When the Stakes are High: Class Actions in Louisiana

On April 20, 2010, BP's Deepwater Horizon rig exploded at a cost of eleven lives. What followed was the largest accidental marine oil spill in history. In the aftermath, BP looked for a solution, ostensibly to cap its exposure and address a swirling PR disaster. BP began to actively negotiate a settlement.

On March 2, 2012, BP agreed to a detailed settlement which set forth specific criteria for recovery under the Fund created by the Agreement. In August of that year, BP asked U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier to approve the settlement. The Agreement was approved.

Despite championing the settlement, BP later filed a lawsuit seeking to set aside the settlement, unless it was interpreted as suggested by BP. BP's challenges were rejected by the Federal District Court. Thereafter, the New Orleans-based Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling in a 2-to-1 decision. BP then applied for a Petition of Writ for Certiorari with the United States Supreme Court in a final challenge to the settlement.

About BP's legal maneuvers, Samuel Issacharoff, a New York University Law Professor, said the following: "This case is about a contract that BP signed that it now wishes it hadn't."

One of BP's primary complaints was that, in effect, the settlement could be interpreted to provide recovery for individuals or businesses who could not show a direct link between a financial downturn and the spill. In response, it was stated that the settlement was crafted to use objective measures to gauge whether losses are recoverable.

On December 8, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected BP's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. As such, the settlement agreement first proposed by BP will remain in place. No higher court remains.

Under the Agreement, potential claimants have 6 months from the Supreme Court's Petition denial to file claims.

La Code Evid. Art. 704 addresses the use of expert testimony in Louisiana Courts and provides, “Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not to be excluded solely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” Though the text of this article is simple, Louisiana trial courts often face questions about when an expert’s opinion crosses a line and invades the jury’s fact-finding function. These questions often arise in the context of Daubert hearings under La. Code Civ. P. art. 1425.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Hulin v. Snow, where the Court was asked to review the extent to which an expert in a civil case could offer testimony that addressed the ultimate issues of law and fact in the case. The ultimate issue in the Hulin case, which involved parental care, was the alleged negligence of the defendants. The Court examined multiple tendered opinions of the plaintiffs’ expert, including expert testimony about the defendants’ negligence and credibility.

In a Per Curiam opinion, the Court ruled that it was improper for the expert to testify on the ultimate issues of whether the defendants were negligent or credible. It held that “(a)lthough experts may aid the trial court in the determinations of ultimate facts, the final conclusions drawn from those facts belong exclusively to the trier of fact.” The testimony of plaintiffs’ expert stated conclusions about these ultimate issues. Therefore, it was inadmissible.

However, the Court did allow the expert, a board-certified pediatrician, to opine on the parental care of the defendants. “Even though this testimony may embrace some of the ultimate issues to be decided by the trier of fact, it is permissible.” It appears the Court found that this testimony did not state conclusions about ultimate issues, as the Court held that the trier of fact could accept or reject the expert’s opinions on parental care as they relate to ultimate facts.

Reference:

Hulin v. Snow, 2023-00530 (La. 6/26/23), --- So.3d ---, 2023 WL 4199310.

Webster's top two definitions of the word "drone" are as follows:

1: A stingless male bee (as of the honeybee) that has the role of mating with the queen and does not gather nectar or pollen.

2: one that lives on the labors of others: parasite

While bees and parasites have their allure, Webster's third definition of the word "drone" is the one with current intrigue.

According to Webster's, a drone is also "an unmanned aircraft or ship guided by remote control or onboard computers." Drones began as play things; but are now poised to revolutionize industry, retail, agriculture, journalism, art, and law at an ever-increasing pace.

Currently, drones are regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration which has for decades regulated flight by planes and helicopters; but not everyone can own an airplane or helicopter. Everyone can own a drone and many soon will.

The soon-to-be pervasive use of drones will stretch at the fabric of criminal and civil law and raises intriguing questions with hazy answers. For example,

1: Without probable case, can the government park a drone over a house or building, or even a crime-ridden city block, and monitor for criminal activity with sensors that easily peer through walls?

2: Does one have a reasonable expectation of privacy within a fenced-in back yard?

3: Is following a personal injury plaintiff via drone considered stalking?

4: Can a business fly a drone over a competitor's work yard to observe it processes without recourse?

5: Is it legal to use technology (which is now available) to disrupt or even crash drones flying overhead? Would that be a tort?

In an upcoming Keogh Cox blog, we will advise of pending changes to the law that may begin to answer some of these questions. For now, we will observe that the word "drone" is no longer a boring word.