The Runaway Railroad Jury Verdict: A Cautionary Tale for Attorneys and Jury Members

“Jury: A group of 12 people, who, having lied to the judge about their health, hearing, and business engagements, have failed to fool him.” - Henry Louis MenckenCongratulations, you have been selected for jury duty. As American as baseball, jury duty is a pillar of the American system of justice, and you can step right up and participate-if you are qualified. In this two-part series, we outline the qualifications and exemptions for potential jurors in Louisiana.In Louisiana, “all qualified citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered for jury service in the district courts of Louisiana and shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose, and that no citizen shall be excluded from jury service in the district courts of Louisiana on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or economic status.” La. Sup. Ct. R. 25To serve as a juror for a civil or criminal case, you must meet the following criteria:

1. Be both a citizen of the United States and Louisiana who has resided within the parish in which he or she is to serve for at least one year immediately preceding his jury service.
2. Be at least eighteen years of age.
3. Be able to read, write, and speak the English language and be possessed of sufficient knowledge of the English language.
4. Not be under interdiction or incapable of serving as a juror because of a mental or physical infirmity, provided that no person shall be deemed incompetent solely because of the loss of hearing in any degree.
5. Not be under indictment for a felony nor have been convicted of a felony for which he has not been pardoned by the governor. C.Cr.P. art. 401, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:3041.

If you receive a jury duty notice and do not meet one of the above requirements, you are encouraged to contact the jury commissioner’s office. Who knows, you may be free in time for the first pitch.

In Madden v. Fairburn, the plaintiff amended her petition to assert a UM claim against an insurer based upon the alleged negligence of a new defendant not named in the original petition. The amended petition asserted a new theory of liability but sought the same recovery under the same UM policy.

The issue presented to the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the First Circuit was whether the original petition interrupted prescription for the claim brought against the UM insurer. Because the insurer did not receive notice in the original petition that it could be liable for damages based upon the new defendant’s fault, the court found prescription could not be interrupted.

Madden was a passenger in a vehicle driven by John Seibert that collided with Steven Ray Fairburn. Madden timely filed suit against Fairburn and Capitol Specialty Insurance Corporation (Capitol Specialty), claiming uninsured motorist (UM) coverage under its policy. The Trial Court later dismissed Madden’s claims against Fairburn. While the appeal of that ruling was pending, and over five years after the accident, Madden amended her petition to allege Seibert was at fault and sought the same UM coverage any damages he caused. Capitol Specialty argued the claim brought against it in the amended petition had prescribed.

At the time of the accident, claims for torts/delictual actions had a one-year prescriptive period that commenced from the date of the injury or damage sustained* Claims to recover damages under a UM policy are subject to a prescription period of two years.^ Madden argued her original claim against Capitol Specialty interrupted prescription because her amended claim arose from the same accident and sought to recover damages under the same UM policy.

La. C.C. art. 3462 states that prescription is interrupted when an obligee (Madden) commences an action against an obligor (Capitol Specialty) in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue. However, in Kling v. Hebert, the Louisiana Supreme Court has clarified that the “essence of interruption of prescription by suit is notice to the defendant of the legal proceedings based on the claim involved.” The Kling judges emphasized that prescription serves to protect defendants from unexpected liability years after an event, particularly when a new legal theory or a different alleged tortfeasor is introduced.

The court also considered Trahan v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, which held that a claim against an insurer based on one party’s negligence does not interrupt prescription for a later claim against the same insurer based on another party’s negligence. Because Madden’s original suit was based on Fairburn’s negligence, Capitol Specialty did not receive timely notice that she would later seek UM coverage based on Seibert’s alleged fault. Thus, the appellate court ruled in favor of the insurer, affirming the prescription of the plaintiff’s claims.

References:

Madden v. Fairburn, 2024-0513 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/27/24), --- So.3d ---, 2024 WL 5232995.

Kling v. Hebert, 23- 00257, p. 4 (La. 1/ 26/24), 378 So. 3d 54.

Trahan v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 314 So. 2d 350 (La. 1975).

*La. C.C. art. 3492. See As of July 1, 2024, delictual actions are subject to a two-year liberative prescriptive period, applying to delictual actions that arose or after the effective date.

^ La. R.S. 9:5629.

A jury in the 16^th Judicial District Court awarded a garbage truck driver $8,307,050.00 in damages related to a September 16, 2016 accident with a train. The Louisiana Court of Appeal for the First Circuit reversed the decision in Theopholia Thomas v. BNSF Railway Company– because the answers to the questions on the jury verdict form were inherently inconsistent.

A garbage truck driver (Thomas) sued BNSF, the company that maintained a railroad track in the Town of Baldwin. On September 16, 2016, Thomas turned too wide while crossing railroad tracks, and his left front tire dropped off wooden planks on the crossing. This caused his left front tire to become stuck between the tracks. Thomas immediately began reversing the truck, then pulled forward and began moving across the railroad tracks. At that time, a BNSF train was bearing down on the crossing, blaring its horn. Thomas accelerated but train struck the rear of his truck. Thomas was injured in the incident.

Thomas filed suit the merits in May of 2022, the jury was provided a verdict form with a series of questions to 1) assign fault between the BNSF and Thomas; 2) determine the proximate cause of the accident; and 3) state the amount of damages. The jury completed the form, and a judgment was rendered by the Court in favor of Thomas.

The jury found: 1) that Thomas was negligent; 2) but that Thomas’ negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident; 3) however, the jury then assigned Thomas 15% of the fault. BSNF challenged the judgment, claiming that the answers on the jury verdict form were inconsistent. If Thomas was at fault, but that fault was not a proximate cause of the accident, then how was he assigned a portion of the fault? Before a party can be assigned fault, the jury must find both that the party was negligent, and that party’s negligence is a proximate cause of the accident.

The court of appeal overturned the over $8 million verdict in favor of Thomas because it agreed that the jury verdict form answers were inconsistent. La. C.C.P. art. 1813(E) provides that when the answers on a jury verdict form are inconsistent with each other, then the court shall not direct the entry of judgment but may return the form to the jury for further consideration or may order a new trial. The appellate court found that the jury could not both: 1) find that Thomas’ negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident; and 2) assign 15% fault to Thomas. Therefore, the verdict was vacated, and the case remanded for a new trial.

The lawsuit will be tried again – to a different jury. Certainly a cautionary tale.

References:

Theopholia Thomas v. BNSF Railway Company, 2023 CA 1209 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/6/24).