A Matter of Control: Vicarious Liability in Construction Projects

Pursuant to House Bill 291, Louisiana modified the prescriptive dates for wrongful death and survival actions. Survival actions are brought to recover damages a deceased person suffered before his or her death. For survival actions, La. Civil Code Article 2315.1 (A) now provides as follows:

If a person who has been injured by an offense or quasi offense dies, the right to recover all damages for injury to that person, his property or otherwise, caused by the offense or quasi offense, shall survive for a period of one year from the death of the deceased or two years from the day that injury or damage is sustained, whichever is longer.

A wrongful death claim can compensate the surviving family members for their own suffering following someone’s death. Similar amendments were made for the wrongful death statute. La. Civil Code Article 2315.2(B) now provides that the right of action for wrongful death prescribes one year from the death of the deceased or two years from the day that injury or damage is sustained, whichever is longer.

The changes to these articles went into effect August 1, 2025.

A conviction for DWI brings the consequences you might expect, such as the loss of driving privileges, expensive attorneys’ fees, and public embarrassment. However, there is one additional, less-obvious consequence of which many are unaware; Louisiana provides immunity from claims brought by a drunk driver who was at least 25% at fault in the accident which caused his injuries, no matter how severe the injuries.

Generally stated, if you are driving drunk and are in an accident that is mostly someone else’s fault, you will not be able to recover for the injuries you sustain. Similarly, if your fault injures a drunk driver, the statute may shield you from liability. The “drunk driving” immunity is found in La. R.S. 9:2798.4. The statute provides immunity against the claims of a driver with a blood alcohol level of .08 or higher.

The immunity may even apply to defendants who were not directly involved in the accident. In Stewart v. Daiquiri Affair, Inc., 20 So.3d 1041 (La. App. 1^st Cir. 2009), writ denied, 19 So.3d 477 (La. 2009), the immunity was found to apply to claims brought by an 18-year-old employee who consumed alcohol on the premises and was subsequently injured in a motor vehicle accident. Rejecting the argument that immunity should not apply when the employer arguably contributed to the under-age plaintiff’s consumption of alcohol, the appellate court in Stewart concluded that the statute’s language required immunity because the employee was more than 25% at fault and her blood alcohol content was over the legal limit.

Because the “drunk driving” immunity statute is supported by the legislature’s strong and long-standing interest in protecting citizens against drunk driving, it has been upheld and applied in many instances. Although you should not need another reason to not drive drunk, you now have one.

Louisiana is a fact-pleading state. Accordingly, Louisiana law requires that a petition contain “a short, clear and concise statement of all causes of action and material facts arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation.” See La. C.C.P. art. 891. Generally, the pleader must state what act or omission he will establish at trial. Legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations do not meet the pleading standards required by Louisiana law.

This concept recently was examined in Henderson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2021-0654 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/17/21), 2021 WL 7162224, where the court considered bad faith allegations the plaintiff tried to assert against an insurer in his petition for damages. At the time of the underlying accident, the plaintiff was a passenger in a Lyft vehicle that was struck by an unknown driver. Steadfast Insurance Company was the Lyft driver’s insurer, and the plaintiff named Steadfast as a defendant to recover damages under its policy.

The plaintiff later amended his petition to seek uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits under the Steadfast policy. He also sought penalties from Steadfast for alleged bad faith and dealing in its insurance practices. In turn, Steadfast filed an exception of no cause of action, arguing that plaintiff’s petition only contained legal conclusions and not specific facts, which were insufficient to support a cause of action. The trial court overruled the exception.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the decision. Plaintiff’s amended petition alleged that Steadfast “refused to deal with him in good faith, including but not limited to, refusing to issue unconditional (McDill) tenders and taking actions in violation of La. R.S. 22:1892 and La. R.S. 22:1973.” The plaintiff also generally alleged the insurer acted “arbitrarily, capriciously and without probable cause” in its failure to pay money under its policy.

The Court noted that the plaintiff’s allegations were legal conclusions asserted as facts, which could not be considered as well-pleaded factual allegations for purposes of a no cause of action. Importantly, the court reiterated that a court may not consider legal conclusions “clothed as facts,” citing Hooks v. Treasurer, 06-0541, p. 10 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/4/07), 961 So.2d 425, 431-32. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s allegations, absent additional information, were insufficient to state a cause of action. The plaintiff failed to state specific actions or omissions that would be established at trial. Hence, he failed to state a cause of action.