Insight

Louisiana Supreme Court Rules on Bond an Insurer Must Post for Suspensive Appeal

Published on: December 3, 2024

A Louisiana litigant has a right to appeal a judgment rendered against it at trial and has two options to appeal the judgment. The litigant can take a suspensive appeal, which suspends the execution of the judgment pending the outcome of the appeal, or it can take a devolutive appeal, which does not. La. C.C.P. art. 2124 provides that when the judgment if for a sum of money, a party seeking a suspensive appeal must post security, or a bond, “equal to the amount of the judgment,” including interest.

What happens when a monetary judgment is cast against an insurer (and its insureds) and the amount of the judgment exceeds the limits of the insurer’s policy? Can the insurer be required to post bond in excess of its policy limits to suspensively appeal the judgment? The Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed this issue and ruled an insurer is required to post a security bond covering only its policy limits.

In Martinez v. Am. Transp. Grp. Risk Retention Grp., Inc., a jury cast judgment against a transportation group, its driver, and its insurer for damages the plaintiff sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The trial court rendered a judgment in the amount of $2,802,054.66, which was in excess of the $1,000,000 limits of the insurer’s policy. The insurer moved for a suspensive appeal and requested a reduced bond because its insured was no longer in existence and could not post a bond. Nevertheless, the trial court set the appeal bond at $2,802,054.66, plus interest. The insurer posted a bond in the amount of its policy limits plus interest and costs and sought appellate review of the trial court’s appeal bond order.

The Supreme Court observed that the contracts clauses of the federal and state constitutions prohibit the enactment of any law “impairing the obligation of contracts.” Therefore, the Court found that to require an insurer to post a bond for suspensive appeal in excess of its policy limits would render meaningless, and therefore impair, the terms of the insurance contract setting the policy’s limits. Thus, the Martinez court should have set security to allow the insurer to suspensively appeal the portion of the judgment up to its policy limit.

However, the Court refused to reduce the suspensive appeal bond for all the defendants cast in judgment. Instead, the Court ruled the insurer could suspensively appeal the judgment up to the amount of its policy limits, stay execution of that portion of the judgment, and devolutively appeal the remainder of the case for its insureds.

References:

Martinez v. Am. Transp. Grp. Risk Retention Grp., Inc., 2023-01716 (La. 10/25/24) 2024 WL 4579047.

Posted by:

Disclaimer

Keogh Cox & Wilson, Ltd. provides this blog as a public service for general information only. The materials contained herein may not reflect the most current legal developments or even express the opinion of all or even most of Keogh Cox attorneys. Such material does not constitute legal advice or form any attorney-client relationship. Keogh Cox and all contributing author(s) expressly disclaim all liability to any person with respect to the contents of this Web site and Blog and expect that no reliance will be made upon the information provided.

Continue Reading

Explore legal perspectives on the issues shaping Louisiana's key industries and courtrooms.

Insight

Hurricane Ida: Governor Extends Legal Deadlines

We previously reported that the Louisiana Supreme Court issued Orders suspending prescriptive, peremptive and abandonment periods for thirty days in the wake of Hurricane Ida. Governor John Bel Edwards has now issued a Proclamation. In addition to other actions, the Proclamation provides that legal deadlines applicable to “legal proceedings in all courts, administrative agencies, and boards” are suspended until September 24, 2021.

The Proclamation also authorizes hotels and motels to cancel reservations which would result in the displacement or eviction of first responders, health care workers, or anyone performing disaster-related work.

Insight

To Arbitrate or Not to Arbitrate: LA Supreme Court Rejects Federal Court Position

Hurricanes Laura and Delta caused substantial damage in Louisiana, resulting in extensive litigation that continues to develop. In a July 8, 2024 blog post, we reported that the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bufkin Enterprises, LLC v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., affirmed that equitable estoppel applied to allow domestic insurers to compel arbitration under the New York Convention even where the insured dismissed the foreign insurers with prejudice. Click here to read more.

New case law from the LA Supreme Court warrants supplementation of our prior blog post. The Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish (“Calcasieu”) filed suit in federal court to recover alleged underpaid and untimely insurance claim payments. Various domestic insurers moved to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration clauses found in two foreign insurers’ policies. The foreign policies required all claims be submitted to arbitration in New York under New York law. The insurers relied upon Bufkin Enterprises, LLC v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., and Calcasieu moved to certify questions to the LA Supreme Court.

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of LA certified questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court to address this issue. In Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court held:

  1. Arbitration is prohibited by statute. The case involved the interpretation of La. R.S. 22:868, as amended in 2020. Generally, La. R.S. 22:868(A) prohibits the use of arbitration clauses in insurance policies. The Court held this prohibition is rooted in public policy because compulsory arbitration clauses deprive courts of jurisdiction over actions against insurers. The Court noted it historically has held arbitration clauses within insurance policies are unenforceable, and it did not deviate from its historical position.
  1. As a matter of first impression, an insurance policy with a political subdivision is a “public contract” within meaning of the statute banning any provision in public contracts which requires a suit or arbitration proceeding to be brought in a forum or jurisdiction outside of the state. It was undisputed that Calcasieu is a political subdivision of this state. Also, it was undisputed the Defendants contracted with Calcasieu to provide insurance coverage for approximately 300 properties that Calcasieu owned for the benefit of the public. No private actors involved. Thus, the Court found, “The Defendants’ insurance policies clearly covered public properties owned by Calcasieu, purchased with public funds––taxpayer dollars. As such, we easily find insurance contracts with political subdivisions, like the policies at issue, are public contracts within the meaning of La. R.S. 9:2778.” Thus, the statute precludes arbitration or venue outside of LA, or the application of foreign law, in claims involving the State and its political subdivisions.
  1. A domestic insurer may not use equitable estoppel to enforce arbitration via a foreign insurer's policy. Citing its disagreement with the Federal Court’s ruling in Bufkin Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Indian Harbor Ins., the Court held “[E]quitable estoppel is not available under these circumstances because it conflicts with the positive law of La. R.S. 22:868, which prohibits the use of arbitration clauses in Louisiana-issued insurance policies. As such, domestic insurers may not employ this common law doctrine to compel arbitration through the clause of another insurer's policies, as it clearly contravenes La. R.S. 22:868(A)(2). A contrary finding would (1) violate Louisiana's positive law prohibiting arbitration in Louisiana-issued insurance policies; and (2) invite domestic insurers’ misuse a doctrine of ‘last resort’ to ceaselessly rely on insurance policies of foreign insurers to compel arbitration.”

References:

Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co., 2024 WL 4579035 (La.), 9, 2024-00449 (La. 10/25/24).

Bufkin Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co. 96 F.4th 726 (5th Cir. 2024).

Insight

To Err is Human, To Rescind-Declined

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed the impact of contractual "errors" in Cynthia Fry Perionnet and Elizabeth Fry Franklin v. Matador Resources Company, 2012-2292, 2012-2377, -- So. 3d --.

The Perionnet case involved a dispute over the intent of a contract to extend a mineral lease. The property owners believed that the lease was extended as to only 168.95 acres of nonproducing land. The defendant/lessors argued that the contract contemplated that the lease would extend to the entire 1850.34 acres to include producing wells. Plaintiffs/property owners argued that their unilateral error regarding the terms of the contract was ground for rescission. The jury ruled in favor of the defendant/lessors. The Court of Appeal reversed. The Supreme Court granted writs.

The Perionnet Court began its opinion with an overview of basic tenets of contract law. The Louisiana Civil Code defines a contract as "an agreement by two or more parties whereby obligations are created, modified, or extinguished." La. C.C. art. 1906. Contracts are formed through offer and acceptance. La. C.C. art. 1927. Once formed, contracts have "the effect of law for the parties and may be dissolved only through the consent of the parties or on grounds provided by law." La. C.C. art. 1983. One such "ground" under Louisiana law is "error." La. C.C. art. 1948.

The Louisiana Civil Code recognizes two forms of error: mutual error (both parties are mistaken) or unilateral error (only one party is mistaken). However, for either error to cause the dissolution of a contract, the error (1) must effect the cause of the obligation and (2) the other party must have known that the matter impacted by the error was the reason for the contract. La. C.C. art. 1949. In a case of mutual error, the court can reform the contract. Either partial or full rescission is the only remedy available for unilateral error. La. CC. art. 1952.

A party challenging a contract for unilateral error must also prove that the error was excusable. "Louisiana jurisprudence is sprinkled with cases which deny relief to the parties who claim an agreement should be invalidated because of unilateral error which is caused, in large part, by the complaining party's inexcusable ignorance, neglect or want of care." Id. p. 25.

The Perionnet Court found that the plaintiffs' alleged mistake was inexcusable. The defendants demonstrated that: 1) plaintiffs could show no excuse for failing to read and understand the contract; 2) plaintiffs' agents who negotiated and reviewed the contract were self-proclaimed experts in oil and gas; and 3) the original lease was on the plaintiffs' agent's own forms. The Court found a "sea of flags" in the written agreement that should have notified the experienced plaintiffs that the agreement extended to the entire property. Therefore, the Court found that the mistake was easily detectable and could have been rectified by a minimal amount of care, i.e. "by simply reading the document and/or requesting simple changes to the written offer before acceptance." Id. at 30.

The Supreme Court's Perionnet decision serves as a healthy reminder of a basic concept - read your contracts. Although to err may be human, it can affect your bottom line.

C. Reynolds LeBlanc

Partner
Civil Procedure
Insurance
Louisiana Supreme Court