Insight

Louisiana Supreme Court Vacates Prior Decision and Finds Prescriptive Periods for Child Abuse Claims Can Be Revived

Published on: June 17, 2024

In 2021, the Louisiana Legislature amended La. R.S. 9:2800.9 to provide that a legal action against a person for sexual abuse of a minor, if barred by liberative prescription prior to the effective date of the amendment, is revived for a three-year period after the effective date of the amendment. In 2022, La. R.S. 9:2800.9 was amended again to specifically state the Legislature’s intent to revive any cause of action related to sexual abuse of a minor that previously prescribed under any Louisiana prescriptive period.

On March 22, 2024, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued its decision in Douglas Bienvenu, et al. v. Defendant 1 and Defendant 2, and found the statute was unconstitutional because it conflicted with due process protections set forth in the Louisiana Constitution. Specifically, the Court found that a defendant has a vested property right in accrued prescription and that revival of a prescribed cause of action violated due process.

However, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs’ request for rehearing, and on June 12, 2024, the Court vacated its prior ruling and found that the amendments to La. R.S. 9:2800.9 were constitutional.

On rehearing, the court agreed that a defendant has a vested property right in accrued prescription but found another step in constitutional analysis was required— examination of whether the legislature’s revival of prescribed causes of action for sexual abuse of minors “comports with substantive due process.” The Court noted, “The essence of substantive due process is protection from arbitrary and capricious action.”

In Bienvenu, the defendants’ right to plead prescription was an economic interest that did not implicate fundamental rights. The statute at issue was social welfare legislation, enacted to address societal costs of child sexual abuse. Therefore, the Court found the applicable due process test was whether the legislation was reasonable in relation to the goal to be attained and was adopted in the interest of the community as a whole. The statute needed only to have a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest to survive due process scrutiny.

The Court found the amendments to La. R.S. 9:2800.9 passed this test because (1) the provision assists in identifying hidden child predators so children will not be abused in the future; (2) shifts the costs of the abuse from the victims and society to those who actually caused it; and (3) educates the public about the prevalence and harm from child sexual abuse to prevent future abuse. These interests were found legitimate and compelling. Thus, the statute was constitutional and could be applied retroactively “to revive, for the period stated, all causes of action related to sexual abuse of a minor that previously prescribed under any Louisiana prescriptive period.”

References:

Bienvenu v. Defendant 1, 2023-01194 (La. 3/22/24), 382 So. 3d 38, reh'g granted, 2023-01194 (La. 5/10/24), and opinion vacated on reh'g, 2023-01194 (La. 6/12/24).

Bienvenu v. Defendant 1, 2023-01194 (La. 6/12/24).

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Here Comes Hurricane Ida: What To Do If Your Home is Damaged by a Storm or Flood

Unfortunately, Louisianians have endured many natural disasters in the past several years. From the historic flooding in Baton Rouge in August 2016 to the devastation caused by Hurricanes Laura and Delta in 2020, Gulf Coast residents are very familiar with significant storms and flooding events. While the rebuilding process will take months or years to complete, this article is designed to provide some basic information on how to document and report your property damage claim and apply for and obtain disaster assistance.

  • DOCUMENT, DOCUMENT, DOCUMENT - Once you are able to do so, make sure to document the damages to your home and contents. Whether for a homeowners or flood insurance policy or to obtain government assistance, take plenty of photos of the damage. Make a list of the items in your home that were damaged or destroyed. One way to organize this list is to list each item from each room together, approximate its age, where it was purchased and its value when purchased. As you rebuild, and materials and items are thrown out, it will be much more difficult to document your claim.
  • REPORT YOUR CLAIM – Report your damage to your homeowners or flood insurer as soon as possible. Provide as much detail about the damage as you can. If you are unaware of your insurer, contact your insurance agent who can help you to report your claim.
  • OBTAIN MULTIPLE ESTIMATES - Although it is often difficult to do so after a natural disaster because of the volume of work, obtain multiple estimates for the work needed on your home. Pay for the estimate if necessary. If you have three estimates and the amounts are close, they are much more credible. Also, try and get as much detail as possible in each estimate, including specific materials to be used, dimensions, and finishes.
  • SAVE YOUR RECEIPTS – Whether for repairs you undertake to fix the damage to your home, to replace contents, or for living expenses after the storm, save your receipts. These receipts will be used to document your losses and verify the amount of your claim to your insurer.
  • FOLLOW UP WITH YOUR INSURER - Provide whatever is requested by your insurer as they adjust your claim. Communicate with your insurer on a regular basis. Although it may seem tedious, communication with your insurer during the claim is important.
  • APPLY FOR ASSISTANCE - Especially if your property is not insured, make sure to immediately apply for government assistance. You can apply for federal assistance at www.disasterassistance.gov. Oftentimes, the state government will also administer federal or state disaster assistance funds.
Insight

Louisiana Supreme Court Rules on Admissibility of Expert Opinion on “Ultimate Issues”

La Code Evid. Art. 704 addresses the use of expert testimony in Louisiana Courts and provides, “Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not to be excluded solely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” Though the text of this article is simple, Louisiana trial courts often face questions about when an expert’s opinion crosses a line and invades the jury’s fact-finding function. These questions often arise in the context of Daubert hearings under La. Code Civ. P. art. 1425.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Hulin v. Snow, where the Court was asked to review the extent to which an expert in a civil case could offer testimony that addressed the ultimate issues of law and fact in the case. The ultimate issue in the Hulin case, which involved parental care, was the alleged negligence of the defendants. The Court examined multiple tendered opinions of the plaintiffs’ expert, including expert testimony about the defendants’ negligence and credibility.

In a Per Curiam opinion, the Court ruled that it was improper for the expert to testify on the ultimate issues of whether the defendants were negligent or credible. It held that “(a)lthough experts may aid the trial court in the determinations of ultimate facts, the final conclusions drawn from those facts belong exclusively to the trier of fact.” The testimony of plaintiffs’ expert stated conclusions about these ultimate issues. Therefore, it was inadmissible.

However, the Court did allow the expert, a board-certified pediatrician, to opine on the parental care of the defendants. “Even though this testimony may embrace some of the ultimate issues to be decided by the trier of fact, it is permissible.” It appears the Court found that this testimony did not state conclusions about ultimate issues, as the Court held that the trier of fact could accept or reject the expert’s opinions on parental care as they relate to ultimate facts.

Reference:

Hulin v. Snow, 2023-00530 (La. 6/26/23), --- So.3d ---, 2023 WL 4199310.

Insight

Third-Party Criminal activity: Is Summary Judgment Available in a Premises Liability case?

The liability of a premises owner for third-party criminal acts has been the subject of many decisions issued by the Louisiana Supreme Court. But recently, the Court clarified how to analyze this issue in the context of summary judgment. In Campbell v. Orient-Express Hotels Louisiana, Inc. (Windsor Court), the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and held that Windsor Court was not liable for a robbery that occurred in its courtyard.

The factual background is simple: Campbell was a frequent guest at the Windsor Court. He decided to approach a vehicle near the entrance to the courtyard when he pulled a “substantial amount of cash” to show the female occupants in the vehicle. He placed the money back in his pocket and talked with them for one minute and forty-six seconds. When he pulled the cash from his pocket a second time, one of the occupants grabbed the cash and the vehicle sped away dragging him with it. Campbell then sued the Windsor Court alleging negligence, strict liability, failure to warn, failure to ensure the safety of its guests, etc.

The importance of this decision is found in how the Court analyzed the case to reach its conclusion that summary judgment was proper: The Court noted that it was not modifying prior duty/risk analysis but was clarifying how the analysis is to be conducted—The issues of “duty” and “scope of duty” are separate inquiries that require separate analysis.

In Campbell, the Court acknowledged that “duty” is a question of law for the court. It then concluded that “(w)hether a particular risk falls within the scope of that duty, by contrast, ‘is fact sensitive and ultimately turns on a question of policy as to whether the particular risk falls within the scope of that duty.’” However, the court continued, “‘(t)he determination of legal cause/scope of the duty involves a purely legal question.’” The Court conducted an historical analysis noting that prior decisions had “merged the concept of duty and scope of duty into a single consideration.”

On the threshold question of duty, the Court acknowledged that in the context of third-party criminal activity, Windsor Court, as an innkeeper, owed a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect its patrons from criminal acts of third parties. Having found this duty, the Court then concluded that “Campbell cannot meet the ‘scope of the duty’ element of his claim.” In other words, “the scope of the duty owed by the Windsor Court did not encompass the risk of the particular harm and Injury Mr. Campbell suffered.”

Here the court asked whether this particular risk and injury were “foreseeable.” The Court examined multiple factors to find that the robbery was not foreseeable, but the Court further noted “perhaps even more important to our decision is the manner in which the robbery occurred.” Campbell was not unexpectedly accosted, but his own actions placed him in peril. As such, the Court found no “ease of association” between Windsor Court’s duty to take reasonable precautions to protect its guests and the risk that the guest would voluntarily approach an unknown vehicle and flash a sizable pile of cash.

Justice Crain concurred in the opinion and noted that “scope of duty can be resolved on summary judgment if reasonable persons could not disagree that the manner of the injury is either within or beyond the scope of the duty.” Justice Crain also noted that the manner of injury must be analyzed in the context of “foreseeability” from the perspective of the premises owner and have an “ease of association” between the duty and the manner of injury—this analysis is necessary to “avoid making a defendant the insurer of all persons against all harms.” Thus, he agreed with the majority that Campbell was unable to establish the scope of duty element.

Reference:

Campbell v. Orient-Express Hotels Louisiana, Inc., 2024-00840 (La. 3/21/25), 403 So. 3d 573.

Christopher K. Jones

Managing Partner
Louisiana
Louisiana Supreme Court
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