Lawsuit "Tripped Up" by Open and Obvious Defense

In Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014), the Supreme Court considered whether police officers could search the contents of a smart phone incident to an arrest. In Riley, an alleged gang member was arrested for possession of a concealed firearm. At the precinct, a police officer went through the arrestee's smart phone looking for evidence of other crimes and found a picture of the arrestee next to a car connected to a drive-by-shooting.

Before determining whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court looked to a trilogy of case.

The first two cases, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) and U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), held that searches incident to arrests are proper when necessary to protect evidence or officers.

The third, Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), held that police may search a vehicle when it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be found, including containers located in the vehicle.

The Supreme Court determined that none of the justifications in the above cases were present in Riley. Unlike Chimel and Robinson, neither the evidence, i.e., the phone, nor the officers were in danger. While officers may examine the physical aspects of the phone to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon, a phone, once secured, poses no threat. Further, multiple options are available to prevent the destruction of evidence without invading the privacy of the arrestee, such as disconnecting the phone from the network or placing the phone in a "Faraday bag."

The Court also considered the prosecution's argument based upon Gant, which compared a cell phone to a physical container. In rejecting this rationale, the Court commented that classifying a smart phone as a physical container is "like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping them together." The Court's analysis was informed by the vast storage capacity of the modern cell phone.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that a smart phone could not be searched incident to arrest under the facts of the case. It will be interesting to observe the extent to which the Court's acknowledgment of the privacy concerns involved in smart phone technology may creep into civil discovery and evidentiary disputes.

Louisiana law does not recognize "strict liability" for slip and falls and a merchant is not automatically liable for someone’s injuries simply because he or she fell on the merchant’s premises. Before plaintiffs can recover damages for a slip and fall that occurs in a merchant’s store, La. R.S. 9:2800.6 requires plaintiffs to prove three separate elements in addition to causation and damages: 1) that the condition that caused the accident presented an unreasonable risk of harm that was reasonably foreseeable; 2) that the merchant either created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of the condition (the “notice element”); and 3) that the merchant failed to exercise reasonable care. A recent decision from the Louisiana Fifth Circuit highlights that evidence used to establish one element is not always good enough to establish another. Instead, all three of these elements are required for liability to attach.In Batiste v. United Fire and Casualty Company, 17-482 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/14/18), the plaintiff claimed she slipped and fell on water in a grocery store aisle. Batiste admitted that she did not know where the water came from, how long the water had been on the ground, or whether any employees knew the water was present. As such, the plaintiff conceded that she could not show that the grocery store created the condition or had actual knowledge of the puddle before she fell.However, Batiste claimed the store had constructive notice of the condition. To support this argument, the plaintiff pointed to evidence that a grocery store employee failed to confirm she completed a walk-around inspection of the store before the accident, in violation of company policy. Batiste argued that the puddle of water would have been discovered had the inspection been performed and that the failure to perform the inspection was proof that the grocery store possessed “constructive notice.”The court disagreed. To establish constructive notice, plaintiffs “must come forward with ‘positive evidence’ showing the damage-causing condition existed for some period of time” sufficient to place the merchant on notice of the defect. Without this “temporal element,” constructive notice cannot be inferred. An employee’s failure to perform a pre-incident inspection could not establish this temporal element. Therefore, the court found that plaintiff’s claims were properly dismissed. In closing, the court observed:

While the evidence regarding the adequacy and timing of the floor inspection may be relevant for proving a failure to exercise reasonable care to discovery a hazardous condition, a delay in the performance of such procedures offers no proof of how long any such condition may have been on the floor, a separate and equally essential requirement of the Batistes’ burden of proof under Section 9:2800.6.

The plaintiff’s claims were dismissed because she could not establish each element of her claim. Evidence of one element was not evidence of another. Reynolds LeBlanc is a partner at Keogh Cox. His practice areas include commercial litigation, personal injury claims, appeals, and other matters. Reynolds is a former teacher, who in his free time plays music and perpetually talks himself into training for his next marathon.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has ruled 6-1 that the funding method for the private school tuition voucher program approved by the Legislature last year is unconstitutional under La. Const. art. VIII, Sect. 13(B). The decision leaves uncertain the status of the approximately 8,000 students who had been approved for vouchers for the 2013-2014 school year.In Louisiana Federation of Teachers et al. (No. 2013-CA-0120), the Court held that once funds are dedicated to the state's Minimum Foundation Program for public education, the Constitution prohibits the use of those funds for the tuition costs of nonpublic schools and nonpublic entities. The Court reasoned that it could not sanction the voucher program's funding method when the source of those funds specifically mandated that they be spent on public education. The Court rejected the argument that the voucher program violated the constitutional requirement that a legislative bill have only "one object."The voucher program was part of a 2012 school reform program that allowed the State to offer vouchers to a large number of Louisiana students and to expand the number of privately managed charter schools.The Jindal administration has pledged to continue the program. In response to the ruling, Jindal stated, "We're disappointed the funding mechanism was rejected, but we are committed to making sure this program continues and we will fund it through the budget."The passing of the voucher program legislation was a high-profile affair prominently covered by local and even national media. In this context, the Court felt it advisable to confirm the Supreme Court's role in approving or rejecting legislation. The first page of the opinion includes the following quote:

The determination of how to best provide for the education of children is not the role of the court in this matter. We defer that determination to those more learned in the fields of education and public policy. The court's role is to evaluate the law set forth in the constitution to determine whether the matters addressed by the legislature comply with the relevant constitutional provisions and "not to legislate social policy on the basis of our own personal inclinations." State v. Smith, 99-0606, 99-2094, 99-2015, 99-2019, p. 11 (La. 7/6/00), 766 So. 2d 501, 510. [Emphasis added]

One might reasonably expect that this will not be the last time the Louisiana Supreme Court will be asked to consider the voucher program.