Wage Garnishment –Failure to Comply with Louisiana Procedures Can Result in Costly Penalties for Louisiana Employers

On December 9, 1982, a victim was raped and stabbed multiple times in her Baton Rouge residence. In those harrowing moments, the victim was face-to-face with her assailant and vowed that she would remember the characteristics of her assailant in the unlikely event she survived. A friend arrived at the residence and entered the second-floor room containing the assailant and the wounded victim. Fortunately, at that moment, noise from a postal employee caused the assailant to flee the scene. The investigation began that same day.

Sometime later, Archie Williams became a suspect and was then criminally charged after the victim identified Mr. Williams as her attacker. The victim identified a prominent scar on the assailant which, in an unfortunate twist of fate, tended to match a scar on Mr. Williams. Several of the governmental officers involved in the investigation and the April 1983 criminal trial of Mr. Williams were sued many years later in the case styled Archie Williams v. City of Baton Rouge, ET AL. Keogh Cox attorneys Drew Blanchfield, Collin LeBlanc, Cathy Giering, and Chelsea Payne represented a forensic scientist, a lab technician, and a print examiner in the suit (the “Forensic Defendants.”) In his June 10, 2024 ruling, Judge Brian A. Jackson granted a Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of these defendants, dismissing the claims against them with prejudice.

At the 1983 criminal trial, Forensic Defendants testified that they could not identify Mr. Williams as the attacker. Similarly, both the prosecutor and defense counsel advised the jury that the physical evidence did not implicate Mr. Williams. Nevertheless, Mr. Williams was convicted based upon the passionate but mistaken testimony of the victim. Mr. Williams had not committed these crimes but remained incarcerated until his release decades later.

Mr. Williams consistently denied guilt. In 2008, he hoped DNA testing would help to prove his innocence. However, the DNA evidence was of no assistance. In 1999, The FBI launched its National Fingerprint Database (“IAFIS.”) Yet, a 2009 search generated no matches to fingerprints from the crime scene that had not already been identified. In 2014, Next Generation Identification (NGI) replaced IAFIS. By 2016, NGI held approximately 72,000,000 criminal fingerprints and 50,000,000 civil fingerprints. A 2019 search of this ever-expanding database matched fingerprint evidence taken from the 1983 crime scene to the prints of a convicted rapist who had died in prison years before. Mr. Williams was innocent and was soon released through a joint filing by the State of Louisiana and Mr. Williams. His lawsuit against multiple defendants followed.

In response, the Forensic Defendants filed a Motion that advanced the “qualified immunity” granted to governmental officials. In opposition to the Motion, the plaintiff possessed the burden: 1) to raise a fact dispute on whether his constitutional rights were violated by the defendants’ individual conduct; and 2) to show those rights were “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. The Court found that the plaintiff did not meet this burden. Although Plaintiff alleged that certain fingerprint evidence had been “suppressed” in violation of the “Brady Rule,” the Court cited the robust factual record showing that the jury was fully aware that no fingerprint evidence identified Mr. Williams and that unidentified prints were present at the crime scene. The Court also rejected the claim that there was any fabricated exculpatory blood or serology evidence.

The facts in Williams highlight the great technological improvements since the early 1980s which now aid the court system, prosecutors, and defense attorneys to protect against the conviction of an innocent suspect. These facts also tell a sad human story of an individual who spent more than 30 years in jail for a crime he did not commit. While it does not replace the lost years, Louisiana has created a fund which provides some financial resources to wrongfully convicted individuals to help them re-enter society. Williams was able to take advantage of this fund.

References:

Archie Williams v. City of Baton Rouge, ET AL, United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana, No. 3:20-cv-00162.

The poet Robert Frost famously wrote that: “Good fences make good neighbors.” But what if there is a problem even fences won’t solve? Louisiana law offers some answers.

Under Louisiana law, a landowner cannot use their property in a manner that interferes with their neighbor’s enjoyable use. While a neighbor may have to put up with some inconveniences, excessive inconveniences that cause damage may be actionable. If a landowner’s activity is considered a nuisance, he may be liable for damages, and the court may require the landowner to stop the activity.

To determine whether a particular activity is considered a nuisance, courts look to the following factors: (1) the character of the neighborhood; (2) the degree of the intrusion; and, (3) its effect on the use and enjoyment of neighboring properties. For example, a person living in a heavy industrial area may have to put up with more noise than someone living in the suburbs. Whether activity is considered a nuisance is determined on a case-by-case basis.

Further, the nature of the noise and its persistence and duration can be a factor in determining whether the activity is a nuisance. For example, in Parish of E. Feliciana ex rel. E. Feliciana Parish Police Jury v. Guidry 2004-1197 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/10/05), 923 So. 2d 45, writ denied, 05-2288 (La. 3/10/06), 925 So. 2d 515, the court looked not only at the level of the noise, but also at the “nature” of the noise. The court held that noise from a motor cross track was a nuisance, likening the noise to a chainsaw, a buzzing bee, or a dentist drill.

Even when a landowner has a right to conduct a business on his property, he cannot create a nuisance in running the business. Louisiana courts have held that noxious smells, dust, debris, rats, flies, and noise may all constitute a nuisance, even if the business was otherwise lawful.

The duty owed to neighbors applies not only to the landowner, but may also apply to tenants or contractors performing “work” on the property. To prove a nuisance, the offended neighbor must show that the landowner/tenant/contractor either “knew or should have known” that the activity was a nuisance.

When mending fences is not possible, you may have other options.

Chelsea Payne is an associate at Keogh Cox and has been practicing for three years. Her practice mainly relates to construction law and complex litigation. Chelsea enjoys playing tennis and spending time with her family.

Generally, Louisiana Workers’ Compensation laws provide coverage for an employee who sustains personal injuries by an accident arising out of and in the course of his or her employment. La. R.S. 23:1021(1) defines “accident” as:

"An unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration."

In Rayborn, Sr. v. Continental Cement Company, LLC et al, the plaintiff-employee filed suit when the worker’s compensation carrier terminated benefits based on its assertion that the plaintiff’s left knee injury was not the result of an “accident” as defined in the statute. The evidence presented at trial established the following:

• After returning home from work one day, the plaintiff began to feel soreness behind his left knee and believed he “may have pulled a muscle.”
• The plaintiff sought medical attention at a local clinic 2 days later.
• The plaintiff told clinic staff that his “leg was hurting,” and that he “was at work climbing up and jumping down off of barges all week.”
• After returning from a pre-planned family trip one week later, the plaintiff told to his managers at work that he hurt his knee “some kind of way” and that he was “doing too much climbing up and jumping down from barges “and his knee “just started hurting.”
• The chart from follow-up clinic visits stated, “Patient had [an] injury while at work when he jumped from a height and later that day felt a discomfort in the left lateral knee.”
• Additional records noted the plaintiff “injured his knee on the job; however it was not readily apparent until [his] knee became stiff later that evening.”
• The plaintiff later consulted with an orthopedic surgeon whose initial chart entry stated, “Over the course of the week, his knee began bothering him in the patellofemoral area and it started to become tight and swollen.”

At the conclusion of trial, the workers’ compensation court ruled that the plaintiff successfully proved that he sustained a work-related injury of his left knee on a particular date by climbing and jumping while performing his work duties. On appeal, the workers’ compensation carrier argued that plaintiff’s assertion that he was injured “some kind of way” over the course of a week was not sufficient to meet the requirement of a specific, identifiable accident in the course and scope of employment under La. R.S. 23:1021(1).

In affirming the decision of the OWC judge, the appellate court highlighted numerous opinions from the Louisiana Supreme Court and other courts of appeal wherein the statutory definition of “accident” was liberally construed to reject an interpretation that excluded “those workers who are worn down, rather than immediately crippled by, their work.” The opinion notes that it is well-settled in the case law that an “accident” exists when “heavy lifting or other strenuous efforts, although usual and customary, cause or contribute to a physical breakdown or accelerate its occurrence because of a pre-existing condition.”

The opinion added, “It is presumed the legislature is aware of how Louisiana courts have interpreted the statute; yet, it has taken no steps to overrule more than thirty years of Louisiana jurisprudence.” In so holding, it is unclear whether the court considered La. R.S. 23:1020.1(D), in which the Legislature specifically rejected the jurisprudential doctrine requiring a liberal interpretation of Workers Compensation statutes in favor of an employee. Despite this statement from the Legislature on the construction of Workers Compensation statutes, the Rayborn opinion suggests that courts may continue to base their decisions on the liberal interpretation of “accident” that has been developed and adopted by Louisiana courts when analyzing what types of injuries are covered under Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law.

References:

Rayborn v. Cont'l Cement Co., LLC, 2023-0403 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/10/24), 2024 WL 132802.