The Runaway Railroad Jury Verdict: A Cautionary Tale for Attorneys and Jury Members

La Code Evid. Art. 704 addresses the use of expert testimony in Louisiana Courts and provides, “Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not to be excluded solely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” Though the text of this article is simple, Louisiana trial courts often face questions about when an expert’s opinion crosses a line and invades the jury’s fact-finding function. These questions often arise in the context of Daubert hearings under La. Code Civ. P. art. 1425.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Hulin v. Snow, where the Court was asked to review the extent to which an expert in a civil case could offer testimony that addressed the ultimate issues of law and fact in the case. The ultimate issue in the Hulin case, which involved parental care, was the alleged negligence of the defendants. The Court examined multiple tendered opinions of the plaintiffs’ expert, including expert testimony about the defendants’ negligence and credibility.

In a Per Curiam opinion, the Court ruled that it was improper for the expert to testify on the ultimate issues of whether the defendants were negligent or credible. It held that “(a)lthough experts may aid the trial court in the determinations of ultimate facts, the final conclusions drawn from those facts belong exclusively to the trier of fact.” The testimony of plaintiffs’ expert stated conclusions about these ultimate issues. Therefore, it was inadmissible.

However, the Court did allow the expert, a board-certified pediatrician, to opine on the parental care of the defendants. “Even though this testimony may embrace some of the ultimate issues to be decided by the trier of fact, it is permissible.” It appears the Court found that this testimony did not state conclusions about ultimate issues, as the Court held that the trier of fact could accept or reject the expert’s opinions on parental care as they relate to ultimate facts.

Reference:

Hulin v. Snow, 2023-00530 (La. 6/26/23), --- So.3d ---, 2023 WL 4199310.

A jury in the 16^th Judicial District Court awarded a garbage truck driver $8,307,050.00 in damages related to a September 16, 2016 accident with a train. The Louisiana Court of Appeal for the First Circuit reversed the decision in Theopholia Thomas v. BNSF Railway Company– because the answers to the questions on the jury verdict form were inherently inconsistent.

A garbage truck driver (Thomas) sued BNSF, the company that maintained a railroad track in the Town of Baldwin. On September 16, 2016, Thomas turned too wide while crossing railroad tracks, and his left front tire dropped off wooden planks on the crossing. This caused his left front tire to become stuck between the tracks. Thomas immediately began reversing the truck, then pulled forward and began moving across the railroad tracks. At that time, a BNSF train was bearing down on the crossing, blaring its horn. Thomas accelerated but train struck the rear of his truck. Thomas was injured in the incident.

Thomas filed suit the merits in May of 2022, the jury was provided a verdict form with a series of questions to 1) assign fault between the BNSF and Thomas; 2) determine the proximate cause of the accident; and 3) state the amount of damages. The jury completed the form, and a judgment was rendered by the Court in favor of Thomas.

The jury found: 1) that Thomas was negligent; 2) but that Thomas’ negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident; 3) however, the jury then assigned Thomas 15% of the fault. BSNF challenged the judgment, claiming that the answers on the jury verdict form were inconsistent. If Thomas was at fault, but that fault was not a proximate cause of the accident, then how was he assigned a portion of the fault? Before a party can be assigned fault, the jury must find both that the party was negligent, and that party’s negligence is a proximate cause of the accident.

The court of appeal overturned the over $8 million verdict in favor of Thomas because it agreed that the jury verdict form answers were inconsistent. La. C.C.P. art. 1813(E) provides that when the answers on a jury verdict form are inconsistent with each other, then the court shall not direct the entry of judgment but may return the form to the jury for further consideration or may order a new trial. The appellate court found that the jury could not both: 1) find that Thomas’ negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident; and 2) assign 15% fault to Thomas. Therefore, the verdict was vacated, and the case remanded for a new trial.

The lawsuit will be tried again – to a different jury. Certainly a cautionary tale.

References:

Theopholia Thomas v. BNSF Railway Company, 2023 CA 1209 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/6/24).

The Judicial Interest Rate for 2024 in the State of Louisiana has been set at 8.75%. This is the highest the rate has been since 2007.

Generally, judicial interest is interest payable on a judgment that has not been satisfied. Depending on the underlying basis for the judgment, the date that the interest begins to accrue can be before the judgment is rendered. For example, La. R.S. 13:4203 provides, “Legal interest shall attach from date of judicial demand, on all judgments, sounding in damages, ‘ex delicto’, which may be rendered by any of the courts.”

In Workers Compensation matters, La. R.S. 23:1201.3 states, “Any compensation awarded and all payments thereof directed to be made by order of the workers' compensation judge shall bear judicial interest from the date compensation was due until the date of satisfaction. The interest rate shall be fixed at the rate in effect on the date the claim for benefits was filed with the office of workers' compensation administration.”

La. R. S. 13:4202 sets forth the method for the annual calculation of judicial interest in Louisiana: “The commissioner of financial institutions shall ascertain, on the first business day of October of each year, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors approved ‘discount rate’ published daily in the Wall Street Journal. The effective judicial interest rate for the calendar year following the calculation date shall be three and one-quarter percentage points above the discount rate as ascertained by the commissioner.” In consideration of these factors set by statute, the Judicial Interest Rate for 2024 will be set at 8.75%.

For context, the historic rates for the last 20 years are:

2023- 6.50%

2022- 3.50%

2021- 3.50%

2020- 5.75%

2019- 6.00%

2018- 5.00%

2017- 4.25%

2016- 4.00%

2015- 4.00%

2014- 4.00%

2013- 4.00%

2012- 4.00%

2011- 4.00%

2010- 3.75%

2009- 5.50%

2008- 8.50%

2007- 9.50%

2006- 8.00%

2005- 6.00%

2004- 5.25%