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Fourth Circuit Brings Clarity to Peremption Statute in Suit Against Design Professional

Published on: February 15, 2016

The question addressed in MR Pittman Group, LLC versus Plaquemines Parish Government, 2015-0396 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/2/15) was whether the five-year peremptive period set by La. R.S. 9:5607 displaces Louisiana’s general one-year prescriptive period set by La. C.C. art. 3492, when applied to tort claims against design professionals. Finding a contractor’s claim against the project engineers prescribed, the MR Pittman court held that the one-year prescriptive period governs tort claims against design professionals.

La. R.S. 9:5607 explicitly provides a peremptive period that extinguishes all claims against architects, engineers and other design professionals five years after the project is completed, thus limiting design professional liability associated with the project. The MR Pittman plaintiff/contractor argued that the statute also eliminates the one-year prescriptive period and instead creates a special five-year prescriptive period, which allowed the contractor up to five years to bring its claim against the engineers to recover for delay and other extra costs allegedly resulting from deficiencies in the construction plans. This interpretation effectively expands tort liability by increasing the time period for bringing a tort claim from one to five years. In rejecting this argument, the MR Pittman court clarified that under the statute any claimant has no more than five years after project completion to bring suit against the design professional for any cause. However, a tort claimant still has only one year to file suit from the date he “knew or should have known” of damage caused by the alleged wrongful actions of the design professional.

A secondary question addressed in MR Pittman was the date of commencement of the one-year prescriptive period, which under La. C.C. 3492 commences to run from the day damage is sustained. The defendant/engineers argued that prescription commenced when the contractor first became aware of the alleged design deficiencies early in construction, as evidenced by the contractor’s notice to the owner of the deficiencies. The contractor argued that it could not fully appreciate its damages until the change orders were resolved later in the project. Citing Louisiana Supreme Court precedent holding that the quantum of damages need not be certain or fully incurred to trigger commencement of prescription, Harvey v. Dixie Graphics, Inc., 593 So.2d 351, 354 (La. 1992), the court agreed with the engineers’ position and dismissed the claims.

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Supreme Court Clarifies Requirements of Unjust Enrichment Claim

Under Louisiana law, unjust enrichment is a cause of action that is based in equity and provides that no one should be enriched at the expense of another. The elements of an unjust enrichment claim are: (1) an enrichment; (2) an impoverishment; (3) a connection between the enrichment and the impoverishment; (4) an absence of justification or cause for the enrichment and impoverishment; and (5) no other available remedy at law. The Supreme Court recently addressed the fourth element regarding the absence of justification for the enrichment.

In H & O Invs., LLC v. Par. of Jefferson Through Sheng, a grass cutting contractor entered into a contract with the Parish for grass cutting in certain areas. The Parish separately contracted with a second contractor for weed control of the same areas. During the contract period, the grass cutting contractor notified the Parish that there was unanticipated weed growth and suggested that the weed control contractor was not properly applying the herbicide. The grass cutting contractor alleged that its work became more expensive because of the weed control contractor’s failure to perform its contractual obligation.

The grass cutting contractor sued the Parish alleging unjust enrichment. The Parish filed an exception of no cause of action, claiming that there was no claim for unjust enrichment because a contract existed between the parties. The Fifth Circuit disagreed and held that the contractor could bring a claim for unjust enrichment because there was no contractual claim between the contractor and the Parish, as both parties fulfilled their contract obligations.

The Supreme Court reversed, noting that a claim for unjust enrichment requires a showing that there was an “absence of justification or cause for the enrichment.” The Supreme Court held that when a contract exists between the parties, it serves as the law between them, and that contract is the legal cause or justification for the enrichment. Therefore, the contract between the contractor and the Parish was in fact the justification for the enrichment such that it could not be “unjust.” The Supreme Court dismissed the contractor’s suit against the Parish.

Reference:

H&O Invs., LLC v. Par. of Jefferson, 24-554 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/18/24), writ granted, decision rev'd sub nom. H & O Invs., LLC v. Par. of Jefferson Through Sheng, 2025-00086 (La. 5/20/25), 408 So.3d 958.

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Mary Anne Wolf will present Construction Insurance at the LSU and LSBA Construction Law CLE Program.

Mary Anne Wolf will present Construction Insurance at the LSU and LSBA Construction Law CLE Program on September 20, 2024.

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What ifs….. Indemnifying Premises Liability Exposure

If you are a property owner, stop and think about the “what ifs” before you enter into a lease with a property manager or lessee. For example, what if an invitee of the property that you own is hurt while on and/or because of a condition on the property? Who is responsible?

A property owner may be able to transfer its potential liability to a property manager or lessee of the property if the lease contains an indemnification provision. However, not all indemnification provisions are enforceable, and these critical provisions are often litigated.

The Eastern District Court of Louisiana recently enforced an indemnification provision, granting summary judgment to a landowner who sought indemnification from its property lessee in Avila v. Village Mart, LLC, Civ. A. No. 20-1850, 2021 WL 4439579 (E.D. La. 9/28/21). In the case, a shopping center leased retail space to a men’s store. Before the store opened, a painter was injured when he fell from a ladder. The owner of the shopping center argued that the lessee owed a defense. It argued indemnity applied because the plaintiffs’ claims arose out of the lessee’s buildout construction, over which the owner did not have any care, custody, or control.

In response, the lessee argued that the owner was not entitled to indemnification because the plaintiffs’ claims did not “arise out of or were connected with Tenant’s use, occupancy, management or control of the Leased Premises.” The lessee claimed that it was not using, occupying, managing, or controlling the leased space because the only permitted use of the space was to sell menswear, and the space was not being used for this purpose at the time of the accident.

Louisiana courts often apply a “but for” causation test to such “arising out of” language in indemnity provisions. Avila, 2021 WL 4439579, at *5, citing Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., No. 06-03, 2010 WL 1293340, at *6 (W.D. La. Mar. 29, 2010), and Perkins v. Rubicon, Inc., 563 So.2d 258, 259-60 (La. 1990). The court observed the lessee’s arguments contradicted language in the lease that allowed the lessee to use and occupy the store before it opened to the public. The lease also explained that the lessee was responsible for certain construction work and identified specific dates to begin work and to open the store. Thus, the lease contemplated use and occupancy before the store was open to the public. The court found that the lessee’s possession of the space and its construction obligations under the lease established its use and occupancy of the space. The court stated:

Given the broad language in the indemnity agreement – ‘arising out of or connected with’ – [the plaintiffs’] injuries, resulting from his work as a subcontractor painting the premises leased by [the retail space lessee,] are connected to [its] use and occupancy of the premises. … Because [the retail space lessee] was in possession of the space, and had assumed responsibility for the buildout and for contractors and subcontractors working on the buildout, the Court finds that the plaintiffs’ liability theories fall within the scope of the indemnity provision in the lease. Avila, 2021 WL 4439579, at *6.

The enforceability of indemnity provisions such as the one examined in Avila will continue to be litigated. In the meantime, Avila reminds us of the importance of sound indemnity language to anticipate the “what ifs.”