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Insight
Governor Issues 2025 Insurance Reforms
During week seven of the 2025 Regular Session, Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry signed the following bills into law:
HB450 legislatively overrules Housley v. Cerise, 579 So. 2d 973 (La. 1991) (which provided a presumption of medical causation where plaintiff had no pre-existing history) and became effective upon signature by the governor. The Act has prospective application only and shall not apply to causes of action arising prior to the effective date.
HB434 modifies “No Pay/No Play” and bars uninsured motorists from recovering for the first $100,000.00 of bodily injury and the first $100,000.00 of property damage based on any cause or right of action arising out of an automobile accident. The Act allows for an uninsured motorist, who institutes an action to recover damages, regardless of fault, and is awarded an amount equal to or less than $100,000.00, to be held liable for all court costs incurred by all parties to the action. The Act’s effective date is August 1, 2025.
HB436 bars unauthorized aliens from recovering general damages and past and future wages for damages arising from an automobile accident. The Act does not apply to a claim made against an uninsured or underinsured motorist policy which names the unauthorized alien as an insured. The Act’s effective date is August 1, 2025.
HB431 provides for modified comparative fault and bars claimants, who are found greater than or equal to 51% at fault, from recovering for damages. If fault attributable to the claimant is less than 51%, the amount recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the fault attributable to the claimant. The bill does not say whether this applies only to auto claims. We expect this will be clarified. The Act’s effective date is January 1, 2026.
HB549 requires a premium discount for policyholders of commercial motor vehicles with installed dashboard cameras and telematic systems and who meet the other requirements enumerated in the Act. The Act’s effective date is January 1, 2026.
HB148 requires insurance companies to display prior premium amounts in close proximity to the renewal premium. The Act also provides for rate filing standards and methods and changes the process by which the insurance commissioner can disapprove a rate if he determines it is excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory. The Act’s effective date is August 1, 2025.
Insurance
Liability
Louisiana
News
Christopher K. Jones was named the Best Lawyers® 2026 Mass Tort Litigation/Class Action – Defendants “Lawyer of the Year” in Baton Rouge.
Keogh Cox partner, Christopher K. Jones, was named the Best Lawyers® 2026 Mass Tort Litigation/Class Action – Defendants “Lawyer of the Year” in Baton Rouge.
Best Lawyers | Top-Rated Attorneys Near Me | Purely Peer Reviewed® Lawyer Rankings
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News
Six Keogh Cox attorneys are recognized in the 2026 editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch in America®.
We are pleased to announce that six Keogh Cox attorneys are recognized in the 2026 editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch in America®.
Lawyers on The Best Lawyers in America® list are divided by geographic region and practice areas. They are reviewed by their peers based on professional expertise and undergo an authentication process to make sure they are in current practice and good standing.
Best Lawyers | Top-Rated Attorneys Near Me | Purely Peer Reviewed® Lawyer Rankings
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Insight
Supreme Court Clarifies Requirements of Unjust Enrichment Claim
Under Louisiana law, unjust enrichment is a cause of action that is based in equity and provides that no one should be enriched at the expense of another. The elements of an unjust enrichment claim are: (1) an enrichment; (2) an impoverishment; (3) a connection between the enrichment and the impoverishment; (4) an absence of justification or cause for the enrichment and impoverishment; and (5) no other available remedy at law. The Supreme Court recently addressed the fourth element regarding the absence of justification for the enrichment.
In H & O Invs., LLC v. Par. of Jefferson Through Sheng, a grass cutting contractor entered into a contract with the Parish for grass cutting in certain areas. The Parish separately contracted with a second contractor for weed control of the same areas. During the contract period, the grass cutting contractor notified the Parish that there was unanticipated weed growth and suggested that the weed control contractor was not properly applying the herbicide. The grass cutting contractor alleged that its work became more expensive because of the weed control contractor’s failure to perform its contractual obligation.
The grass cutting contractor sued the Parish alleging unjust enrichment. The Parish filed an exception of no cause of action, claiming that there was no claim for unjust enrichment because a contract existed between the parties. The Fifth Circuit disagreed and held that the contractor could bring a claim for unjust enrichment because there was no contractual claim between the contractor and the Parish, as both parties fulfilled their contract obligations.
The Supreme Court reversed, noting that a claim for unjust enrichment requires a showing that there was an “absence of justification or cause for the enrichment.” The Supreme Court held that when a contract exists between the parties, it serves as the law between them, and that contract is the legal cause or justification for the enrichment. Therefore, the contract between the contractor and the Parish was in fact the justification for the enrichment such that it could not be “unjust.” The Supreme Court dismissed the contractor’s suit against the Parish.
Reference:
H&O Invs., LLC v. Par. of Jefferson, 24-554 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/18/24), writ granted, decision rev'd sub nom. H & O Invs., LLC v. Par. of Jefferson Through Sheng, 2025-00086 (La. 5/20/25), 408 So.3d 958.
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Construction
Contracts
Louisiana
News
Mary Anne Wolf will present Discovery in Arbitration at the Baton Rouge Bar Association Construction Law section meeting on August 14, 2025.
Mary Anne Wolf will present Discovery in Arbitration at the Baton Rouge Bar Association Construction Law section meeting on August 14, 2025. You can register online at brba.org. CLE credit is available.
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Insight
Third-Party Criminal activity: Is Summary Judgment Available in a Premises Liability case?
The liability of a premises owner for third-party criminal acts has been the subject of many decisions issued by the Louisiana Supreme Court. But recently, the Court clarified how to analyze this issue in the context of summary judgment. In Campbell v. Orient-Express Hotels Louisiana, Inc. (Windsor Court), the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and held that Windsor Court was not liable for a robbery that occurred in its courtyard.
The factual background is simple: Campbell was a frequent guest at the Windsor Court. He decided to approach a vehicle near the entrance to the courtyard when he pulled a “substantial amount of cash” to show the female occupants in the vehicle. He placed the money back in his pocket and talked with them for one minute and forty-six seconds. When he pulled the cash from his pocket a second time, one of the occupants grabbed the cash and the vehicle sped away dragging him with it. Campbell then sued the Windsor Court alleging negligence, strict liability, failure to warn, failure to ensure the safety of its guests, etc.
The importance of this decision is found in how the Court analyzed the case to reach its conclusion that summary judgment was proper: The Court noted that it was not modifying prior duty/risk analysis but was clarifying how the analysis is to be conducted—The issues of “duty” and “scope of duty” are separate inquiries that require separate analysis.
In Campbell, the Court acknowledged that “duty” is a question of law for the court. It then concluded that “(w)hether a particular risk falls within the scope of that duty, by contrast, ‘is fact sensitive and ultimately turns on a question of policy as to whether the particular risk falls within the scope of that duty.’” However, the court continued, “‘(t)he determination of legal cause/scope of the duty involves a purely legal question.’” The Court conducted an historical analysis noting that prior decisions had “merged the concept of duty and scope of duty into a single consideration.”
On the threshold question of duty, the Court acknowledged that in the context of third-party criminal activity, Windsor Court, as an innkeeper, owed a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect its patrons from criminal acts of third parties. Having found this duty, the Court then concluded that “Campbell cannot meet the ‘scope of the duty’ element of his claim.” In other words, “the scope of the duty owed by the Windsor Court did not encompass the risk of the particular harm and Injury Mr. Campbell suffered.”
Here the court asked whether this particular risk and injury were “foreseeable.” The Court examined multiple factors to find that the robbery was not foreseeable, but the Court further noted “perhaps even more important to our decision is the manner in which the robbery occurred.” Campbell was not unexpectedly accosted, but his own actions placed him in peril. As such, the Court found no “ease of association” between Windsor Court’s duty to take reasonable precautions to protect its guests and the risk that the guest would voluntarily approach an unknown vehicle and flash a sizable pile of cash.
Justice Crain concurred in the opinion and noted that “scope of duty can be resolved on summary judgment if reasonable persons could not disagree that the manner of the injury is either within or beyond the scope of the duty.” Justice Crain also noted that the manner of injury must be analyzed in the context of “foreseeability” from the perspective of the premises owner and have an “ease of association” between the duty and the manner of injury—this analysis is necessary to “avoid making a defendant the insurer of all persons against all harms.” Thus, he agreed with the majority that Campbell was unable to establish the scope of duty element.
Reference:
Campbell v. Orient-Express Hotels Louisiana, Inc., 2024-00840 (La. 3/21/25), 403 So. 3d 573.
Louisiana Supreme Court
Summary Judgment
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Insight
Impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc. on Universal Injunctions and Class Actions
On June 27, 2025, in an Opinion authored by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, the United States Supreme Court determined that “universal injunctions,” injunctions issued by district judges that apply nationwide, “likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has given to federal courts.” In Trump v. CASA, Inc., the Supreme Court, with a 6-3 vote, concluded that district courts do not have authority to issue universal injunctions which seek to prohibit the enforcement of a law or policy against anyone nationwide. The decision limits the relief afforded by the district courts in consolidated matters to only the parties in those actions.
By prohibiting the use of “universal injunctions” in federal courts, litigants already have started to utilize another procedure to seek the relief they seek – class actions. Class actions are a special procedure provided by both federal and state law that allows one or more class representatives to file suit and seek to represent the interests of other similarly situated individuals or companies. Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Trump v. CASA, Inc., a single litigant could apply for a universal injunction through an individual action. Now that the Supreme Court has declared that process unavailable for application of an injunction nationwide, class actions may be the procedural process litigants attempt to use to achieve that same purpose. It remains to be seen whether class actions will be an effective way to achieve broader relief for individuals impacted by government policies.
References:
Trump v. CASA, Inc., --- S.Ct. ---, No. 24A884, 2025 WL 1773631 (U.S. June 27, 2025).
Class Actions
Litigation
Supreme Court
Insight
Courts Address Circumstances that Support Summary Judgment Dismissing Claims of Bad Faith Against Insurers
Courts around Louisiana continue to address factual scenarios for when summary judgment on an insured’s first party bad faith claim may be appropriate.
In Creamer Brothers Inc. et al. v. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin, the federal court for the Western District of Louisiana addressed an insured’s claim for bad faith penalties and attorney’s fees arising out of an insurance claim for damages sustained in a February 2021 ice storm. The pertinent timeline is as follows:
- February 22, 2021: Date of Loss/Ice Storm
- February 26, 2021: Adjuster inspects property
- April 9, 2021: Adjuster completes estimate
- April 15, 2021: Insurer issues payment
- August 6, 2021: Insured submits damages estimate
- August 26, 2021: Insurer reinspects property with engineer
- September 24, 2021: Engineer submits report to Insurer
- October 7, 2021: Insurer prepares new estimate
- October 11, 2021: Insurer tenders supplemental payment
- October 12, 2022: Suit filed
The insurer argued summary judgment was appropriate because its damage assessment created a reasonable, well-founded dispute regarding the extent of damage caused by the ice storm. Plaintiff disagreed, arguing bad faith attached because the insurer relied solely on its own expert reports which they argued amounted to an investigation that was so inadequate it could be deemed unreasonable.
The Court sided with the insurer, granting its summary judgment. In so holding, the Court relied on the portion of La. R.S. 22:1892 which provides an insurer’s conduct must be “arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause” for bad faith to attach. Specifically, the Court stated, “the fact that the parties’ experts reached different conclusions in their respective assessments gives rise to a dispute in the extent of Plaintiffs’ coverage, but does not illustrate a genuine issue of fact as to General Casualty’s ‘bad faith.’”
The Court noted the insurer sufficiently communicated with the insured, provided the insured with multiple expert reports containing their data and conclusions, and “ultimately made payments to Plaintiffs in accordance with those conclusions.” Plaintiff failed to point to evidence General Casualty’s conduct was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause, “despite yielding unsatisfactory results.”
In a case out of the Eastern District, Gentilly, LLC v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., the Court similarly relied on plaintiff’s failure to establish a general issue of material fact to show the insurer’s conduct was “arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.” The Gentilly case arose out of the plaintiff’s insurance claim for damages sustained to its commercial shopping center during Hurricane Ida. The parties engaged in a series of inspections, estimates, expert reports, payments, and supplemental payments over the course of about thirteen months, followed by several months of inactivity, then another period of investigation and adjustment over the course of about nineteen months.
Plaintiff argued the insurer’s 43-day delay in its first payout, failure to have an engineer inspect the property for a year, and gross under-evaluation of the damages as evidenced by its supplemental tender supported its bad faith claim. The Court disagreed.
In support of its conclusion, the Court noted the insurer advised plaintiff the inspection would take multiple days, and the delay in issuing payment arose out of the inspectors’ availability. The Court noted the insurer’s actions were “consistently in line with its expert appraisals.” In conclusion, the Court stated, “[t]hough the payout process was protracted by the scope and complexity of the insured loss, plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material facts indicating that State Farm’s actions were arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.”
Louisiana courts have not established a bright-line rule for determining when summary judgment is appropriate on an insured’s bad faith claim. However, these cases seem to suggest that continued adjustment over a period of time may not give rise to bad faith claims where an insured cannot cite to evidence an insurer’s conduct was “arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause.”
References:
Creamer Brothers Inc. et al. v. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin, No. 22-cv-6110, 2025 WL 818579 (W.D. La. Mar. 13, 2025).
Gentilly, LLC v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 23-cv-262, 2024 WL 5246606 (E.D. La. Dec. 30, 2024).
Property
Summary Judgment
Bad Faith
Insurance
News
Keogh Cox is pleased to announce that our firm has been ranked in the 2025 edition of Chambers USA in Construction.
Keogh Cox is pleased to announce that our firm has been ranked in the 2025 edition of Chambers USA in Construction. Thank you to our clients for your support and confidence in us. Congratulations to our Construction Group for their outstanding work: John P. Wolff, III, Mary Anne Wolf, Tori S. Bowling, Brian T. Butler, and Chelsea A. Payne.
Keogh, Cox & Wilson, Ltd, Construction | Chambers USA Profile
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Insight
Arbitration Awards: U.S. Fifth Circuit Confirms Judicial Deference
Arbitration is a favored method of dispute resolution in the energy and construction sectors, where complex, high-value contracts often generate multimillion-dollar disputes. Understanding the courts' standard of review of arbitration awards directly impacts risk assessment, contract drafting, and dispute resolution strategies. A recent U.S. Fifth Circuit decision reinforces the limited grounds for judicial intervention, a principle that remains central to the effectiveness of arbitration as an efficient alternative to litigation.
In United States Trinity Services, LLC v. Southeast Directional Drilling, LLC, a drilling subcontractor obtained a $1.7 million arbitration award against the general contractor for standby costs incurred on a pipeline installation project. The subcontractor incurred costs when ordered to stop work for causes outside its control, including delayed permits, mud infiltration, and COVID-19. The subcontract contained a provision that called for reimbursement of standby costs. On appeal, the general contractor sought to vacate the award in the U.S. Northern District of Texas, arguing that the arbitration panel failed to properly interpret various contract provisions related to standby costs and exceeded its authority and acted in manifest disregard of Texas law in interpreting the contract.
The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC §10 (“FAA”) applies and provides the exclusive grounds to vacate an award: corruption, fraud, evident partiality, misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, refusing to hear evidence, or where arbitrators exceeded their powers. The U. S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the FAA was enacted to create a national policy favoring arbitration; the arbitrator’s authority derives from the parties’ contract; and once parties agree to arbitrate, they “bargain for” the arbitrator’s, not the court’s, interpretation of their contract.
The Court instructed that a party challenging an award bears a high burden to show that the arbitrator ignored the contract. It is not sufficient to show the arbitrator erred in interpreting the contract. The question the court asks is “whether the arbitrators construed the contract at all” not “whether they construed it correctly.” A court should not reassess the merits of the arbitrator’s decision. Here, the award recited the pertinent contract terms and the arbitrators’ analysis. This showed the arbitrators considered the contract provisions, thus ending the Court’s inquiry.
The Court rejected the argument that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law in interpreting the contract. “Manifest disregard” – a judicially-created concept – is not a freestanding ground for vacatur. It does not serve as a separate basis to establish that arbitrators exceeded their powers. Otherwise, the FAA’s stated grounds for vacatur would be expanded to essentially a “full-bore” judicial review process.*
However, the Circuits are split on the validity of manifest disregard of the law or contract as a basis to vacate an award. See for example, Dewan v. Walia, where the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated an award after finding the arbitrator’s contract interpretation ‘untenable.”
Mary Anne Wolf, PE, FCIArb, is an arbitrator, mediator, and attorney in construction, energy, commercial and complex cases.
References:
United States Trinity Services, LLC v. Southeast Directional Drilling, LLC, 2025 WL 1218096 (5th Cir. 2025).
Dewan v. Walia, 544 Fed Appx 240 (4th Cir. 2013).
* Hall Street Assoc., LLC v. Mattel, 128 S.Ct. 1396 (2008).
Arbitration
Award
Construction
Energy
Exceed Powers
Federal Arbitration Act
Manifest Disregard
US Fifth Circuit
Vacate
Vacatur
Insight
Court Confirms Changes to Direct Action Statute Apply to Cases Filed After August 1, 2024
In 2024, the Louisiana Legislature revised La. R.S. 22:1269, the Louisiana Direct Action Statute, to provide an injured person “shall have no right of direct action against the insurer” unless one of several exceptions applies. This legislation took effect on August 1, 2024. Since its effective date, litigants in Louisiana have debated whether this change to the law was substantive or procedural. If the amendment were procedural, it would apply to all cases filed after August 1, 2024. If substantive, the changes would only apply when the accident occurred after August 1, 2024.
While several Federal Court cases previously addressed this issue, no Louisiana appellate court had done so until the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal issued its ruling in Hurel v. National Fire and Marine Ins. Co., et at.
In Hurel, the plaintiff filed suit on October 1, 2024, naming the insurer and other parties as defendants in a case filed in connection with a motor vehicle accident. The insurer filed an Exception of No Right of Action, Motion to Strike, and a Motion in Limine, on the basis that the amendment to the Direct Action Statute prohibited the plaintiff from (1) naming the insurer in the case caption and (2) presenting evidence of insurance coverage at trial. In response, the plaintiff argued that the amendment could not apply because the accident occurred before the effective date of the statutory amendment. The trial court denied the exception, the motion to strike and the motion in limine.
On appellate review, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit cited prior jurisprudence that routinely found the Direct Action Statute granted a procedural right of action against an insurer where the plaintiff has a substantive cause of action against the insured. The Court found the recent amendments “removed the procedural right of action against an insurer.” The plaintiff had a procedural right of action, but it became operative only when, and if, that right was invoked timely— that is before the amendment went into effect.
After August 1, 2024, the plaintiff had no right or interest in a direct action against the insurer. Thus, because the plaintiff did not have a statutory right of direct action against the insurer, the Court granted the insurer’s exception. For the same reasons, the court of appeal also granted the insurer’s Motion in Limine to prevent plaintiff from disclosing insurance coverage to the jury and granted its Motion to Strike the insurer’s name from the case caption.
Reference:
Hurel v. Nat'l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2025-0049 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/11/25), --- So.3d ---, 2025 WL 762645.
Direct Action
Insurance
Insurer