Insight

A More "Direct Action"

Published on: July 9, 2013

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently announced a decision that could alter the impact of Louisiana's "Direct Action Statute." See Soileau v. Smith True Value and Rental, et. al., 2012-1711, -- So. 3d ---.In Soileau, the injured plaintiff initiated suit after a John Deere front-end loader malfunctioned. She settled with a number of parties but proceeded to trial against the store from which the machinery was rented, the store's owners (collectively, the Smiths) and the Smiths' insurer, Hartford Insurance Company.The plaintiff sued Hartford under Louisiana's Direct Action Statute, which was enacted to provide plaintiffs with a "direct" right of action against a tortfeasor's insurance company. In many other states, a plaintiff cannot sue a tortfeasor's insurer directly as this cause of action is not permitted by the common law. Insured Lloyd's v. Bobo, 156 S. E. 2d 518 (Ga. App. 1967).Generally, the Direct Action Statute allows a plaintiff to assert a claim against both the insured and its insurer. However, suit may be brought against the insurer only in the few exceptions outlined in the statute.The plaintiff's original petition in Soileau complied with the statute because it joined both Hartford and its insureds, the Smiths. During the trial, the plaintiff verbally dismissed the Smiths from the suit, not seeking "any damages personally against them."Following the dismissal, Hartford was the only party who remained. The plaintiff did not expressly reserve any rights against Hartford who then sought dismissal on two grounds:

  1. Hartford according to its policy was obligated it to pay only "those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages." Because Hartford's insureds were fully released (and therefore could not be "legally obligated to pay damages"), Hartford denied liability.
  2. Hartford also asserted that the dismissal terminated the plaintiff's right to sue Hartford under the Direct Action Statute because none of the six circumstances allowing suit to be brought against Hartford alone existed.

The trial court rejected both of Hartford's arguments. The jury found for the plaintiff in the amount of $9.4 million and allocated 15% of the fault to the Smiths. Judgment was then rendered against Hartford. Hartford appealed. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal agreed with Hartford's arguments and dismissed it from the suit. The Louisiana Supreme Court accepted writs.In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff maintained her right of action against Hartford despite the dismissal. The Court accepted the plaintiff's position that she intended to reserve her rights against Hartford and cited to Civil Code article 1802 which provides that the renunciation of rights against one solidary obligor "must be express." Therefore, because the plaintiff did not expressly release Hartford, its release would not be presumed.The majority also ruled that the Direct Action Statute did not bar the plaintiff's claim against Hartford. Under the Court's reasoning, the circumstances outlined in the Direct Action Statute are relevant only at the time suit is filed. Thereafter, after suit is "brought," a plaintiff can freely dismiss the insured and maintain its suit against the insurer alone.The Court expressed that its holding is consistent with the statute because the naming of the Smiths in the caption of the suit allowed the jury to recognize that the suit was not just against a "company." In support, the Court quoted from one of the drafters of the Direct Action Statute who testified as follows:[T]he purpose of the bill is to permit the trier of fact to see that there are two human beings involved, a plaintiff and an insured defendant, rather than just a victim and a company.However, the plaintiff's counsel in Soileau was allowed to inform the jury during closing arguments that Hartford was the only defendant left in the lawsuit and that the Smiths could not be held liable.Three justices dissented.One dissenting opinion reasoned that Hartford should not be held liable because it could never be liable for the conduct of a dismissed insured who could not be "legally liable to pay damages."All dissenters complained that the majority's holding will, in effect, allow plaintiffs to sidestep the requirements of the Direct Action Statute. Justice Guidry wrote that the majority ruling will allow plaintiffs to "circumvent" the direct action. Justice Victory added that the Court's holding allows a "plaintiff to name the insured along with the insurer as defendants in order to comply with the statute, but then dismiss the insured and proceed at trial against the insurer alone..."  The true impact of Soileau remains to be seen.

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Insight

No Pay, No Play: What is it and why does it matter?

Louisiana’s automobile insurance premiums are some of the highest in the United States. With so many other demands on driver’s wallets, it may seem tempting to simply not purchase a liability automobile policy, even if it is required by Louisiana law. Louisiana’s “No Pay, No Play” statute, LA-R.S. 32:866, is intended to fight that temptation. See Progressive Sec. Ins. Co. v. Foster, 1997-2985 (La. 4/23/98), 711 So.2d 675. Below are some key considerations for drivers and insurers on either side of a potential “No Pay, No Play” dispute.

For Drivers

The “No Pay, No Play” statute means just what it seems—if you do not pay for your own liability insurance, you cannot recover under someone else’s liability insurance even if the accident is not your fault … at least to a point.

Specifically, the “No Pay, No Play” statute precludes someone who does not have liability insurance from recovering from another driver’s policy (1) the first $15,000 of bodily injury damages and (2) the first $25,000 of property damage. Of course, if damages do not exceed these amounts, it means the uninsured driver cannot recover his or her damage at all.

Of course, some exceptions exist. For example, the statute does not apply (meaning, it does reduce the plaintiff driver’s recovery) if the other driver is cited for operating his or her vehicle while intoxicated and is convicted or pleads nolo contendere; if the other driver intentionally causes the accident; if the other driver flees the scene; or if the other driver is in furtherance of the commission of a felony. However, the off-chance that a driver falls into an exception should not outweigh the obligation to comply with Louisiana law.

For Insurers

Generally, liability insurers should assert the “No Pay, No Play” affirmative defense when it appears a plaintiff driver lacks liability insurance. However, insurers should also keep in mind that this defense also has limitations.

For instance, the “No Pay, No Play” statute is not necessarily a total bar to a plaintiff’s recovery. If damages exceed $15,000 for bodily injury and/or $25,000 for property damage, payment may still be owed for these excess damages.

Secondly, the party asserting the “No Pay, No Play” affirmative defense—usually a defendant insurer—bears the burden of establishing that the plaintiff driver lacked insurance coverage on the vehicle he or she was operating at the time of the incident.

This burden can sometimes present difficult issues. For instance, in Johnson v. Henderson, 2004-1723 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/16/05), 899 So.2d 626, the plaintiff was operating a vehicle he did not own. The defendant failed to yield and struck the plaintiff’s car. The defendant and his insurer asserted the affirmative defense under “No Pay, No Play.”

The facts of the case suggest the vehicle that the plaintiff was operating was not insured, but plaintiff paid his “premiums” to the owners of the vehicle, had an ostensibly valid insurance card, and believed he was insured. The court found that the defendants failed to carry their burden of establishing a lack of coverage. As a result, the insurer owed the plaintiff the full amount of his damages—a total of $5,855.00 that would otherwise have been precluded under the statute.

The “No Pay, No Play” issue is easily avoided: Louisiana drivers should get the insurance required by the statute. Failure to do so runs the risk of discounting (and potentially barring) recovery for accidents that are not the driver’s fault.

Insight

Bad Faith Action Brought Against an Insurer Less than Ten Years after the Date of Loss Dismissed As Prescribed

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently ruled a plaintiff’s bad faith insurance claim was prescribed where the policy at issue required actions to be brought within two years after the date of loss.

In Phyllis Wilson v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, the plaintiff asserted a bad faith claim against an insurer. The applicable policy of insurance provided “[n]o action can be brought unless the policy provisions have been complied with and the action is started within two years after the date of loss.” The plaintiff alleged that the insurer failed to timely tender payments for losses that occurred on August 27, 2020 and October 20, 2020. However, the plaintiff did not file her suit unit January 9, 2023.

Prior to the Wilson decision, courts frequently relied on the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Citadel Ins. Co., which held that actions against insurers under Louisiana’s bad faith statutes are subject to a ten-year prescriptive period. In Smith, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a bad faith action against an insurer was a delictual or tort action subject to a one-year prescriptive period, or a contractual action, which is subject to a ten-year prescriptive period under Louisiana law. The Smith court concluded that the duty of good faith owed by the insurer to the insured “emanates from the contract between the parties” such that the “insured’s cause of action is personal and subject to a ten-year prescriptive period.”

In Wilson, the Louisiana Supreme Court examined whether Smith required the Court to uphold a ten-year prescriptive period for bad faith actions even though the insurance policy at issue prohibited actions brought more than two years after the date of loss. The Wilson court ultimately concluded that an action against an insurer brought more than two years after the date of loss is prescribed where the applicable insurance policy set a term of two years for filing a claim against the insurer.

To reach this conclusion, the Wilson court cited Taranto v. Louisiana citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., which held “in the absence a statutory prohibition, a clause in an insurance policy fixing a reasonable time to institute suit is valid.” The Wilson court then turned to the applicable statute and noted that La. R.S. 22:868(B) “expressly provides that no policy ‘shall contain any condition, stipulation, or agreement limiting right of action against the insurer to a period of less than twenty-four months next after the inception of the loss when the claim is a first-party claim…’” The Wilson court noted the two-year limitation in the applicable policy was consistent with La. R.S. 22:868(B).

The court’s ruling supports the argument that policy provisions requiring actions to be filed within two years of the date of loss are enforceable. However, the Court did not disturb its holding in Smith, noting the Smith case was factually distinguishable because it did not involve a policy that contained a contractual limitation on the insured’s institution of suits.

References:

Phyllis Wilson v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, No. 2023-CC-01320 (La. 1/10/2024) (per curiam), 2024 WL 108714.

Smith v. Citadel Ins. Co., 2019-00052 (La. 10/22/19), 285 So.3d 1062.

Taranto v. Louisiana citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 2010-0105 (La. 3/15/11), 62 So.3d 721, 728.

Insight

Louisiana Supreme Court Rejects Mental Anguish Claim

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently held that an insurance agent's negligent handling of a claim did not justify an award for mental anguish in Prest v. Louisiana Citizens Property Corp., 2012-0513 (La. 12/4/12). In Prest, it was alleged that the agent negligently failed to process a request for increased insurance sent more than 10 days prior to Hurricane Katrina.

Based upon representations from their agent, plaintiffs believed their property was insured up to the requested amounts for Katrina-related damages. However, the insurance company denied the additional coverage because the request for additional coverage was not reviewed.

The plaintiffs filed suit and settled the claim for insurance benefits. They reserved in the settlement the right to pursue a negligence claim against their insurance agent and took that claim to trial.

At trial, the Trial Court found the agent negligent and awarded damages to include a $75,000 award for "frustration, inconvenience and mental anguish." The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court likewise upheld the finding of negligence. However, it reversed the award for mental damages.

Generally, if a defendant's conduct is merely negligent and only causes mental disturbance without physical injury, the defendant is not liable for damages. Moresi v. State, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1095 (La. 1990). An exception to this rule exists when there is a likelihood of genuine or serious mental distress arising from "special circumstances."

The Supreme Court did not feel that the facts involving the additional insurance created "special circumstances" sufficient to disregard the general rule that emotional damages are not recoverable in the absence of physical injury. In its ruling, the Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs were likely stressed and inconvenienced by the insurer's failure to pay. Nevertheless, the Court did not find that the plaintiffs' stress was any greater than that experienced by a host of Louisiana citizens affected by Hurricane Katrina.

C. Reynolds LeBlanc

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