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Court Finds Real Estate Agents Are Not Required to Research the Truthfulness of Their Client’s Representations

Published on: February 5, 2026

In Smith v. Grantham, homebuyers sued the sellers for alleged failure to disclose prior flooding of the home. The buyers also sued the sellers’ real estate agent for negligent misrepresentation, arguing the realtor knew or should have known of a prior history of flooding. The plaintiff referenced the previous sellers’ property disclosure documents located in the MLS listing database, which disclosed a prior flooding incident. However, the property disclosure document that the realtor received from her clients denied any prior flooding of the property or structure.

The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of the sellers’ agent, noting that her clients represented in their property disclosure document that the property had never flooded, and she had no actual knowledge contradicting their representation. The Court stated that under La. R.S. 9:3894(B), a real estate agent is relieved of liability for providing false information furnished by her client if she did not have actual knowledge that the information was incorrect. The court held that imposing a higher duty on a real estate agent would improperly “create a situation in which the agent had to independently verify information before conveying it to the buyer.”

Reference:

Smith v. Grantham, 93-0881 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/4/24), 394 So.3d 316.

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When "Drone" Used to be a Boring Word

Webster's top two definitions of the word "drone" are as follows:

1: A stingless male bee (as of the honeybee) that has the role of mating with the queen and does not gather nectar or pollen.

2: one that lives on the labors of others: parasite

While bees and parasites have their allure, Webster's third definition of the word "drone" is the one with current intrigue.

According to Webster's, a drone is also "an unmanned aircraft or ship guided by remote control or onboard computers." Drones began as play things; but are now poised to revolutionize industry, retail, agriculture, journalism, art, and law at an ever-increasing pace.

Currently, drones are regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration which has for decades regulated flight by planes and helicopters; but not everyone can own an airplane or helicopter. Everyone can own a drone and many soon will.

The soon-to-be pervasive use of drones will stretch at the fabric of criminal and civil law and raises intriguing questions with hazy answers. For example,

1: Without probable case, can the government park a drone over a house or building, or even a crime-ridden city block, and monitor for criminal activity with sensors that easily peer through walls?

2: Does one have a reasonable expectation of privacy within a fenced-in back yard?

3: Is following a personal injury plaintiff via drone considered stalking?

4: Can a business fly a drone over a competitor's work yard to observe it processes without recourse?

5: Is it legal to use technology (which is now available) to disrupt or even crash drones flying overhead? Would that be a tort?

In an upcoming Keogh Cox blog, we will advise of pending changes to the law that may begin to answer some of these questions. For now, we will observe that the word "drone" is no longer a boring word.

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Court holds real estate agents representing sellers are not required to investigate the seller’s representations about the property.

In Casbon v. K.W.E.J., LLC d/b/a Keller Williams Realty, et al, the buyer of a home sued her real estate agent for the seller’s alleged misrepresentation of the home’s living area square footage. The facts of this case are unusual because the seller’s representation was based on a prior appraisal report, and accurately reflected the home’s square footage as stated in that report. Also, the buyer financed the purchase, and her lending institution appraised the home again, which resulted in a nearly identical living area square footage calculation.

The plaintiff sought to refinance about a year after buying the home. She used a different lending institution, which retained a different appraiser. The house included a sunroom which had been converted from a porch. The appraiser chose to classify the sunroom as something other than standard living area. As a result, the appraisal report stated the home’s living area square footage was several hundred square feet smaller than the prior appraisal reports, and the plaintiff was not approved for the refinance. The plaintiff sued her real estate agent on the ground that the agent failed to verify the living area square footage before plaintiff purchased the home.

The defendant agent filed summary judgment, arguing she did not owe the plaintiff a duty to investigate or confirm the home’s square footage. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, finding an issue of fact regarding the classification of the sunroom, specifically “whether it is living area or not living area.”

Reversing the Trial Court, the Court of Appeal granted summary judgment in favor of the real estate agent. The Court noted prior caselaw establishing that agents are not required to confirm square footage as represented by a property owner by measuring or otherwise researching the accuracy of the seller’s representation. The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the issue here was how the sunroom was classified rather than how the room was measured. To the Court, this was a “distinction without a difference.”

The Court applied the standard rule that real estate agents only are required to disclose defects which are known or should be known to them. Additionally, the purchase agreement expressly put the obligation to verify the seller’s representation of living area on the buyer. Thus, the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed.

Case reference: Casbon v. K.W.E.J, LLC, et al, 23-321 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/4/23), 375 So.3d 524.

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Louisiana Supreme Court Confirms that Statutory Deadline to Oppose Summary Judgment Is Mandatory

A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device a party can use to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. La. C.C.P. art. 966 is the statute that governs motions for summary judgment in Louisiana. The statute was amended in 2015 to establish some new procedural rules for filing summary judgment motions. Before the statue was amended, the deadline for opposing a motion for summary judgment was set in the District Court Rules, and courts frequently allowed oppositions to motions for summary judgment to be filed after the statutory delay.

In 2015, the Legislature amended the statute to state that “absent the consent of the parties and the court, an opposition shall be filed” within the new fifteen-day deadline established by the article. In Auricchio v. Harriston, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled the amendments to the statute removed the discretionary language that previously allowed a court to allow a party additional time to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court ruled the amendments to art. 966 made the opposition deadline mandatory, and late-filed oppositions should not be considered in connection with a ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently revisited this issue in Mahe v. LCMC Health Holdings LLC. The Court considered whether a trial court may grant a continuance of a hearing on a motion for summary judgment when a party fails to file its opposition within the fifteen-day deadline set in La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2).

In Mahe, a party requested a continuance of the hearing after the fifteen-day deadline passed. While subsection 966(C)(2) provides that a continuance of the hearing is permitted “for good cause shown,” the Court held that the requested continuance could not serve to circumvent the mandatory deadline for filing an opposition, as described in the Auricchio case. Accordingly, the order granting the continuance was reversed, and the trial court was instructed to rule on the motion for summary judgment without consideration of the untimely filed opposition. In so holding, the Court reinforced the mandatory deadlines set in La. C.C.P. art. 966 and provided additional guidance on the procedural rules for filing and opposing motions for summary judgment.