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Court Gives Guidance on Elements of a Slip and Fall: You’ve Got to Keep them Separated

Published on: May 30, 2018

Louisiana law does not recognize "strict liability" for slip and falls and a merchant is not automatically liable for someone’s injuries simply because he or she fell on the merchant’s premises. Before plaintiffs can recover damages for a slip and fall that occurs in a merchant’s store, La. R.S. 9:2800.6 requires plaintiffs to prove three separate elements in addition to causation and damages: 1) that the condition that caused the accident presented an unreasonable risk of harm that was reasonably foreseeable; 2) that the merchant either created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of the condition (the “notice element”); and 3) that the merchant failed to exercise reasonable care. A recent decision from the Louisiana Fifth Circuit highlights that evidence used to establish one element is not always good enough to establish another. Instead, all three of these elements are required for liability to attach.In Batiste v. United Fire and Casualty Company, 17-482 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/14/18), the plaintiff claimed she slipped and fell on water in a grocery store aisle. Batiste admitted that she did not know where the water came from, how long the water had been on the ground, or whether any employees knew the water was present. As such, the plaintiff conceded that she could not show that the grocery store created the condition or had actual knowledge of the puddle before she fell.However, Batiste claimed the store had constructive notice of the condition. To support this argument, the plaintiff pointed to evidence that a grocery store employee failed to confirm she completed a walk-around inspection of the store before the accident, in violation of company policy. Batiste argued that the puddle of water would have been discovered had the inspection been performed and that the failure to perform the inspection was proof that the grocery store possessed “constructive notice.”The court disagreed. To establish constructive notice, plaintiffs “must come forward with ‘positive evidence’ showing the damage-causing condition existed for some period of time” sufficient to place the merchant on notice of the defect. Without this “temporal element,” constructive notice cannot be inferred. An employee’s failure to perform a pre-incident inspection could not establish this temporal element. Therefore, the court found that plaintiff’s claims were properly dismissed. In closing, the court observed:

While the evidence regarding the adequacy and timing of the floor inspection may be relevant for proving a failure to exercise reasonable care to discovery a hazardous condition, a delay in the performance of such procedures offers no proof of how long any such condition may have been on the floor, a separate and equally essential requirement of the Batistes’ burden of proof under Section 9:2800.6.

The plaintiff’s claims were dismissed because she could not establish each element of her claim. Evidence of one element was not evidence of another. Reynolds LeBlanc is a partner at Keogh Cox. His practice areas include commercial litigation, personal injury claims, appeals, and other matters. Reynolds is a former teacher, who in his free time plays music and perpetually talks himself into training for his next marathon.

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Lawsuit "Tripped Up" by Open and Obvious Defense

Louisiana premises liability law continues to evolve in the wake of the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Broussard v. State, 113 So.3d 175 (La. 2013). The Broussard decision was believed to limit the application of the open and obvious defense in the context of a Motion for Summary Judgment on liability.On February 18, 2014, the First Circuit Court of Appeals decided Gustafson v. Priority Electric, Inc., et al, 2013 CA 1096, 2014 WL 647704 (2/18/14) (not designated for publication), providing additional insight as to how Broussard will affect the applicability of the open and obvious defense. Based on Gustafson, the open and obvious defense may still be alive in the context of a Motion for Summary Judgment.While the Gustafson's home was under construction, Ms. Gustafson entered the home unescorted. She stood facing a newly repainted wall and took several steps backward to broaden her perspective of the wall. As she walked backwards, she tripped on one of two unfinished PVC conduit "stub-outs" containing electrical wire that would ultimately service floor-mounted outlets in an adjoining den. The lawsuit ensued.Priority Electric filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that the stub-out presented an open and obvious condition that was readily discoverable had plaintiff exercised reasonable care. The company further argued that it had no duty to warn. The Trial Court agreed that the stub-out was an open and obvious condition and granted the motion.The Appellate Court conducted a de novo. The defendants argued, and the Trial Court agreed, that "if a defect is obvious and apparent, then there is no correlative duty to warn of its existence." Citing Broussard, the Appellate Court found that statement to be a misstatement of the law, noting that Broussard's analytic framework for evaluating an unreasonable risk of harm is classified as a determination of whether a defendant breached a duty owed, rather than a determination of whether a duty is owed ab initio.In light of Broussard, the Trial Court's reasoning underlying the grant of summary judgment was flawed. Nevertheless, the Appellate Court found a basis to support the Trial Court's dismissal of the claims utilizing a "risk-utility" analysis considering multiple factors.

1. Utility of the Stub-Outs

The necessity and utility of the stub-outs was not disputed.

2. Likelihood and Magnitude of Harm

The decision turned on this element. The utility of the stub-outs must be weighed against the likelihood and magnitude of harm presented by their defective condition, including whether the defect was open and obvious. The plaintiffs did not make a showing that any of the numerous contractors, subcontractors or visitors to the premises ever tripped. They also failed to offer expert testimony to show that the stub-outs presented an unreasonable risk of harm. Instead, they relied solely on the testimony of Ms. Gustafson, who admitted she was walking backwards and not paying attention. Unlike in Broussard, there was no evidence that the stub-outs were not "open and obvious to all who encountered them..."3. Cost of Preventing the HarmNo expert testimony was presented to show that the use of PVC stub-outs was unconventional in a new home or that there were reasonable alternatives to their use. No evidence was presented to show how the stub-outs could have been better placed or made more visible.  Although plaintiffs argued that warning cones should have been in place, no evidence was presented to show that the contrast of the blue pipes on the gray cement was insufficient to alert an unsuspecting person.4. Nature of Plaintiff's ActivityPlaintiff was walking backwards when she fell. She acted unreasonably. The home was under construction and could have encountered a number of hazards. She failed to offer countervailing evidence on this issue.Upon balancing all of the factors above, all evidence showed that the accident would not have occurred "but for" Ms. Gustafson's own inattention and negligence.

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Impact of Supreme Court's Recent "Open and Obvious" Ruling not Obvious

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently issued a ruling on the application of the "open and obvious" doctrine in slip and fall cases. The facts of Broussard v. State of Louisiana, 2012-1238 (La. 4/5/13), presented problems for both sides. A UPS driver tripped and fell over an offset between the floor and an elevator. The elevator in a State building had problems for years. One problem was that the elevator would not align properly between floors causing an offset between the floor and the elevator. However, the UPS driver delivered products to this particular State building daily and was well aware of the problem. At the time of the incident, he noticed that the elevator was not properly aligned but nevertheless attempted to pull a dolly with approximately 300 pounds of computer paper over the offset. The inertia created caused the plaintiff to lose control. Plaintiff sued the State, the owner of the building, for injury to his back.

To recover damages from an owner of a building for a slip and fall, a plaintiff must prove: 1) ownership of the building; 2) owner's knowledge of the defect; 3) that damage could have been prevented by reasonable care; 4) that the owner failed to exercise reasonable care; 5) causation of damages; and 6) that the defect in the building created an unreasonable risk of harm. La. C.C. art. 2322; Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983). It was the "unreasonable risk of harm" element that was at issue before the Broussard Court.

Louisiana jurisprudence has created a risk-utility balancing test to determine if a defect in a building poses an unreasonable risk of harm. The risk-utility balance test consists of four factors: 1) the utility of the complained-of condition; (2) the likelihood and magnitude of harm, including the obviousness and apparentness of the condition; (3) the cost of preventing the harm; and (4) the nature of the plaintiff's activities in terms of its social utility or whether it is dangerous by nature. Dauzet v. Curnest Guillot Logging, Inc., 08-0528 (La. 12/2/08), 995 So. 2d 1184.

In applying this balancing test, the jury found the State 62% liable and Plaintiff 38% liable for Plaintiff's damage. The court of appeal reversed that decision. It found that, where the Plaintiff knew of the defect, the defect was "open and obvious" such that the State had no duty to protect against the condition.

The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed. Under the specific facts of the case, the Court found that Plaintiff's knowledge of the defect was insufficient to meet the open and obvious test. According to the Court, for a defect to be considered open and obvious it must be open and obvious to all. "Thus, in order to be open and obvious, the risk of harm should be apparent to all who encounter the dangerous condition." Broussard, p. 17.

The Supreme Court reasoned that the open and obvious question is not based upon the plaintiff's particular state of mind. Such an analysis is akin to assumption of the risk - a theory of law that was omitted when Louisiana enacted its comparative fault regime. Instead, the open and obvious to all standard is, according to Broussard, "sensible . . . and does not undermine the comparative fault regime by allowing a plaintiff's negligence to operate as a bar to recovery in a case where the defendant's conduct poses a risk of harm to the hypothetical blameless plaintiff." Id. p. 18.

The true impact of the Broussard decision remains to be seen. Under one reading, the opinion's impact should be limited to its specific facts. Under any interpretation, Broussard preserves the rule that an allegedly defective condition which is obvious to all will bar recovery to the plaintiff.

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Keogh Cox Secures Dismissal of Premises Liability Case

The Fourth Circuit recently affirmed summary judgment Keogh Cox obtained in Clark v. Premier Automotive Management, LLC, finding the plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence failed to establish an unreasonable risk of harm caused her to fall.

In Clark, the plaintiff claimed she was injured after slipped and fell in a puddle of water in a service garage. Keogh Cox attorneys Chad A. Sullivan and Cole C. Frazier filed a motion for summary judgment on behalf of the defendants in response. The defendants asserted that the plaintiff failed to submit sufficient proof to establish that standing water or a hazardous condition caused her fall. Specifically, the defendants maintained that the plaintiff could not establish (1) an unreasonable risk of harm existed within the garage or (2) the puddle of water existed on the garage floor for an extended period of time.

The plaintiff’s deposition testimony established that it rained earlier in the day, that she was walking quickly before she fell, and that she was wearing flip flops. The plaintiff also testified she assumed she fell in a puddle of water because her back was damp after her fall. She described the amount of water under her shoes as the size of a “softball.”

The defendants also attached the affidavits of two employees who worked at the service garage on the day of the incident. The affidavits acknowledged wet conditions on the day of the incident but denied any prior complaints or accidents in the area. The affidavits also established that the plaintiff fell in an uncovered area of the garage that slopes downward. Thus, there was no possibility for standing water or puddles to collect.

Based upon this evidence, the appellate court found that the defendants satisfied their burden of proof to show there was no unreasonable risk of harm. The court stated the burden then shifted to the plaintiff to establish that there was an unreasonable risk of harm and thus establishing a genuine issue of material fact. However, the court found that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden because all her arguments were based upon conclusory allegations and unsupported speculation. To support her claims, the plaintiff could only cite to the “possibility” of the existence of standing water or puddles. As such, the plaintiff only speculated whether a hazardous substance or an unreasonable risk of harm caused her fall. Such speculation was insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.

In so holding, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims that Keogh Cox obtained through summary judgment.

References:

Clark v. Premier Auto. Mgmt., LLC, 2024-0397 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/10/25), --- So.3d ---, 2025 WL 451473.

C. Reynolds LeBlanc

Partner
Slip and Fall