Insight

Torts: “Loss of Chance”: Claim Limited to Medical Malpractice

Published on: December 31, 2019

InNiang v. Dryades YMCA School of Commerce, Inc., 19-0425 (La. App. 4 Cir.12/4/19), - - - So.3d - - -, the Fourth Circuit declined to expand the “loss ofchance of survival” cause of action to non-medical defendants. Despite astatute which arguably supported such a cause of action under case facts, theFourth Circuit felt constrained to reject the claim.

OnMarch 7, 2017, Mouhamadou Niang collapsed while playing basketball at aYMCA. Mrs. Niang was certified in cardiac life support, and requested anautomated external defibrillator (“AED”) to attempt to resuscitation. Mrs. Niang was advised that an AED machine was not available. Thereafter,Mr. Niang was transported to University Medical Center where he died on March11, 2017 secondary to cardiac arrest.

Mrs.Niang sued the YMCA for failing to have an AED machine on premises and assertedmultiple claims including a loss of chance of survival claim. Shecontended that the lack of the defibrillator contributed to her husband’sdeath. Under La. R. S. 40:1137.3, all “physical fitness facilities” suchas the YMCA are required to have an AED available.

TheYMCA filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment which was granted. Inits reasons, the trial court held that the “loss of chance” cause of action waslimited to claims raised in a medical malpractice context. The FourthCircuit affirmed.

TheFourth Circuit found that, although styled as a Motion for Partial SummaryJudgment, the YMCA had actually raised an Exception of No Cause of Action andtherefore analyzed the issue as a pure question of law. The FourthCircuit reviewed prior Louisiana Supreme Court decisions providing a right torecover damages for a loss of chance of survival in the medical malpracticecontext including the decision in Hastings v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 498So.2d 713 (La. 1986). In Hastings, the Louisiana Supreme Courtidentified a cause of action where a stab wound victim with weak vital signswas transferred from the hospital after the patient lacked insurance. The Hastingscourt commented on the reduced burden of proof in such cases:

“The law does not require the plaintiff to prove to a certainty that the patient would have lived had he received more prompt diagnosis and treatment for the condition causing the death.”

TheFourth Circuit identified no cases directly “on point” when the defendant wasnot a medical practitioner. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit gaveconsideration to a noted Oklahoma decision in Hardy v. Southwestern BellTel. Co., 910 P.2d 1024 (Okla. 1996) which addressed the issue. Thecourt in Hardy considered the public policy implications associated withexpanding the loss of chance of survival claim to non-medical cases andreasoned that the policy concerns which justify a reduced burden of causationin medical malpractice claims do not transfer to ordinary negligencecases. The cause of action against medical providers is supported by the“special relationship” of the physician and the patient. No suchrelationship exists in a non-medical setting.

Citingto Hardy, the Niang court determined that allowing a loss ofchance of survival claim with general negligence would allow for improperspeculation as to a person’s chance of survival. Identifying nocontrolling cases and the lack of any statute creating a cause of action innon-medical malpractice cases, the Niang court concluded that loss ofchance of survival claims are not supported outside of the medical context.

Collin is a Keogh Cox partner who litigates injury,commercial, and legal malpractice disputes. He lives in nearby Zachary,Louisiana with his wife Melissa and three all too active children. He is anoutdoorsman, a league tennis player, a cook, and a hobbyist writer.

Posted by:

Disclaimer

Keogh Cox & Wilson, Ltd. provides this blog as a public service for general information only. The materials contained herein may not reflect the most current legal developments or even express the opinion of all or even most of Keogh Cox attorneys. Such material does not constitute legal advice or form any attorney-client relationship. Keogh Cox and all contributing author(s) expressly disclaim all liability to any person with respect to the contents of this Web site and Blog and expect that no reliance will be made upon the information provided.

Continue Reading

Explore legal perspectives on the issues shaping Louisiana's key industries and courtrooms.

Insight

When "Drone" Used to be a Boring Word

Webster's top two definitions of the word "drone" are as follows:

1: A stingless male bee (as of the honeybee) that has the role of mating with the queen and does not gather nectar or pollen.

2: one that lives on the labors of others: parasite

While bees and parasites have their allure, Webster's third definition of the word "drone" is the one with current intrigue.

According to Webster's, a drone is also "an unmanned aircraft or ship guided by remote control or onboard computers." Drones began as play things; but are now poised to revolutionize industry, retail, agriculture, journalism, art, and law at an ever-increasing pace.

Currently, drones are regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration which has for decades regulated flight by planes and helicopters; but not everyone can own an airplane or helicopter. Everyone can own a drone and many soon will.

The soon-to-be pervasive use of drones will stretch at the fabric of criminal and civil law and raises intriguing questions with hazy answers. For example,

1: Without probable case, can the government park a drone over a house or building, or even a crime-ridden city block, and monitor for criminal activity with sensors that easily peer through walls?

2: Does one have a reasonable expectation of privacy within a fenced-in back yard?

3: Is following a personal injury plaintiff via drone considered stalking?

4: Can a business fly a drone over a competitor's work yard to observe it processes without recourse?

5: Is it legal to use technology (which is now available) to disrupt or even crash drones flying overhead? Would that be a tort?

In an upcoming Keogh Cox blog, we will advise of pending changes to the law that may begin to answer some of these questions. For now, we will observe that the word "drone" is no longer a boring word.

Insight

Medical Malpractice: Can failure to communicate test results be medical malpractice?

The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal recently considered a medical malpractice case with an unusual set of facts. Rather than the standard medical malpractice case, where a patient argues that he was misdiagnosed and/or claims that the doctor made a mistake when administering medical treatment, in Dufreche v. Jeffery Wayne Coco, MD and Internal Medicine Specialists, Inc., 2020-CA-0030 (La. App. 4th Cir.), the patient alleged that his doctor committed malpractice by failing to communicate test results.

In Dufreche, the patient showed signs of an HIV infection. He was tested twice before being treated by the infectious disease specialist. Both tests were negative. During his examination, the infectious disease doctor thought it was unlikely that the patient had HIV, but tested him anyway at the patient’s insistence. According to the patient, he was notified by the doctor that he would be provided the results upon receipt.

Unfortunately, the test results showed that the patient was HIV positive; however, he was not contacted. Fifteen months passed, during which the patient was unaware that he was HIV positive. Because he was not contacted, he assumed he was negative. When testing by another physician showed he was positive, the patient/plaintiff filed suit to recover damages allegedly suffered through a delay in treatment and psychological shock, including a claim for “emotional distress.”

To recover, the patient was required to establish: 1) the standard of care; 2) breach of that standard of care; and 3) that the breach caused his emotional distress. At trial, the doctor testified that he required his patients to follow up in person to receive test results, and expected the patients to contact his office to schedule an appointment. The court found that expecting a patient to follow up in person to receive sensitive test results was not a breach of the standard of care. However, the evidence established that the patient was not instructed that he must schedule an in-person appointment to obtain his test results.

The Dufreche court agreed with the lower court in finding that a failure to notify the patient of the doctor’s policy was a breach of the standard of care. Further, the court found that the infectious disease specialist, who admitted to a duty to the public to protect them from HIV, had also breached his duty for failing to notify an HIV positive patient of his diagnosis for over fifteen months. The doctor’s failure to communicate the results caused the patient’s emotional distress – resulting in an award of $45,000 in damages.

Virginia “Jenny” McLin is a partner at Keogh Cox who practices in the fields of corporate litigation, insurance defense and workers compensation defense. When she is not practicing law, Jenny can be found volunteering with the Junior League of Baton Rouge; cheering for the LSU Tigers with her husband Ryan; or shuffling her two kids to and from dance practice.

Insight

When the Stakes are High: Class Actions in Louisiana

They make movies about “class actions” exactly because they can involve high stakes, with millions, even billions of dollars on the line. The class action procedure can create exposure at this level because of the large numbers of potential claims involved. Class actions are used to address losses experienced from unfair or fraudulent business practices, natural disasters, industrial explosions, or any event or action which is alleged to have damaged a large group in a similar way.

As a procedural device, the class action combines several claims (often hundreds or thousands) into a single action. A key battle in most Louisiana class actions is whether the proposed claim can properly be “certified” as a class action under Louisiana procedure. The recent Fourth Circuit decision in Duhon v. Harbor Homeowners’ Ass’n., Inc., 2016 WL 3551620 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/30/16) addressed whether the lower court’s class “certification” was proper under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 591.

Duhon involved damages experienced following hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In particular, the class representatives sought damages against the Harbor View Condominium Association and its insurers claiming that the association was guilty of faulty repairs following these two hurricanes. In deciding whether certification was proper, the Duhon court considered the following elements, all of which must be present to certify a proper class action:

Numerosity- the class must be so numerous that joinder of all involved persons would prove impractical;

Commonality- the case must present questions of law and fact that are common to the class;

Typicality- the claims and defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and,

Adequacy of representation- the representative parties must be positioned to fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class.

After analyzing each of these “elements,” the Duhon court upheld the Trial Court’s certification of the claim as a class action. Further, the court concluded that the questions of law and fact common to the members of the class predominated over any questions affecting only individual members such that a class action was superior to other available methods to fairly and efficiently adjudicate the controversy.

While the class action procedure has its detractors, it is sometimes the only real option to address a harm to a large group. Now that the class in Duhon has been certified, the case will proceed through discovery and towards trial on the merits. Who knows, they may make a movie about it someday.

Collin J. LeBlanc

Partner
Legal Malpractice
Medical
Torts