Trees and Neighbors: A Growing Problem

Generally, Louisiana Workers’ Compensation laws provide coverage for an employee who sustains personal injuries by an accident arising out of and in the course of his or her employment. La. R.S. 23:1021(1) defines “accident” as:

"An unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration."

In Rayborn, Sr. v. Continental Cement Company, LLC et al, the plaintiff-employee filed suit when the worker’s compensation carrier terminated benefits based on its assertion that the plaintiff’s left knee injury was not the result of an “accident” as defined in the statute. The evidence presented at trial established the following:

• After returning home from work one day, the plaintiff began to feel soreness behind his left knee and believed he “may have pulled a muscle.”
• The plaintiff sought medical attention at a local clinic 2 days later.
• The plaintiff told clinic staff that his “leg was hurting,” and that he “was at work climbing up and jumping down off of barges all week.”
• After returning from a pre-planned family trip one week later, the plaintiff told to his managers at work that he hurt his knee “some kind of way” and that he was “doing too much climbing up and jumping down from barges “and his knee “just started hurting.”
• The chart from follow-up clinic visits stated, “Patient had [an] injury while at work when he jumped from a height and later that day felt a discomfort in the left lateral knee.”
• Additional records noted the plaintiff “injured his knee on the job; however it was not readily apparent until [his] knee became stiff later that evening.”
• The plaintiff later consulted with an orthopedic surgeon whose initial chart entry stated, “Over the course of the week, his knee began bothering him in the patellofemoral area and it started to become tight and swollen.”

At the conclusion of trial, the workers’ compensation court ruled that the plaintiff successfully proved that he sustained a work-related injury of his left knee on a particular date by climbing and jumping while performing his work duties. On appeal, the workers’ compensation carrier argued that plaintiff’s assertion that he was injured “some kind of way” over the course of a week was not sufficient to meet the requirement of a specific, identifiable accident in the course and scope of employment under La. R.S. 23:1021(1).

In affirming the decision of the OWC judge, the appellate court highlighted numerous opinions from the Louisiana Supreme Court and other courts of appeal wherein the statutory definition of “accident” was liberally construed to reject an interpretation that excluded “those workers who are worn down, rather than immediately crippled by, their work.” The opinion notes that it is well-settled in the case law that an “accident” exists when “heavy lifting or other strenuous efforts, although usual and customary, cause or contribute to a physical breakdown or accelerate its occurrence because of a pre-existing condition.”

The opinion added, “It is presumed the legislature is aware of how Louisiana courts have interpreted the statute; yet, it has taken no steps to overrule more than thirty years of Louisiana jurisprudence.” In so holding, it is unclear whether the court considered La. R.S. 23:1020.1(D), in which the Legislature specifically rejected the jurisprudential doctrine requiring a liberal interpretation of Workers Compensation statutes in favor of an employee. Despite this statement from the Legislature on the construction of Workers Compensation statutes, the Rayborn opinion suggests that courts may continue to base their decisions on the liberal interpretation of “accident” that has been developed and adopted by Louisiana courts when analyzing what types of injuries are covered under Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law.

References:

Rayborn v. Cont'l Cement Co., LLC, 2023-0403 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/10/24), 2024 WL 132802.

Plaintiff Brady Hardisty and a coworker attempted to use chains attached to a tractor to pull a Caterpillar bulldozer from the mud. A chain snapped and struck plaintiff in the head and face. Hardisty sued Caterpillar under allegations that its product was unreasonably dangerous. Caterpillar filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing Hardisty was not engaged in a “reasonably anticipated use” of its product. Both the trial court and the appellate court identified “material issues of fact” in denying Caterpillar’s motion. The Supreme Court reversed, and entered summary judgment for Caterpillar.^

Caterpillar cited its Operation Manual that warned against the use of chains and gave a safer alternative. Hardisty asserted that material issues of fact existed as to whether Caterpillar “knew or should have known” that users were not following product warnings. Hardisty offered opinions from its expert witness that: (1) Caterpillar knew of the danger because it warned against the use of chains and (2) experience showed that the use of chains was a common practice in the industry.

The Hardisty court reasoned that the expert’s own “experience” was insufficient to refute Caterpillar’s evidence that it received no report of prior similar accidents. However, the Court cited to earlier case law for the proposition that even actual knowledge would not defeat the motion, stating:

The jurisprudence has recognized that knowledge of the potential and actual intentional abuse of a product does not create a question of fact on the question of reasonably anticipated use when the manufacturer expressly warned against the danger of such misuse.

In a recent case handled by Keogh Cox, the federal Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for defendants, citing Hardisty for the proposition that a manufacturer may reasonably expect that its users will follow “clear and direct” product warnings. See Friels v. Louisiana State Administrative Office of Rick Management, et al.

References:

^Hardisty v. Walker, 25-00239 (La. 6/3/25), 410 So,3d 774.

Louisiana State Administrative Office of Rick Management, et al., No. 24-30688, 8/15/25. Opinion not designated for publication. 5^th Cir. R. 47.5.

“There were eleven votes for 'guilty.' It's not easy for me to raise my hand and send a boy off to die without talking about it first.” - Reginald Rose, Twelve Angry MenJury service is a civil duty. Our system would collapse without the diligent individuals who respond and serve, but the law does provide exemptions and exceptions which may be utilized to be excused. Part 2 of this blog will explore those circumstances.General Exemptions

Louisiana provides two general exemptions from jury service.

1 - Age. Persons seventy years of age or older shall be exempt from jury service and may decline to serve as jurors. La. Const. Ann. art. V, § 33. However, they are free to serve if otherwise qualified.

2 - Prior Service. The second, all “persons who have served as grand or petit jurors in criminal cases or as trial jurors in civil cases or in a central jury pool during a period of two years immediately preceding their selection for jury service.” La. Sup. Ct. R. 25.

No exemption is automatic. A prospective juror qualifying for one of the above exemptions must assert the exemption by contacting the appropriate jury commission.

Recognized Excuses

In criminal cases, a juror may be excused when such service “would result in undue hardship or extreme inconvenience.” C.Cr.P. art. 783

In civil cases, a juror may be excused when service would result in “undue or extreme physical or financial hardship.” However, these circumstances are limited to circumstances in which an individual would:

1. Be required to abandon a person under his or her personal care or supervision due to the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate substitute care giver during the period of participation in the jury pool or on the jury; or

2. Incur costs that would have a substantial adverse impact on the payment of the individual's necessary daily living expenses or on those for whom he or she provides the principal means of support; or

3. Suffer physical hardship due to an existing illness or disease. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:3042

With respect to both criminal and civil service, a request for excusal can be mailed to the issuing court and should include an explanation of circumstances. In most cases, the letter must also include supporting documentation, such as, “state income tax returns, medical statements from licensed physicians, proof of dependency or guardianship, and similar documents, which the judge finds to clearly support the request to be excused.” “Failure to provide documentation shall result in a denial of the request for a waiver.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:3042You should serve if you can but, if you need to be excused, questions regarding exemptions, excusals, and/or qualifications should be directed to the appropriate jury commissioner’s office.