When the Stakes are High: Class Actions in Louisiana

On June 27, 2025, in an Opinion authored by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, the United States Supreme Court determined that “universal injunctions,” injunctions issued by district judges that apply nationwide, “likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has given to federal courts.” In Trump v. CASA, Inc., the Supreme Court, with a 6-3 vote, concluded that district courts do not have authority to issue universal injunctions which seek to prohibit the enforcement of a law or policy against anyone nationwide. The decision limits the relief afforded by the district courts in consolidated matters to only the parties in those actions.

By prohibiting the use of “universal injunctions” in federal courts, litigants already have started to utilize another procedure to seek the relief they seek – class actions. Class actions are a special procedure provided by both federal and state law that allows one or more class representatives to file suit and seek to represent the interests of other similarly situated individuals or companies. Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Trump v. CASA, Inc., a single litigant could apply for a universal injunction through an individual action. Now that the Supreme Court has declared that process unavailable for application of an injunction nationwide, class actions may be the procedural process litigants attempt to use to achieve that same purpose. It remains to be seen whether class actions will be an effective way to achieve broader relief for individuals impacted by government policies.

References:

Trump v. CASA, Inc., --- S.Ct. ---, No. 24A884, 2025 WL 1773631 (U.S. June 27, 2025).

The image of a law firm stuffed with banker boxes floor-to-ceiling is shifting to the view of a computer server filled with gigabytes of information. This is increasingly a digital world and the documents, photographs, charts, memos, and emails that are the “stuff” cases are built upon now often come in digital form. As a result, great emphasis is placed upon “electronic discovery.”

What is “electronic discovery”? “Discovery” includes the exchange of information between parties in a lawsuit. “Electronic discovery” is the process of collecting, preparing, reviewing, and producing “electronically-stored information” in the context of a civil action.

What is electronically stored information (“ESI”)? The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure define ESI as information created, manipulated, communicated, stored, and best utilized in digital form, requiring the use of computer hardware and software. Because of the wide variety of computer systems currently in use, and the rapidity of technological change, courts often give an expansive definition of ESI which can include any type of information that is stored electronically, including emails, images, spreadsheets, “metadata,” PDF documents, databases, and other groupings of information.

Are printed copies of my emails sufficient? In litigation, emails are commonly produced as printouts or PDFs. However, courts may require the production of emails in their native electronic form to allow the other party to certify that the produced emails have not been altered. If the court finds that a party, anticipating litigation, intentionally deletes or destroys ESI, that party may be exposed to a claim that they have “spoliated” evidence. An opponent may even complain if a party fails to take affirmative steps to prevent information from being deleted or overridden as part of an automated process. For instance, this often occurs when a surveillance camera system “writes over” older video to create space for new video.

In a very important ruling by the Louisiana Supreme Court, a tort defendant is no longer liable for any “actual charges” by medical providers above the amount paid by a Workers Compensation insurer pursuant to promulgated Workers Compensation fee schedule . In Simmons v. Cornerstone Investments, LLC, 2018-cc-0735 (La. 5/18/19), the court concluded:

“…the amount of medical expenses charged above the amount actually incurred is not a collateral source and its exclusion from the purview of the jury was proper.” See http://www.lasc.org/opinions/2019/18-0735.CC.OPN.pdf

The court conducted a detailed analysis of the development of the collateral source rule under applicable jurisprudence noting that the genesis of the collateral source rule:

“Under the collateral source rule, a tortfeasor may not benefit, and an injured plaintiff’s tort recovery may not be reduced, because of monies received by the plaintiff from sources independent of the tortfeasor’s procuration or contribution. Under this well-established doctrine, the payments received from the independent source are not deducted from the award the aggrieved party would otherwise receive from the wrongdoer.” See Louisiana Dept. of Transp. & Dev. v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 02-2349, p. 6 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So.2d 734, 739.

Essentially, the court asks two questions when assessing whether the collateral source rule should apply. First, does the claimed benefit arise from some payment, wage deduction or other contribution by the Plaintiff that would diminish the plaintiff’s patrimony? Second, will the goal of tort deterrence be promoted by allowing the windfall? In a series of cases culminating in the case at bar, the court has been limiting the application of the collateral source rule in a number of contexts.

The court in Bozeman v. State, 03-1016 (La. 7/2/04), 879 So.2d 692, found that the collateral source rule did not apply when Medicaid was the payor such that the defendant could not be responsible for any amounts above what Medicaid paid to the provider. The court reasoned that it would be “unconscionable” to require taxpayers to pay the bills and then let a plaintiff recover the full undiscounted medical expenses and “pocket the windfall.” The court continued by noting in “Cutsinger v. Redfern, 08-2607 (La. 5/22/09), 12 So.3d 945, this court found the collateral source rule did not apply to prevent the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist carrier from receiving a credit for workers’ compensation benefits paid by her employer, even though the plaintiff paid for the UM coverage herself.” In Hoffman v. 21st Century North American Ins. Co., 14-2279 (La. 10/2/15), 209 So.3d 702, the court held that the collateral source rule does not apply to attorney-negotiated medical discounts. The court also looked at the US 5^th Circuit in Deperrodil v. Bozovic Marine, Inc., 842 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2016), that the collateral source rule does not apply above any amounts actually paid by the employer in the context of the LHWCA.

In each of the instances outlined, the court noted that the patrimony of the plaintiff was not impacted by limiting recovery to the amount of medical bills actually paid. Moreover, the court noted that the goal of tort deterrence is not negatively impacted, and that allowing a plaintiff to recover a windfall in this context is tantamount to an award of punitive damages that are not recoverable absent statutory authority which is not present in this context. The Simmons decision now extends that same logic to cases where a Workers Compensation insurer has paid the medical benefits pursuant to the Louisiana Workers Compensation Law.

This ruling will have significant impact on the evaluation, settlement and trial of tort cases that have corresponding Workers Compensation claims.

Submitted by John P. Wolff, III (Partner)