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Can a Corporation Drive Drunk?: A Look at Employer Liability for Punitive Damages

Published on: July 5, 2016

The power to punish is generally the role of the criminal courts. Civil courts concern themselves with making a plaintiff "whole." In fact, it would be legal error for a civil court to impose recovery against a defendant as a form of punishment--with one notable exception. When "punitive damages" are allowed, a civil court may "punish" a defendant.

In Louisiana, punitive damages are only allowed when a statute specifically says they may be awarded. One of these statutes is La. Civil Code article 2315.4, which allows punitive damages when the plaintiff’s injuries were caused “by a defendant whose intoxication while operating a motor vehicle was a cause in fact of the resulting injuries.” Based upon the words used, punitive recovery for drunk driving would appear limited to recovery against the individual who was "operating a motor vehicle." However, what if the driver was intoxicated while “on the clock,” in the "course and scope" of his employment? Can his employer also be liable for punitive damages? Unfortunately, the answer to these questions is unclear and may vary depending upon where the case was filed.

The First and Third Circuits indicate that an employer should not be liable for these damages. In Darby v. Sentry Ins. Auto. Mut. Co., the First Circuit held that an employer could not be liable for punitive damages when its intoxicated employee was at fault for an accident, even when the employer was aware the employee had a history of alcohol abuse. The court reasoned that the principle of strict construction of punitive statutes prevented it from holding anyone other than the driver liable. 2007-0407 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/23/07), 960 So. 2d 226, writ denied, 2007-0638 (La. 3/28/07), 953 So. 2d 59. Similarly, in Romero v. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co., the Third Circuit ruled that an employer could only be liable for the compensatory damages caused by its employee, to the exclusion of punitive damages. 2010-338 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/29/10), 54 So. 3d 789, writ denied, 2011-0551 (La. 4/25/11), 62 So. 3d 96. A federal court decision from the Western District of Louisiana also supports this conclusion. See Lankford v. Nat'l Carriers Inc., 2015 WL 518736 (W.D. La. Feb. 6, 2015).

In contrast, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have found that an employer can be liable for its intoxicated employee’s punitive damages. The Fourth Circuit, offering little commentary, found that an employer could be responsible for damages caused by its employee’s acts, including punitive damages under art. 2315.4. See Curtis v. Rome, 98-0966 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/5/99), 735 So. 2d 822. Punitive damages were also awarded against an employer in a Fifth Circuit case, Levet v. Calais & Sons, Inc., 751 So.2d 153 (La. Ct. App. 1987). However, in Levet, the employer stipulated to liability and essentially agreed to be responsible for punitive damages.

While the Louisiana Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issue, language from Berg v. Zummo tends to indicate that the employer may not be liable for drunk-driving punitive damages. In Berg, the Supreme Court examined art. 2315.4 to determine whether a bartender could be liable for providing an intoxicated driver with alcohol prior to the accident. In that context, the Court held that art. 2315.4 did not extend to someone who “contributed to” the intoxication because that Article “reflects the legislature’s intent to penalize only the intoxicated driver.” 2000-1699 (La. 4/25/01), 786 So. 2d 708, 718. However, the Berg Court specifically acknowledged lower court decisions that permitted such liability for employers, reserving its judgment on that issue for another day.

So, if someone asks you whether a corporation can drive drunk, the proper answer may be this: depends on who you ask.

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THE “ATTORNEY-CLIENT” PRIVILEGE: How, When (and Why) the Communications between You and Your Attorney are Protected - Part 1

This blog is one of a two-part series regarding perhaps the most important aspect of the attorney-client relationship -- the attorney-client privilege. So, what is it and why is the privilege so important? In short, the attorney-client privilege is a legal doctrine that protects communications between a client and his or her attorney. Unlike most other relationships, the privilege stays in place even after the relationship is terminated. The purpose of the privilege is to allow clients to have open and honest communications with their attorney. LSA-L.C.E. art. 506. However, not all communications between a client and attorney are privileged and certain requirements must be met for the privilege to attach.

-Existence of Attorney-Client Relationship. An attorney-client relationship must be in place. Louisiana law does not require that the attorney be formally retained or payment made for the privilege to attach. The privilege may apply even when the client merely discusses a legal matter with an attorney when the client reasonably believes the attorney is acting as his or her attorney.

-Confidential Communications. While the communication can take many forms (oral, written, digital, etc.) it is protected only if it was intended to be confidential, which generally means that the communication was not intended to be disclosed to others not involved in the attorney-client relationship or the legal representation. For example, if a client meets with his attorney and brings a friend along, then the meeting may not be protected by the privilege. Because the privilege is for the protection of the client, the client may choose to intentionally waive the privilege, or may do so inadvertently through their actions.

-Legal Services. The communication must be related to obtaining or facilitating the legal services offered by the attorney. The privilege has been held to apply to the employees of the attorney and sometimes experts retained to assist in the case.

When applicable, the attorney-client privilege applies not only to what was said, but also to your attorney’s observations of your mental, emotional, and physical state at the time you communicate. The privilege does not generally apply to information gathered by the attorney from other sources; however, another doctrine, the “work product” doctrine, may nevertheless protect such information.It is important that clients understand that the privilege does not apply merely because the client chooses to involve the attorney in the communication. Generally, the privilege only applies when the communication was intended as confidential and to further the legal services offered by the attorney. In this way, the client may not be allowed to utilize the privilege where they include the attorney in a communication with a third-party that is not otherwise protected.While the attorney-client privilege safeguards the attorney-client relationship, ensures that clients can tell their attorney the things they need to know about a case, and assists the attorney to provide the best legal help possible, it is also subject to restrictions. These restrictions are explored in Part 2 of this series.

Insight

Click It: The Seat Belt Defense In Louisiana

Louisiana has exhibited a certain double standard when it comes to seat belts. For years, Louisiana participated in the “Click It or Ticket” public service campaign that lectured on the grave dangers caused by a failure to wear seat belts and the criminal consequences for a failure to comply. Nevertheless, and for decades, the failure to wear a seat belt was off limits as evidence to reduce a plaintiff’s recovery in a personal injury context. But, the rule was changed: effective January 1, 2021, the “gag rule” against evidence that a plaintiff failed to wear a seat belt in an accident has been lifted. La. R.S. 32:295.1. Louisiana has no recent history with the “seat belt defense,” such that many questions arise. To frame these questions, this blog takes a quick look to cases from other states and certain guideposts that may already exist in Louisiana jurisprudence.

Like several other states, Florida has a history with the defense. In Smith v. Butterick, 769 So.2d 1056, 1058-9 (Fla.2d DCA 2000), the court outlined three elements of proof a defendant must show to prevail on the defense. Similar elements have been identified in other states. See, e.g., Law v. Superior Court In and For Maricopa County, 157 Ariz. 147, 755 P.2d 1135 (1988). Louisiana may adopt similar elements or chart a different course. The elements outlined in Smith were as follows:

1-Failure to use an available, operational seat belt

This element can be proven through testimony from the plaintiff, passengers, responding law enforcement, or other such testimony or evidence to show that a seat belt was not in use at the time of the accident. Similarly, testimony or photographs may be used to show that the seat belt was operational.

2- Failure to use seat belt was unreasonable under the circumstances

Insofar as Louisiana and most states generally mandate the use of seatbelts, this element should be easy to demonstrate. Therefore, unusual facts may be necessary to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to use a seat belt such as an emergency trip to the hospital.

3-Plaintiff’s failure to use a seat belt substantially caused or contributed to the damages

Of the three possible elements, this is likely to be the battleground. In some cases, the issue may be simple. For instance, if a plaintiff’s failure to use a seatbelt allows their body to strike (or travel through) a windshield, it may be simple to show that the plaintiff’s (or decedent’s) failure to use a seatbelt magnified the injuries. Expert testimony may not even be needed. In Smith, testimony from a mechanical engineer that the passenger would not have hit interior surfaces had they used a seat belt was allowed. However, will expert testimony be required in most cases and what type of expert will be needed? Engineer? Physician? Biomechanical?

Will the defendant bear the burden to prove the aggravation like they have in many national cases? Will Louisiana courts fashion an inference or “shifting burden” approach where a prima facie showing that a plaintiff’s whose failure to wear a seat belt increased the possibility of injury would possess the burden to show their injuries would have occurred even had they used a seat belt. In Anderson v. Watson, 953 P. 2d 1284 (Colo. 1998), the court required the defendant to only show a prima facie case of seat belt nonuse to allow the fact of nonuse to go to the jury.

Seat belts are required because they can prevent or lessen injury. Does a defendant have to show the precise details as to how seat belt nonuse caused or magnified the injury? In Louisiana, these answers remain unclear; but these are some of the questions.

Further complications are present in cases involving alleged traumatic brain injury (TBI) and the new frontier of vestibular injuries. Louisiana courts have often rejected testimony from accident reconstruction or bio-mechanical experts for a variety of reasons, but with this statutory defense, such testimony may be critical to determine who is responsible for an alleged catastrophic loss. States that recognize this rule have examined many factors that relate to the injuries that arise from the failure to use a seatbelt. As such, it seems inevitable that expert testimony on this issue must be considered in many nonuse cases.

No doubt, many of these questions will be the subject of litigation arising from accidents which occur after January 1, 2021. Louisiana’s double standard has ended. What is certain is that a failure to wear a seat belt now has the potential to harm not only a plaintiff’s health, but also their chances of recovery in civil litigation.

Collin is a Keogh Cox partner who litigates injury, commercial, and legal malpractice disputes. He lives in nearby Zachary, Louisiana with his wife Melissa and three all too active children. He is an outdoorsman, a tennis player, a cook, and a hobbyist writer.

This blog was written in partnership with John P Wolff, III.

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Louisiana Court Limits Use of Biomechanical Expert Testimony

The use of biomechanical expert testimony in Louisiana courts has evolved over the last few years. A recent decision from the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal provides an example of the changing standards for the admissibility of biomechanical expert testimony and its relation to medical causation.

In Pollard v. 21st Century Centennial Ins. Co., 21-65 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/21), 334 So. 3d 1013, writ denied, 2022-00163 (La. 4/20/22), the defendants argued that the underlying accident involved a minor rear-end impact not likely to cause injury. The defendants hired a biomechanical expert who was also a medical doctor. The expert performed an “impact severity analysis” to determine the force of impact in the collision.

The expert concluded that the accident involved a minimum damage collision; he relied upon the “force reflection method” and test data at his crash test facility to determine how fast the rear-ending vehicle would have traveled to cause the damage present on the plaintiff’s vehicle. Based upon his findings, the expert opined that the plaintiff was not seriously injured in the collision. He went further to testify that specific injuries could not have been caused by the forces involved.

The Fifth Circuit noted the same expert was previously excluded in a case that went to the Louisiana Supreme Court in Blair v. Coney, 2019-00795 (La. 4/3/20), reh'g denied, 2019-00795 (La. 7/9/20), 298 So. 3d 168, where the Court found the expert’s testimony to be based upon insufficient facts or data. In Blair, the Supreme Court found the expert’s testimony should be excluded because he did not (1) inspect either vehicle involved in the collision; (2) speak with the damage appraisers; (3) know the plaintiff’s body position at the time of the accident; (4) inspect plaintiff’s vehicle for variance from the test-vehicle or (5) interview the plaintiff. Thus, his testimony failed to meet the requirements of C.E. art. 702(A)(2).

Citing the Blair decision, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit in Pollard concluded that the expert “relied on the same [improper] methodology in reaching his conclusions.” Therefore, the appellate court found the trial court erred in denying a motion in limine to exclude the expert’s testimony. Although the expert cited to peer-reviewed literature to support his conclusions, the evidence revealed that “most of the research and articles” he cited were either written by him or one of his employees.

Effective January 1, 2021, Louisiana amended La. R.S. 32.295.1, which now allows the admission of a plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat belt as a factor to be considered in comparative fault. Defendants will seek to use biomechanical experts to prove that the failure to use a seatbelt substantially caused or contributed to the damages.

Biomechanical testimony may be allowed. However, as shown in Pollard, biomechanical opinions which lack sufficient inquiry to match the analysis to the real-world impact will be treated with skepticism. Taking Blair and Pollard together, the courts appear to resist expert biomechanical opinions which seek to definitively resolve medical causation which often involves subjective elements and credibility determinations reserved for the trier of fact.

It is certain that defendants will continue to advance the “low impact” argument because force-of-impact testimony is a relevant factor in determining causation or extent of injuries. See, e.g., Merrells v. State Farm Mutual Auto, Ins. Co., 33-404 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/21/00), 764 So. 2d 1182. What is less than certain is the role of the biomechanical expert. Following the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Pollard, the Louisiana Supreme court denied the defendant’s writ application 4 to 3, with all three dissenters advising they would have granted the writ. Issues surrounding the use and scope of testimony from biomechanical experts appear far from settled.

C. Reynolds LeBlanc

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Attorney
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