a finding that prescriptioncommenced prior to birth would not “protect the interests” of the child. While the parent’s claims were prescribed, the claim filed on behalf of theinfant, and any claims that the parents had related to their infant’s healthcondition, were timely.

The court's analysis inDeFelice reminds that determining which prescriptive period applies to whichclaim is often the most important issue.

A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device a party can use to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. La. C.C.P. art. 966 is the statute that governs motions for summary judgment in Louisiana. The statute was amended in 2015 to establish some new procedural rules for filing summary judgment motions. Before the statue was amended, the deadline for opposing a motion for summary judgment was set in the District Court Rules, and courts frequently allowed oppositions to motions for summary judgment to be filed after the statutory delay.

In 2015, the Legislature amended the statute to state that “absent the consent of the parties and the court, an opposition shall be filed” within the new fifteen-day deadline established by the article. In Auricchio v. Harriston, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled the amendments to the statute removed the discretionary language that previously allowed a court to allow a party additional time to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court ruled the amendments to art. 966 made the opposition deadline mandatory, and late-filed oppositions should not be considered in connection with a ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently revisited this issue in Mahe v. LCMC Health Holdings LLC. The Court considered whether a trial court may grant a continuance of a hearing on a motion for summary judgment when a party fails to file its opposition within the fifteen-day deadline set in La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2).

In Mahe, a party requested a continuance of the hearing after the fifteen-day deadline passed. While subsection 966(C)(2) provides that a continuance of the hearing is permitted “for good cause shown,” the Court held that the requested continuance could not serve to circumvent the mandatory deadline for filing an opposition, as described in the Auricchio case. Accordingly, the order granting the continuance was reversed, and the trial court was instructed to rule on the motion for summary judgment without consideration of the untimely filed opposition. In so holding, the Court reinforced the mandatory deadlines set in La. C.C.P. art. 966 and provided additional guidance on the procedural rules for filing and opposing motions for summary judgment.